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Abstract 
With the rise of attacks on digital systems, organizations have started 
demanding security from the software they use. To comply with these 
requirements, software vendors have adopted various secure software 
engineering practices that enhance the regular development activities. There 
is a specific class of practices, called security design analysis, that is 
particularly challenging to integrate into agile development. Security design 
analysis examines the design of software or its component to assess its 
security posture and recommends changes and additional work to enhance it. 
While cost-efficient, as it resolves vulnerabilities before they are introduced 
into the software, practitioners and researchers highlight low adoption rates 
and inefficient execution of these methods. Part of the problem lies in the 
specific set of expertise required to practice them efficiently, which differs 
from regular software engineering. Additionally, several applicability issues 
arise when introducing traditional security design analysis into the agile 
workflow, including complexity, unaccountability of work, and lack of 
guidance. Through this research, we address these issues. 
We examine different teaching techniques to determine which support better 
learning outcomes for security design analysis. We find the case study 
analysis and the hybrid flipped classroom teaching methods suitable for our 
context and combine them to construct a framework for generating training 
workshops dedicated to teaching security design analysis. Through a 
controlled experiment, we evaluate our approach and demonstrate that threat 
models of higher quality are produced by trainees that attended the 
framework-formulated workshops, as opposed to the traditional workshops 
covering the same topics. 
To address the applicability issues of complexity, unaccountability, and lack 
of guidance, we create a process around the security design analysis method. 
This process enables the incremental development of threat models as the 
software changes, where organizations can tailor the process according to 
their needs, to define and prioritize security work accordingly. We evaluate 
our approach through a comparative analysis with similar methods found in 
literature, as well as through two case study implementations of the process 
where we demonstrate the tailoring of the process and its execution on real-
world user stories. 
Finally, we combine both methods into a process for integrating software 
security design analysis to the agile development process, to construct the 
baseline threat models and set up the foundation for the continuous 
improvement of the security design analysis. 
 
viii 
Keywords: security design analysis, threat modeling, secure software 
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security 
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Rezime 
Digitalna revolucija je u proteklim decenijama rezultovala širokom 
primenom računara i softvera u rešavanju raznih problema u raznim 
oblastima. Vlade, organizacije i pojedinci sve više zavise od softverskih 
rešenja koja rade sa osetljivim podacima i funkcijama (Gandhi i drugi, 2011). 
Dodatno, kriminal i terorizam pronalaze svoje mesto u digitalnom svetu. 
Krađa podataka, sabotaža softvera i ugrožavanje njegovih korisnika je 
postala stvar svakodnevnice. Zbog ovoga, vlade i organizacije sve više ulažu 
u bezbednost svojih sistema, što uključuje i bezbednost softvera koji kupuju 
(Salini i Kanmani, 2012). Naime, organizacije zahtevaju od proizvođača 
softvera da razviju bezbedan softver. 
Razvoj bezbednog softvera se postiže primenom niza bezbednosnih 
aktivnosti kroz čitav životni ciklus razvoja softvera, od njegovog 
koncipiranja, preko dizajna i implementacije, pa sve do verifikacije i 
postavke u produkciju (Howard i Lipner, 2006). Jedan podskup ovih 
aktivnosti se bavi inženjeringom bezbednosnih zahteva, što podrazumeva 
prikupljanje i analizu bezbednosnih zahteva i definisanje načina za njihovo 
ispunjavanje. Bezbednosni zahtevi, za razliku od funkcionalnih, se bave 
aktivnostima koje korisnik ne bi smeo da vrši kroz softver. Na visokom 
nivou apstrakcije, bave se zaštitom bezbednosnih svojstava (poput 
poverljivosti, integriteta i dostupnosti) resursa sistema. Inženjering 
bezbednosnih zahteva podrazumeva analizu poslovnih zahteva, 
bezbednosnih standarda i pravnih regulativa koje treba softver da ispuni, kao 
i razmatranje motivacije i mogućnosti napadača koji bi hteli da ugroze 
softver. Ova analiza napadača i njihovog uticaja na softver se sprovodi kroz 
aktivnost koja se naziva modelovanje pretnji. 
Modelovanje pretnji uključuje skup tehnika za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna 
softvera (Shostack, 2014b). Ove tehnike sistematski ispituju dizajn softvera i 
njegovih celina, razmatrajući načine kako napadači mogu da ga 
kompromituju. Iako koraci bezbednosne analize dizajna zavise od konkretne 
tehnike koja se koristi, grubo se mogu grupisati u tri veće celine: 
 Analiza modula – gde se ispituje modul kako bi se razumeo njegov 
način rada, koji su tokovi podataka, i način na koji komunicira sa 
spoljnim entitetima. 
 Analiza pretnji – gde se određuju pretnje za modul i resurse kojima 
manipuliše, poput bitnih podataka i servisa. Pretnje se dekomponuju 
na napade putem kojih se mogu ostvariti, ranjivosti koje dozvoljavaju 
da napad uspe i bezbednosne kontrole koje regulišu date ranjivosti. 
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 Analiza rizika – gde se razmatraju negativne posledice realizacije 
pretnje i verovatnoće da se to desi, kako bi se zaključile protivmere i 
odredila pogodna strategija za regulisanje rizika. 
Rezultat ove aktivnosti su zahtevi za izmenu dizajna softvera ili zahtevi za 
njegovo dodatno obezbeđivanje, na primer kroz dodatan razvoj ili integraciju 
bezbednosnih alata. Bezbednosna analiza dizajna je aktivnost koja pronalazi 
ranjivosti u sistemu u ranim fazama razvoja, pre nego što se program napiše i 
kada je najjeftinije regulisati bezbednosne probleme. Međutim, efikasna 
primena ove aktivnosti u kontekstu savremenih metodologija razvoja 
softvera je relativno retka, uprkos sve većoj potražnji za bezbednim 
softverom (Baca i Carlsson, 2011; Oyetoyan i drugi, 2016; Türpe i Poller, 
2017). 
Ključni problemi koji su identifikovani za uspešnu primenu bezbednosne 
analize dizajna u proces agilnog razvoja softvera uključuju: 
1. Nedostatak znanja da se efikasno sprovodi. Veština koje je potrebna 
da se izvrši bezbednosna analiza dizajna se teško prenosi i stiče i ne 
odgovara mentalitetu koji je potreban za standardan razvoj softvera 
(Shostack, 2014b; Schoenfield, 2015). Zbog ovoga, timovi koji se 
bave razvojem softvera uglavnom ne poseduju dovoljno veštine da 
praktikuju bezbednosnu analizu dizajna (Morrison i drugi, 2017). 
2. Neslaganje paradigmi između agilnog razvoja i tradicionalnih tehnika 
za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna, koje su krojene za vodopad 
metodologije razvoja softvera. U agilnom razvoju, prvobitni dizajn se 
brzo menja kako se novi zahtevi za softver definišu. Tradicionalne 
tehnike bezbednosne analize dizajna podrazumevaju temeljnu analizu 
prvobitnog dizajna, što rezultuje zastarelim modelima pretnji i 
rezultatima analize upitne vrednosti. Zbog svoje kompleksnosti, 
skupo je sprovesti kompletnu bezbednosnu analizu dizajna za svaki 
novi razvoj. Dodatna problematika se ispoljava i kroz nedostatak 
opipljivih rezultata analize i jasno definisanog kraja analize, što 
dovodi do nejasno definisanog posla i njegovog trajanja. Najzad, 
značajan deo tehnika za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna ne pruža 
dovoljno smernica kako izvršavati analizu niti kako je integrisati u 
razvoj softvera (Poller i drugi, 2017; Luburić i drugi, 2018a). 
U sklopu ovog istraživanja, fokus se stavlja na razvoj podržan Scrum radnim 
okvirom, kao najrasprostranjenijim pristupom agilnog razvoja (CollabNet 
VersionOne, 2019). Iz prethodno navedenih problema identifikovana su 
istraživačka pitanja koje teza obrađuje: 
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1. Kako efikasno naučiti Scrum timove da vrše bezbednosnu analizu 
dizajna? 
2. Kako integrisati bezbednosnu analizu dizajna u proces agilnog 
razvoja softvera baziranog na Scrum-u? 
Spram istraživačkih pitanja, formirana je centralna hipoteza disertacije koja 
glasi: 
 Timovi koji razvijaju softver po Scrum agilnoj metodologiji mogu 
praktikovati bezbednosnu analizu dizajna softvera tokom čitavog 
njegovog razvoja, čime dokazuju da je bezbednost adekvatno 
razmotrena tokom dizajna, pod uslovom da: 
o Dobiju prikladnu obuku kako bi efikasno praktikovali 
bezbednosnu analizu dizajna. 
o Tehnika bezbednosne analize dizajna je kompatabilna sa 
načinom rada u Scrum procesu, i ne zahteva uvođenje novih 
uloga u razvojni tim, niti konstrukciju kompleksne 
dokumentacije. 
o Posao je opipljiv, merljiv, konačan, te mu se može odrediti 
prioritet i formulisati plan realizacije kao i za standardan 
razvoj. 
o Postoji dovoljno uputstva kako usvojiti, koristiti, i adaptirati 
tehniku bezbednosne analize dizajna za različite 
organizacione kontekste. 
Polazna hipoteza je razložena na tri očekivana doprinosa disertacije: 
1) Konstrukcija radnog okvira za pomoć pri kreiranju radionica, kroz 
koje inženjeri softvera efikasno uče kako da sprovode bezbednosnu 
analizu softvera. 
2) Definisanje procesa bezbednosne analize dizajna koji rešava 
probleme koji postoje u interakciji procesa agilnog razvoja i 
tradicionalnih tehnika za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna. 
3) Definisanje procesa za integraciju bezbednosne analize dizajna u 
agilan razvoj putem upotrebe radnog okvira za konstrukciju radionica 
kako bi se uspostavilo znanje za integraciju, upotrebu i kontinualno 
unapređenje procesa bezbednosne analize dizajna, opisan pod tačkom 
dva. Kombinacija ove dve tehnike treba da podrži agilan razvoj 
softvera i da odgovori na zahteve za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna 
koje definišu standardi na temu razvoja bezbednog softvera. 
U cilju razmatranja prvog dela hipoteze i prvog istraživačkog pitanja, 
istražuju se metode obuke namenjene učenju tehnika razvoja bezbednog 
softvera, što je tema sekcije 2.1. Sa rastom interesovanja za razvoj 
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bezbednog softvera, formirana je istraživačka grana koja se bavi ispitivanjem 
tehnika obuke inženjera softvera da razvijaju bezbedniji softver. 
Tradicionalna učionica, gde predavač izlaže znanje dok polaznici pasivno 
slušaju, se u literaturi i praksi ističe kao neadekvatna za obuku na temu 
razvoja bezbednog softvera. Zbog ovoga, alternativne tehnike za obuku se 
ispituju. 
Varma i Garg (2005) su razmatrali upotrebu različitih tehnika učenja u polju 
softverskog inženjerstva. Zaključili su da je analiza studija slučajeva (engl. 
Case study analysis) efikasna tehnika za obuku inženjera softvera, 
postavljajući pogodan teren na kom se može ispoljiti kompleksnost i 
zamršenost koja postoji u softverskim proizvodima. Meneely i Lucidi (2013) 
su primenili ovu tehniku u sklopu univerzitetskog kursa čija tema je razvoj 
bezbednog softvera. Na početku svakog predavanja, autori analiziraju 
„ranjivost dana“, gde ispituju primere bezbednosnih problema iz stvarnog 
sveta i analiziraju posledice ranjivosti, način na koji bi se mogla 
eksploatisati, programski kod njene implementacije, kao i način na koji bi se 
ranjivost rešila. Tokom ove aktivnosti, autori zapažaju visok nivo 
interesovanja među studentima. Analiza studija slučajeva postavlja polaznike 
u realistične situacije, gde je potrebno da se izbore sa nepotpunim 
informacijama, ciljevima koji su u koliziji i ograničenjima poput novca i 
vremena (Andersen i Schiano, 2014) i stimuliše kritičko razmišljanje (Dunne 
i Brooks, 2004). 
Gamifikacija (engl. Gamification) predstavlja moderan metod učenja, gde se 
kroz igru u kojoj učestvuju polaznici formiraju pozitivni ishodi učenja 
povećanjem angažmana i interaktivnosti među polaznicima. Denning i drugi 
(2013) su definisali kartašku igru Control-Alt-Hack, kao alat za učenje 
računarske bezbednosti kroz igru. Još jednu kartašku igru, Elevation of 
Privilege, je definisao Shostack (2014a) sa ciljem da nauči inženjere softvera 
kako da vrše bezbednosnu analizu dizajna softvera. Kroz ovu igru, učesnici 
diskutuju ranjivosti u sistemu, mesta odakle napadač može da sprovede 
napad i resurse koje bi želeo da ugrozi. U kontekstu agilnog razvoja softvera, 
Williams i drugi (2010) su definisali Protection Poker, igru koja pomaže 
razvojnim timovima da odrede i rangiraju bezbednosne rizike koji postoje u 
softveru i koje novi korisnički zahtevi mogu doneti. 
Kassicieh i drugi (2015) ispituju korporativne radionice iz domena 
računarske bezbednosti i ističu njihovu neefikasnost. Autori ističu da je deo 
problema to što tradicionalna tehnika učenja ne podržava razvoj 
„mentaliteta“ koji je potreban za bezbednost. Nekoliko autora ističe da je za 
aktivnosti poput bezbednosne analize dizajna neophodan „napadački pogled“ 
na problem (Shostack, 2014a; Schoenfield, 2015; Carranza i DeCusatis, 
2015). Carranza i DeCusatis (2015) ispituju hibridnu invertovanu učionicu 
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(engl. Hybrid flipped classroom) kao pogodniju tehniku za razvoj 
napadačkog pogleda u odnosu na tradicionalnu učionicu. Kod hibridne 
invertovane učionice polaznici dobijaju materijale, poput video predavanja, 
članaka ili poglavlja u knjizi, koje treba samostalno da prođu pre radionice. 
Tokom radionice, polaznici diskutuju materijale sa predavačem kako bi 
dodatno razumeli gradivo i stekli novi pogled na izneseno znanje. Potom 
rade na zadacima i sprovode aktivnosti koje zahtevaju znanje iz pripremnih 
materijala. Invertovanu učionicu ističu i Kassicieh i drugi (2015), kao jedan 
način da se unaprede radionice iz domena računarske bezbednosti. 
Elektronski-podržano učenje (engl. E-learning) je pronašlo specifičnu 
primenu kod učenja tehnika razvoja bezbednog softvera. Nekoliko autora je 
formiralo platforme za učenje o softverskoj bezbednosti kroz ranjive 
softverske pakete. Pohl i drugi (2015) ističu BREW, ranjiv softver koji 
studenti koriste kao metu za napada. Walden (2008) razvija OWASP 
WebGoat projekat, što predstavlja kolekciju malih aplikacija, gde svaka ima 
jednu ili više ranjivosti u vidu izazova koje treba rešiti. Ovi softverski paketi 
donose visok nivo angažmana među polaznicima zbog svoje interaktivnosti i 
sistema izazova (Pohl i drugi, 2015; Kimminich, 2019). Putem njih, 
polaznici savladavaju ranjivosti, napade i bezbednosne kontrole. 
Prethodno navedene tehnike su ispitivane u sklopu predmeta na zavšrnoj 
godini osnovnih akademskih studija na Fakultetu tehničkih nauka u Novom 
Sadu, koji pokriva temu razvoja bezbednog softvera. Spram preporuka 
istaknutih u literaturi, kombinuju se tehnike hibridne invertovane učionice 
(NSF, 2008; Andersen i Schiano, 2014) sa analizom studija slučaja (Carranza 
i DeCusatis, 2015) kako bi se formirao radni okvir spram kog se kreiraju 
laboratorijske vežbe. Efikasnost radnog okvira se evaluira i utvrđuju se bolji 
rezultati učenja u odnosu na tradicionalnu učionicu. Kako bi se rešio problem 
kompleksnosti radnog okvira, formira se proširenje koje se zasniva na 
upotrebi gamifikacije i ranjivih softverskih paketa (Kimminich, 2019). 
Rezultujući radni okvir je tema poglavlja 3. 
Kako bi se odgovorilo na drugo istraživačko pitanje i drugi deo hipoteze, u 
sekciji 2.2 se razmatraju postojeće tehnike za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna i 
njihovi problemi, kao i zahtevi koje standardi propisuju za ove tehnike. 
Pogodan izvor ovih tehnika predstavlja skorašnja sistematična studija 
mapiranja koja izlaže tehnike za inženjering bezbednosnih zahteva u agilnom 
razvoju (Villamizar i drugi, 2018). Ovo uključuje Abuser Story (Peeters, 
2005), SEAP (Baca i drugi, 2015), Secure Scrum (Pohl i Hof, 2015), Security 
Backlog (Azham i drugi, 2011), S-Scrum (Mougouei i drugi, 2013), Agile 
Security Framework (Singhal, 2011), Security assurance case (Othmane i 
drugi, 2014a), i VAHTI-Scrum (Rindell i drugi, 2015). Navedene tehnike se 
analiziraju kako bi se utvrdilo kako odgovaraju na probleme kompleksnosti, 
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neopipljivosti posla i nedostatka uputstva za upotrebu i adaptaciju. Iz ove 
analize proizilaze sledeći zaključci: 
1. Nedostatak uputstva za rad, izvršavanje i prilagođavanje tehnike 
predstavlja čest problem. 
2. Posao je opipljiv i merljiv kada se u proces uključi ekspert iz domena 
softverske bezbednosti, no to ugrožava zahtev za jednostavnost 
tehnike jer je za svaku analizu potrebno njegovo angažovanje. 
3. Tehnike koje ispunjuju zahtev za jednostavnost ne objašnjavaju kada 
je analiza gotova, te nije moguće izmeriti posao i ispuniti zahtev 
jasno definisanog posla. 
U sklopu iste sekcije se ispituje i sistematičan pregled literature na temu 
tehnika bezbednosne analize dizajna koju sprovode Tuma i drugi (2018). 
Autori ispituju 26 tehnika i razmatraju njihovo usvajanje i primenu u 
industriji savremenog razvoja softvera. Istaknuto je nekoliko problema koji 
ograničavaju usvajanje ovih tehnika, uključujući nedovoljnu upotrebu 
automatizacije, nedostatak definicije kada je posao završen i nedostatak 
smernica kako da se metoda praktikuje. 
Galvez i Gurses (2018) ispituju izazove koji postoje prilikom modelovanja 
pretnji u agilnom razvoju. Uočeni su problemi u održavanju i ažuriranju 
kompleksnih modela pretnji, u određivanju pogodne apstrakcije za 
modelovanje pretnji, kao i u nedostatku znanja i smernica za vršenje ove 
aktivnosti. Sličnu studiju sprovode Cruzes i drugi (2018) koji ispituju 
upotrebu bezbednosne analize dizajna u kontekstu određenog proizvođača 
softvera. Autori su ustanovili da razvojni timovi ne žele da proizvode modele 
pretnji jer oduzimaju previše vremena u odnosu na vrednost koju donose, 
kao i da postoji nedostatak ekspertize, znanja i smernica kako da efikasno 
izvršavaju ovu aktivnost. 
Nakon pregleda predloženih tehnika za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna iz 
literature, analizirani su industrijski standardi koji propisuju zahteve za 
proces razvoja bezbednog softvera, stavljajući fokus na aktivnosti koje se 
tiču bezbednosne analize dizajna. IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard definiše 
zahteve za razvoj bezbednih softverskih i hardverskih proizvoda (IEC, 
2018a). Odavde se dodatno ispituju prakse vezane za inženjering 
bezbednosnih zahteva i konstrukciju bezbednog dizajna. Po sličnom 
pristupu, analizira se NIST SP 800-160v1, standard koji definiše proces za 
inženjering bezbednih sistema (Ross i drugi, 2016). 
Iz navedenog istraživanja se izdvajaju principi koji vode formulisanje 
procesa za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna, sa ciljem definisanja procesa koji 
ispunjava zahteve industrijskih standarda (IEC, 2018; Ross i drugi, 2016) i 
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rešava neke od problema u postojećim tehnikama (Luburić i drugi, 2018a; 
Tuma i drugi, 2018; Cruzes i drugi, 2018; Galvez i Gurses, 2018): 
 Visok stepen složenosti procesa je u kontradikciji za zahtevom 
agilnosti u razvoju softvera. 
 Neophodan je određen nivo bezbednosne ekspertize kako bi se posao 
mogao definisati i rangirati. Potrebno je obučiti razvojni tim ili uvesti 
domenskog eksperta. Najzad, usled nemogućnosti dokazivanja da su 
sve bitne pretnje pronađene i razložene, potrebno je vremenski 
ograničiti izvršavanje procesa bezbednosne analize dizajna. 
 Organizacijama su potrebna uputstva i usmeravanja kako bi usvojili i 
prilagodili metod za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna. Ovo podrazumeva 
opis samog metoda, primere njegove upotrebe i uputstvo kako ga 
prilagoditi različitim potrebama organizacije. 
Poglavlje 3 prikazuje detalje radnog okvira za konstrukciju laboratorijskih 
vežbi (Luburić i drugi, 2019a) čija svrha je obuka na temu bezbednosne 
analize dizajna. Kroz sekciju 3.1 se opisuju komponente radnog okvira i 
proces njegove upotrebe. Radni okvir se sastoji iz četiri komponente: 
1. Odabrane tehnike za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna, što predstavlja 
glavni cilj učenja i glavni ulaz za korišćenje radnog okvira, 
2. Pripremni materijali koji sadrže potrebno znanje koje polaznici treba 
da usvoje kako bi učestvovali u laboratorijskoj vežbi, 
3. Jedna ili više studija slučaja koje će biti meta bezbednosne analize 
dizajna, 
4. Laboratorijske vežbe kao glavni rezultat radnog okvira, što 
podrazumeva skup pripremnih materijala, opis studija slučaja, skup 
zadataka za polaznike i tok vežbi u vidu uputstva za predavača. 
Radni okvir definiše sledeće korake potrebne za definisanje laboratorijskih 
vežbi ili radionica: 
1. Odabir tehnike za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna; 
2. Dekomponovanje tehnike na segmente sa idejom da jedan segment 
bude tema jedne radionice, odnosno laboratorijske vežbe; 
3. Ispitivanje svakog segmenta, tako da se: 
a. Odrede relevantni bezbednosni koncepti (napadi, ranjivosti i 
protivmere); 
b. Konstruišu pripremni materijali (npr. u vidu prezentacija, 
video materijala, tekstualnih dokumenata); 
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c. Definišu zahtevi koje studija slučaja treba da ispuni kako bi se 
mogao uspešno sprovesti segment bezbednosne analize 
dizajna i primeniti prateći pripremni materijali; 
d. Odredi tok laboratorijske vežbe, uključujući i zadatke; 
e. Proceni da li je laboratorijska vežba previše kompleksna 
uzimajući u obzir vremensko ograničenje i izdeli u više vežbi 
ukoliko jeste. 
4. Nakon ispitivanja svih segmenata, formuliše se jedna ili više studija 
slučaja spram skupa svih zahteva, gde kreator vežbi treba da se trudi 
da stvori realistične studije koje će biti dovoljno bliske polaznicima. 
5. Uzimajući u obzir definisane studije slučaja, formulišu se konačni 
tokovi laboratorijskih vežbi, gde se u ovom koraku mogu spajati i 
razdvajati vežbe spram organizacionih ograničenja i procene kreatora 
vežbi. 
Sekcija 3.2 ističe primere izvršavanja radnog okvira i njegova unapređenja, 
sa ciljem pružanja dodatnih smernica za upotrebu radnog okvira. Ovde se 
opisuje upotreba radnog okvira za stvaranje šest laboratorijskih vežbi za 
potrebe predmeta na osnovnim akademskim studijama koji pokriva temu 
razvoja bezbednog softvera. Za metod bezbednosne analize dizajna odabran 
je STRIDE (Shostack, 2014b), gde se prvobitnim razlaganjem formira skup 
od šest segmenata, jedan za svaku klasu pretnji koje definiše STRIDE. Za 
svaku od metoda definišu se bezbednosni koncepti koji se tiču date klase 
pretnji, stavljajući fokus na napade i odbrane koji su relevantni za domen. 
Spram segmenata se formira šest vežbi koje se opisuju srednjim nivoom 
detalja. Ovde je u grubim crtama istaknuto koje su teme koje pripremni 
materijali pokrivaju, šta su zahtevi za studije slučajeva i kako izgledaju sami 
tokovi vežbi. Najzad, za studiju slučajeva koja se koristi u svim vežbama je 
opisan informacioni sistem moderne bolnice kao sistem koji sadrži značajnu 
količinu vrednih podataka i resursa i otvara dovoljno prostora gde se mogu 
primeniti tehnologije poznate studentima. 
U sklopu iste sekcije se detaljnije opisuje jedna laboratorijska vežba koja se 
tiče analiziranja pretnji neporecivosti i dizajniranja mehanizma za beleženje 
događaja koji ispunjava kako bezbednosne tako i funkcionalne zahteve. 
Ovde su opisani pripremni materijali koji se koriste. Potom se razrađuje 
studija slučaja informacionog sistema bolnice, stavljajući fokus na osetljive 
podatke i operacije u sistemu. Najzad, ističe se struktura zadataka i aktivnosti 
koje se sprovode tokom date vežbe koje predavač i polaznici izvršavaju. 
Na kraju sekcije se definiše proširenje za radni okvir, gde se primenjuju 
tehnike gamifikacije i elektronski-podržanog učenja kroz uvođenje javno 
dostupnog ranjivog softverskog paketa. Uvođenje ovakvog alata značajno 
 
xvii 
smanjuje kompleksnost konstrukcije laboratorijskih vežbi i napor koji je 
potreban da se one naprave. Proces konstrukcije vežbi se menja tako što 
kreator vežbi sakuplja zahteve za studiju slučaja, nakon čega pretražuje javno 
dostupne repozitorijume (Siles i Bennets, 2019) kako bi pronašao pogodnog 
kandidata da ispuni date zahteve. Ranjivi softverski paketi nude pripremne 
materijale kako bi se izazovi savladali, te se oni mogu iskoristiti u sklopu 
izrade pripremnih materijala za laboratorijske vežbe. Bitno ograničenje 
predstavlja relativno mali broj kvalitetnih ranjivih softverskih paketa što 
značajno ograničava kreatora vežbi u izboru i integraciji ovih alata u 
laboratorije. U sklopu ovog dela disertacije opisana je konstrukcija nove 
laboratorijske vežbe za pretnje koje Injection napadi donose, a odabrani su 
zbog rasprostranjenosti i ozbiljnih negativnih posledica koje mogu 
prouzrokovati. Nakon definisanja zahteva za studiju slučaja, odabran je 
OWASP Juice Shop alat (Kimminich, 2019), koji ispunjava sve navedene 
zahteve. Ovaj alat predstavlja realističnu veb-prodavnicu koja sadrži 
mnoštvo ranjivosti i koja je u značajnoj meri slična aplikacijama koje 
studenti razvijaju u sklopu predmeta koje ranije slušaju. Najzad, ovde je dat 
detaljan opis aktivnosti koje se sprovode tokom vežbi i način na koji je alat 
iskorišćen da doprinese pozitivnim ishodima učenja. 
Sekcija 3.3 ističe detalje kontrolisanog eksperimenta, ankete i opservacija 
predavača koje su sprovedene kako bi se pokazalo da laboratorijske vežbe 
kreirane uz pomoć radnog okvira stvaraju bolje ishode učenja u odnosu na 
tradicionalan pristup. Ovde je opisan kurs u okviru kog je primenjen radni 
okvir kako bi se istakle bitne informacije vezane za same polaznike. U 
sklopu kursa, studenti konstruišu model pretnji za određen informacioni 
sistem kao deo projektnog zadatka koji je neophodno uraditi kako bi studenti 
uspešno završili kurs. 
Kroz kontrolisani eksperiment se poredi prosečan kvalitet modela pretnji koji 
sastavljaju timovi studenata dve generacije, gde jedna generacija prolazi kroz 
tradicionalne vežbe, a druga kroz vežbe stvorene koristeći radni okvir. Obe 
generacije formiraju model pretnji za isti informacioni sistem. Za ocenjivanje 
kvaliteta modela pretnji se koriste formule koje definišu Scandariato i drugi 
(2015), što podrazumeva: 
 Kvalitet dijagrama toka podataka na osnovu kog se vrši identifikacija 
pretnji, gde se kvalitet meri u tome koliko precizno oslikava tokove 
podataka u sistemu i u kojoj meri je nivo detalja pogođen. 
 Kvalitet identifikacije pretnji, gde se meri broj ispravno navedenih 
pretnji (true positive), neispravno navedenih pretnji (false positive) i 
neidentifikovanih pretnji (false negative). 
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Fokus se stavlja na korak identifikacije pretnji, gde se računaju i porede 
prosečna preciznost i odziv za identifikovane pretnje na nivou generacije. 
Četrnaest modela pretnji je razmatrano iz generacije koja je slušala 
tradicionalne vežbe i sedamnaest iz one koja je slušala vežbe kreirane uz 
pomoć radnog okvira. 
Efikasnost proširenja radnog okvira sa ranjivim softverskim paketom se 
ispituje anketiranjem polaznika i razmatranjem opservacija predavača. 
Tokom vežbi, predavači su posmatrali nivo angažovanja polaznika, prirodu 
njihove interakcije sa ranjivim softverskim paketom, efekat koji je alat imao 
na vežbe i probleme koji su nastajali zbog njegove upotrebe. Anketa upućena 
polaznicima je sadržala tvrdnje koje su se ocenjivale po Likertovoj skali sa 5 
tačaka (Albaum, 1997), kao i nekoliko otvorenih pitanja, koja su navedena u 
sekciji 3.3.4. 
Rezultati evaluacija su opisani u sekciji 3.4. Sa aspekta kontrolisanog 
eksperimenta, primećeno je značajno povećanje u preciznosti (87% u odnosu 
na 68%) i opozivu (81% u odnosu na 54%) kod generacije studenata koja je 
slušala vežbe konstruisane uz pomoć radnog okvira, u odnosu na studente 
koji su slušali tradicionalne vežbe. Ovi rezultati su statistički značajni, što se 
proverava uz pomoć Mann-Whitney testa. Dodatno, Scandariato i drugi 
(2015) ističu da rezultati preko 80% u preciznosti i opozivu predstavljaju 
povoljan rezultat i uspešnu analizu. 
Povodom evaluacije proširenja, predavači su primetili povećan stepen 
angažmana studenata. Deo zasluge se pripisuje realističnosti ranjive 
aplikacije koja izgleda kao prosečna veb-prodavnica koja se može pronaći na 
internetu. Drugi razlog je familijarnost koju studenti imaju sa ovakvom 
aplikacijom, koja je izgrađena njima poznatim tehnologijama i principima. 
Najzad, sistem izazova koji OWASP Juice Shop pruža je stimulisao 
atmosferu takmičenja što je dodatno podiglo nivo zabave i angažmana. 
Anketa koja je usledila je potvrdila opservacije gde su vežbe koje su koristile 
ranjivi softverski paket bile najbolje ocenjene od svih ostalih. 
U sklopu ove sekcije razmatraju se i ograničenja studije i samog radnog 
okvira. Deo unapređenja kvaliteta modela pretnji generacije koja je slušala 
vežbe konstruisane putem radnog okvira dolazi i iz unapređenja kvaliteta 
samih predavača koji su imali jednu godinu više da unaprede svoje znanje. 
Schoenfield (2015) ističe da je za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna iskustvo bitan 
faktor, te je ovo sigurno imalo efekta na kvalitet vežbi. Dodatno, nije moguće 
isključiti unapređenje kvaliteta kurseva koje su studenti ranije slušali tokom 
svog školovanja. Iako značajnijih promena (npr. u vidu izmena studijskog 
programa) nije bilo, nije ispraćeno da li postoje sitnije izmene u okviru 
predmeta koje bi mogle da utiču na ove rezultate. Što se tiče radnog okvira, 
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bitno ograničenje u njegovoj upotrebi je kompleksnost. Kreator 
laboratorijskih vežbi ili radionica treba da formira pripremne materijale, 
konstruiše studiju slučaja i formuliše tok vežbi koji sve to sinhronizuje. 
Ranjivi softverski paketi mogu u značajnoj meri da redukuju ovaj problem, 
no ograničenje koje postoji jeste relativno mala količina kvalitetnih alata. 
Bitno je istaći da radni okvir za kreiranje materijala za radionice je moguće 
primeniti u korporativnom okruženju gde će proizvođači softvera moći da 
konstruišu radionice za učenje bezbednosne analize dizajna koristeći 
tehnologije i pretnje koje su relevantne za kontekst softvera koji proizvode. 
Studije slučaja u ovom kontekstu treba da budu softverski proizvodi koje 
organizacija razvija. Isto tako, univerziteti i fakulteti koji nude kurseve na 
temu razvoja bezbednog softvera mogu da iskoriste radni okvir da konstruišu 
sadržaj laboratorijskih vežbi za potrebe učenja bezbednosne analize dizajna. 
Iako je radni okvir evaluiran na studentima završne godine osnovnih 
akademskih studija, ne postoje prepreke da se na sličan način radni okvir 
primeni i u softverskim kompanijama za obuku inženjera. Prema tome, radni 
okvir se može smatrati pogodnim načinom da se inženjeri softvera efikasno 
obučavaju kako da sprovode bezbednosnu analizu dizajna. 
Poglavlje 4 definiše SATMUS (engl. Security Analysis and Threat Modeling 
of User Stories) proces za bezbednosnu analizu dizajna koji je prikladan 
agilnom načinu razvoja softvera, pruža opipljive i merljive rezultate, sadrži 
dovoljno instrukcija za njegovu upotrebu i adaptaciju i proizvodi praktično 
primenljiv model pretnji koji prati inkrementalan razvoj softvera. Kroz 
sekciju 4.1 je opisan SATMUS proces, što uključuje aktivnosti od kojih je 
sastavljen, kao i njegove ulaze i izlaze. U sklopu te sekcije su istaknuti detalji 
aktivnosti procesa i smernice za njihovo izvršavanje. Cilj SATMUS procesa 
jeste da otkrije ranjivosti i slabosti u dizajnu razvijenog softvera kako bi 
definisao korektivne mere. 
Da bi podržao inkrementalan razvoj, SATMUS se primenjuje sa svakom 
korisničkom pričom (engl. User story), kratkom izjavom koja definiše šta je 
to što softver treba da radi i podrži. Kroz korisničke priče, Scrum 
metodologija inkrementalno razrađuje i proširuje softver (Cohn, 2004). U 
sklopu SATMUS analize, korisnička priča se ispituje kako bi se procenilo 
kako utiče na bezbednost softvera i da li je potrebno uložiti dodatne resurse 
kako bi se proizvod sa novim programskim kodom adekvatno zaštitio. 
Rezultat izvršavanja SATMUS procesa obuhvata: 
 Nove korisničke priče koje opisuju dodatan razvoj koji je potreban, 
 Dodatne bezbednosne kriterijume prihvatanja ispunjenosti 
analizirane korisničke priče (Leffingwell, 2010), 
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 Zahtev za dodatno istraživanje (engl. Research spike), kada se otkrije 
potencijalan bezbednosni problem, ali ne postoji dovoljno znanja 
kako da se razreši (Knaster i Leffingwell, 2018). 
Prvi skup aktivnosti SATMUS procesa se tiče proračuna kritičnosti 
analizirane korisničke priče sa aspekta bezbednosti. Ovde se određuje da li 
će razvoj potreban za ispunjenje korisničke priče raditi sa osetljivim 
resursima i kontekst u kom će se novi programski kod dodati (npr. da li 
komunicira sa čovekom, da li je blizu izložene površine za napad), na osnovu 
čega se sprovodi formula za računanje kritičnosti. Spram ovih faktora se 
definiše nivo kritičnosti korisničke priče sa aspekta bezbednosti. 
U slučaju da korisnička priča nije interesantna sa aspekta bezbednosti, 
odnosno ima nizak nivo kritičnosti, proces se završava uz eventualnu 
napomenu da je analiza sprovedena. 
Za korisničke priče srednje kritičnosti, analizira se model pretnji kroz skup 
aktivnosti koje predstavljaju bezbednosnu analizu dizajna. Modul se analizira 
kako bi se proverilo da li postoje značajne promene, poput novih komponenti 
ili tokova podataka i da li se novi resursi uključuju u postojeći modul. 
Ukoliko se značajna promena identifikuje, sledeći korak predstavlja analiza 
pretnji za datu novinu, gde se ističu ranjivosti i scenariji napada koji bi mogli 
da eksploatišu novi kod. Najzad, definišu se protivmere i zadaci koji treba da 
reše identifikovani problem i koji se dodaju u spisak zahteva za softver. 
Rezultati analize se dokumentuju uz pomoć odgovarajućeg alata (npr. 
Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool (Microsoft, 2019)). 
Najzad, za korisničke priče visoke kritičnosti, razvojni tim zahteva dodatnu 
podršku u bezbednosnoj analizi. Ova podrška može doći van organizacije, 
dovođenjem konsultanta, a može doći i interno, angažovanjem iskusnih 
inženjera ili domenskih eksperata. 
Sekcija 4.2 razmatra šest segmenata SATMUS procesa koji su skloni 
modifikaciji i adaptaciji za različite organizacije i nivoe bezbednosti koji su 
zahtevani od softvera koji se proizvodi. Organizacija treba da donese odluke 
na koji način će konfigurisati svaki od navedenih segmenata prilikom 
usvajanja SATMUS procesa. Prvi segment se tiče inventara i načina 
reprezentacije resursa sa kojim razvojni timovi rade i njihovog mapiranja na 
funkcionalne i bezbednosne zahteve koji diktiraju prioritet zaštite samih 
resursa. Drugi segment se tiče same formule za računanje kritičnosti 
korisničke priče koja treba da uvaži resurse koji novi razvoj dotiče, 
okruženje u kom se nalazi novi kod, kritičnost same funkcionalnosti koju 
programski kod pruža i druge potencijalne faktore. Pošto formula diktira 
učestalost bezbednosne analize dizajna, organizacija definiše prioritet ove 
analize samom konfiguracijom formule. Putem formule, moguće je 
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konfigurisati da timovi koji rade na osetljivim komponentama moraju za 
svaki razvoj da analiziraju model pretnji, dok će ostali timovi to raditi dosta 
ređe. Treći segment predstavlja odluku o angažovanju internog formalnog ili 
neformalnog tima za ekspertizu iz softverske bezbednosti, koji može da 
pomogne sa analizom korisničkih priča visoke kritičnosti. Povodom 
bezbednosne analize dizajna, potrebno je da se odabere pogodni metod, kao i 
da se razmotri upotreba alata i potreba za obukom razvojnih timova kako bi 
se metod bezbednosne analize dizajna efikasno sprovodio. Ovo predstavlja 
četvrti i peti segment procesa. Najzad, u sklopu šestog segmenta je 
neophodno definisati strukture rezultata analize, u vidu šablona za modele 
pretnji i njihove rezultate, kako bi se ispunili zahtevi koje organizacija ima 
po ovom pitanju (npr. definisane od strane IEC 62443-4-1 standarda). 
U istoj sekciji se prikazuju i dve relevantne studije slučaja implementacije i 
adaptacije SATMUS procesa u okviru dva različita okruženja kako bi se 
istakle dodatne smernice za upotrebu procesa i njegovo prilagođavanje. Prva 
studija slučaja predstavlja implementaciju procesa u velikoj organizaciji koja 
razvija softver za industrijski sistem kontrole, gde postoji visok stepen 
bezbednosnih zahteva. Takođe, istaknuta je implementacija SATMUS 
procesa za organizaciju koja razvija softver sa relativno niskim 
bezbednosnim zahtevima. Ova organizacija razvija informacione sisteme za 
podršku rukovodstvu koji sadrže nešto manji broj osetljivih resursa. Kroz 
ove studije slučajeva se ističu načini na koje SATMUS proces može da se 
izmeni i adaptira. 
Za evaluaciju SATMUS procesa se koriste dve najčešće tehnike za 
evaluaciju metoda za bezbednosnu analizu – komparativna analiza i analiza 
studija slučaja. Sekcija 4.3 razmatra kako SATMUS odgovara na probleme 
kompleksnosti, nedefinisanog posla i nedostatka smernica u odnosu na druge 
razmotrene metode bezbednosne analize dizajna. Nakon toga, prikazuje se 
nekoliko ilustrativnih primera izvršavanja SATMUS procesa, na korisničkim 
pričama koje dolaze iz konteksta studija slučajeva implementacije SATMUS 
procesa koje su opisane u sekciji 4.2. 
Zahvaljujući svojoj fleksibilnosti, kako u odabiru samog metoda 
bezbednosne analize dizajna, tako i u konfiguraciji formule za računanje 
kritičnosti korisničke priče, SATMUS je moguće prilagoditi različitim 
organizacionim kontekstima. Ova fleksibilnost omogućuje da se definiše 
tačno onoliko posla oko bezbednosne analize dizajna koliko je potrebno da 
organizacija ispuni svoje poslovne zahteve i ciljeve. Time što se vremenski 
ograniči analiza pretnji sav posao je jasno merljiv i opipljiv, te nema 
poteškoća zbog nedefinisanog posla. Smernice za izvršavanje SATMUS 
procesa su definisane kroz sekcije 4.1, 4.3.2 i 4.3.3, dok su uputstva za 
njegovo prilagođavanje istaknuta kroz sekciju 4.2. Deo ograničenja 
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SATMUS procesa predstavlja njegova delimična složenost, gde je 
neophodno obučiti razvojne timove, angažovati domenske eksperte, ili 
iskoristiti alate. Sa druge strane, rezultujuća dokumentacija je onoliko 
kompleksna koliko se zahteva zbog čega je problem kompleksnosti 
parcijalno ispunjen. 
Najzad, SATMUS se evaluira sprovođenjem analize na pet odabranih 
korisničkih priča, gde dve dolaze iz konteksta prve organizacije koja razvija 
industrijski sistem, a tri iz konteksta druge organizacije koja razvija 
informacione sisteme za podršku rukovodstvu. Kroz ovu evaluaciju se ističe 
način izvršavanja procesa, gde se za svaku aktivnost opisuje njeno 
sprovođenje i rezultati. 
Villamizar i drugi (2018) u sklopu sistematične studije mapiranja tehnika za 
inženjering bezbednosnih zahteva u agilnom razvoju ističu nekoliko 
segmenata ograničenja za ove tehnike. U sklopu sekcije 4.4 se razmatra na 
koji način SATMUS odgovara na ova ograničenja.  
Poglavlje 5 ove disertacije kombinuje radni okvir za konstrukciju radionica 
sa SATMUS procesom i ističe način na koji ove metode zajedno mogu da 
omoguće integraciju bezbednosne analize dizajna softvera u proces agilnog 
razvoja. 
U sklopu sekcije 5.1 se opisuju koraci koje organizacija treba da sprovede da 
integriše tehnike izložene kroz ovu disertaciju u svoje poslovanje i uspostavi 
njihovo kontinualno unapređenje. Na početku se određuju eksperti koji će 
uspostaviti ovu novinu, a koji mogu biti eksterno angažovani ili mogu doći i 
iz organizacije u slučaju kada postoje zaposleni sa adekvatnim poznavanjem 
softverske bezbednosti. Ovi eksperti biraju studije slučajeva među 
softverskim projektima organizacije, kako bi našli realistične i relevantne 
studije slučajeva za obuku zaposlenih. Eksperti potom biraju metod za 
bezbednosnu analizu dizajna koji se ugrađuje u radni okvir i u SATMUS 
proces, i vrše dodatne adaptacije SATMUS procesa spram želja vlasnika 
organizacije i proizvoda. U sklopu radnog okvira za konstrukciju radionica, 
ekspert formira pripremne materijale i koristeći ranije odabranu studiju 
slučaja formuliše radionice i njihove tokove. 
Nakon konstrukcije radionica neophodno je sprovesti ih, gde će članovi 
razvojnih timova doći da nauče kako da sprovode bezbednosnu analizu 
dizajna i SATMUS proces. Kroz ovu aktivnost, eksperti treba da usmere 
razvojne timove da formiraju modele pretnji za svoje komponente, koje 
potom mogu koristiti kao polaznu tačku za kasnije izvršavanje SATMUS 
procesa u svom standardnom razvoju. 
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Sa ovakvom osnovom, ekspert može da radi na kontinualnom razvoju time 
što će unapređivati radionice kako bude njihova ekspertiza iz bezbednosti 
softvera rasla i kako se nove pretnje budu otkrivale. U sklopu ove sekcije su 
navedene različite strategije za kontinualno unapređenje upotrebe SATMUS 
procesa i radnog okvira za konstrukciju radionica. 
Sekcija 5.2 ističe način na koji SATMUS proces i radni okvir za konstrukciju 
radionica direktno odgovaraju na zahteve za proces razvoja bezbednog 
softvera, kao i način na koji su povezani sa ostalim praksama ovog procesa, 
što uključuje upravljanje, programiranje i testiranje bezbednosti u razvijenom 
softveru. 
Poglavlje 6 zaključuje istraživanje koje je sprovedeno kroz ovu disertaciju. 
Navedeni su glavni doprinosi koji su proizišli iz disertacije: 
 Definisanje radnog okvira za konstrukciju radionica sa ciljem 
obučavanja inženjera softvera kako da sprovode bezbednosnu analizu 
dizajna. Ovaj doprinos podrazumeva i same smernice upotrebe 
radnog okvira, uz primere njegovog izvršavanja. 
 Definisanje SATMUS procesa koji proširuje bezbednosnu analizu 
dizajna da je učini kompatabilnom sa pristupom agilnog razvoja 
softvera. U sklopu ovog doprinosa ulaze i smernice za izvršavanje 
procesa i njegovo prilagođavanje različitim kontekstima. 
 Definisanje procesa za integraciju bezbednosne analize dizajna u 
proces agilnog razvoja kroz upotrebu radnog okvira za konstrukciju 
radionica i SATMUS procesa. Ovo uključuje smernice za inicijalnu 
postavku bezbednosne analize dizajna i uputstva za kontinualno 
unapređenje. 
 
 
Ključne reči: bezbednosna analiza dizajna, modelovanje pretnji, razvoj 
bezbednog softvera, životni ciklus razvoja bezbednosti, bezbednosna 
ekspertiza, bezbednost softvera  
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1 Introduction 
In an age when data is more valuable than oil and everything from the 
physical world has found its digital counterpart, software systems have 
become the new battlefield. Digital warfare and crime are on the rise, 
harming individuals, business, and nations. To secure ourselves, we must 
secure our software, and that is where we come in.  
This thesis examines secure software engineering practices and focus on 
security design analysis, a practice that discovers and mitigates 
vulnerabilities early in the software’s development. While cost-efficient and 
praised by industry leaders and researchers alike, there exist several issues 
that limit the adoption of this practice in contemporary agile software 
development. Throughout this work, we identify and address these issues. 
We start by describing the general problem area that our work addresses in 
Section 1.1. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe the theoretical background behind 
the problem, where we examine agile software development methodologies 
and secure software engineering practices, focusing on security design 
analysis. In Section 1.4, we specify the exact problem that our work 
addresses and describe our hypothesis and research goals. 
1.1 Problem Area   
With the emergence of the Digital Age, malicious groups and individuals 
have focused their efforts on attacking the cyberspace to further their agenda. 
These threat agents use sophisticated tooling and know-how to hack 
computer systems of individuals, organizations, and governments (Gandhi et 
al., 2011). The impact of cyberattacks has not been negligible. A decade ago, 
Kshetri (2009) examined the economic impact of cybercrime and concluded 
that cybercrime was costing businesses and individuals billions of dollars a 
year. Notable cyberattacks were conducted as part of cyberwarfare, 
destroying industrial control system equipment (Langner, 2011) and causing 
power grid blackouts for hundreds of thousands (Case, 2016). More common 
attacks are conducted by cybercriminals trying to steal personally identifiable 
information, where major websites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, and 
other have suffered from data breaches (Parwani et al., 2013). 
Cyberattackers realize their agendas by issuing attacks that exploit 
vulnerabilities that a system might have. Organizations have started securing 
their operations by adopting cybersecurity standards (e.g., the ISO/IEC 27k 
series (Disterer, 2013), the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (Sedgewick, 
2014)) to protect their business and customers from cyberattacks. As 
computer systems present a broad and often-targeted attack surface through 
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the software they run (ENISA, 2019; Positive Technologies, 2019), 
organizations are requiring vendors of software used by their system to be 
constructed with security built-in to avoid the introduction of vulnerabilities 
to the organization through those products (Salini and Kanmani, 2012). 
Software security has traditionally been considered through non-functional 
or quality requirements, less valuable than functional requirements (Salini 
and Kanmani, 2012; Türpe and Poller, 2017). However, recent years have 
seen a rise in security requirements, mandated by security standards and 
regulations, as well as directly by the customer. These sources often specify 
security requirements at a high level of abstraction (e.g., “protect sensitive 
data throughout its lifecycle”), requiring software engineers to derive lower 
level requirements through security requirements engineering techniques 
such as threat modeling and misuse cases (Lamsweerde, 2004; Myagmar et 
al., 2005; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). 
Security requirements engineering is one of several categories of security 
practices that produce more secure software. Many software vendors have 
modified their software development lifecycle during the past decade by 
integrating various security-related practices into the development process. 
The result is the security development lifecycle (SDL), the most famous of 
which was published by Microsoft (Howard and Lipner, 2006) at the start of 
the millennia. It represents a development process that creates demonstrably 
more secure software. Since then, many software vendors have adopted and 
adapted the SDL to fit their workflow and organizational needs, as well as 
the needs of their customers (Geer, 2010; Baca and Carlsson, 2011; 
Mohamed et al., 2016; Oyetoyan et al., 2016; Weir et al., 2017; Morrison et 
al., 2017). Furthermore, in the past few years, several standards were issued, 
that specify process requirements for the secure development of hardware 
and software products (Ross et al., 2016; IEC, 2018a). 
Despite a significant number of SDL initiatives found in literature, as well as 
the explicit requirement for secure products, adoption rates of the security 
development lifecycle are still low. A survey conducted by Errata Security in 
2010 shows that, out of 46 organizations, only 30% use a formal SDL 
methodology in their workflow, while 43% do not use any SDL 
methodology, formal or otherwise (Geer, 2010). More recently, a study was 
conducted in Malaysia that interviewed software development practitioners 
about security (Mohamed et al., 2016). The study concluded that, while 
practitioners are becoming more aware of the importance of security, the 
SDL practices are immature, and a notable percent of practitioners (19.4%) 
never receive any security-related training. As software presents a significant 
and often targeted attack surface, the lack of adoption of the SDL, and the 
low maturity of existing SDLs is troubling. 
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The lack of SDL adoption can be explained, in part, due to the nature of 
state-of-the-art software development practices. Specifically, agile software 
development (Cockburn, 2002) defines the development workflow of many 
software vendors today. This set of development methodologies has been 
criticized for neglecting security requirements (Beznosov and Kruchten, 
2004; Ramesh et al., 2010). The first instances of the SDL (Howard and 
Lipner, 2006; Ayalew et al., 2013) were initially designed for the waterfall 
development model, though since then several adaptations of this process 
have been created for agile development methodologies (Baca and Carlsson, 
2011; Oyetoyan et al., 2016; Poller et al., 2017). However, the traditional 
practices that compose the SDL are challenging to integrate into agile 
development and are often inefficiently practiced (Baca and Carlsson, 2011; 
Oyetoyan et al., 2016; Türpe and Poller, 2017). 
1.2 Agile Software Development 
Since its inception, the practice of developing software has proven to be 
unpredictable. Software developers, while experts in the technology used to 
build computer systems, often do not correctly understand customer 
requirements. On the other hand, parties interested in procuring software 
often have a vague, inaccurate idea of what exactly is the problem that they 
wish to solve (Wysocki, 2011). This lack of foresight, coupled with 
miscommunication between the vendor and the buyer, has resulted in a 
significant percentile of projects developed using traditional software 
methods to fail to meet customer requirements (Othmane, 2014a). 
A new class of development methodologies has been defined during the past 
two decades to deal with the identified issues. Agile software development 
has emerged as a practice that emphasizes adaption to changing software 
requirements. Instead of relying on long-term plans constructed during 
project inception, developers produce frequent increments of running, tested 
software features and continuously collaborate with the customer, to make 
sure the correct requirements are met (Leffingwell, 2010). 
Out of all agile development approaches, the Scrum framework is by far the 
most widespread. According to the 2019 State of Agile survey (CollabNet 
VersionOne, 2019), pure Scrum is applied by 54% of software vendors that 
practice agile development. When considering hybrid methods that rely on 
Scrum (e.g., Scrum with Kanban), this number goes up to 72%. 
Scrum is a lightweight framework for team collaboration on complex 
product development. It introduces roles, events, artifacts, and rules that bind 
them together while leaving plenty of room for self-organizing to deal with 
unpredictable and challenging problems (Sutherland and Schwaber, 2011). 
 
4 
We examine the different scrum roles and their responsibilities in Section 
1.2.1. We then describe how these roles interact and what the general Scrum 
workflow looks like in Section 1.2.2.  
1.2.1 Scrum Roles 
The Scrum team consists of several roles, including the product owner, the 
Scrum master, and members of the development team. These roles interface 
with several roles external to the Scrum team, which include the business 
owner, the stakeholders that benefit from the developed product, and the 
subject matter experts that assist the Scrum team. Figure 1 illustrates the 
Scrum team, outlining the core roles of the team and their interaction with 
roles external to the team. 
 
Figure 1 Roles in Scrum development 
The goal of the product owner is to optimize the value that the developed 
product brings to the stakeholders. They are responsible for determining and 
prioritizing user requirements, by communicating and defining them with the 
relevant stakeholders (e.g., end-users of the software, IT administrators 
responsible for maintaining and configuring the software). The product 
owner documents and prioritizes requirements in the product backlog. While 
not mandatory, the most common way to express these requirements is 
through user stories (Cohn, 2004). A user story is a brief statement of intent 
that describes what the software needs to do for the user. The product owner 
monitors the development team’s progress to ensure that the correct vision of 
the product is being implemented and that the requirements are understood 
correctly. Multiple product owners can coordinate to specify and deliver a 
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sophisticated product, where each product owner is part of one or more 
Scrum teams (Knaster and Leffingwell, 2018). 
The Scrum master assists the team in practicing Scrum by facilitating a 
dynamic that optimizes the performance of the team. They are responsible 
for organizing the Scrum workflow, helping with user story analysis and 
workload management. For sophisticated products that are built by multiple 
Scrum teams, the Scrum masters meet periodically, to discuss the progress, 
issues, and any cross-team coordination that is required to successfully build 
the product. This meeting is known as Scrum of Scrums (Knaster and 
Leffingwell, 2018). 
The development team includes architects, coders, and testers that design, 
implement, and test the software described through the user stories. Scrum 
recognizes no titles for the development team members, regardless of the 
work being performed. While the size of the team varies, it usually spans 
from four to seven members. Optimal team size is small enough to remain 
nimble and large enough to complete significant work (Sutherland and 
Schwaber, 2011). 
The business owner monitors the work results of the Scrum team and 
provides resources and assistance when necessary. The product owner works 
with the business owner to determine the priority of up-coming backlog 
items, process conflicting needs of stakeholders, determine release schedules, 
and provide resources for the team. Likewise, the business owner 
consolidates with the Scrum master, to resolve organizational constraints and 
difficulties, so that the team can work more efficiently (Knaster and 
Leffingwell, 2018). 
The stakeholders present a group of people that have a legitimate interest in 
the developed product and are the primary driver for developing the product. 
The goal of the product is to satisfy the needs and desires of the stakeholders 
(Knaster and Leffingwell, 2018). 
Domain experts or subject matter experts contain specialized knowledge or 
skills that the Scrum team needs to develop their product. Domain experts 
can have knowledge related to the business, offering insight into the needs of 
the stakeholders. Furthermore, domain experts can have technical knowledge 
(e.g., databases, cloud technologies, cybersecurity) that the team requires to 
fulfill the stakeholder’s desires efficiently (Rawsthorne and Shimp, 2011). 
1.2.2 Workflow 
The Scrum team constructs software iteratively, by producing sets of 
functionalities in short intervals (usually two to four weeks), called sprints. 
At the beginning of the sprint is the sprint planning event, where the team 
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selects the user stories that they will implement from the product backlog 
during this sprint. The result of this activity is the construction of the sprint 
backlog that defines the goal for this sprint (Sutherland and Schwaber, 2011). 
From the sprint backlog, members of the development team complete user 
stories until there are no more stories or the sprint ends. During this time, 
user stories are decomposed, understood, implemented, and tested. 
Throughout the sprint, the team refines the acceptance criteria for each user 
story, which determine when a user story is finished (Leffingwell, 2010). 
While the acceptance criteria are story-specific, the definition of done is an 
artifact that lists additional acceptance criteria for all user stories. This 
artifact lists tasks that need to be completed to maintain the quality of the 
product (e.g., regression testing completed, user documentation updated to 
reflect the new story, and the performance testing benchmark achieved). The 
definition of done contains business-facing tests that provide quality control 
(Rawsthorne and Trainer, 2010). 
Through daily Scrum meetings, the development team discusses their 
progress, highlighting work that they completed since the last meeting, their 
plans until the next meeting, and any potential blockers or issues that are 
hampering their progress. The goal of these meetings is to increase the 
productivity of the development team, bring to attention any issues as soon 
as they appear and continuously monitoring the remaining work to 
reorganize and plan accordingly (Rawsthorne and Shimp, 2011). 
At the end of the sprint is the review. At this stage, the Scrum team and 
stakeholders discuss the results of the sprint. The development team holds a 
demo, presenting the implementation of each story. The product owner 
accepts stories they deem finished while returning incomplete ones to the 
backlog (Knaster and Leffingwell, 2018). 
The last activity is the retrospective, where the team takes the time to reflect 
on and assess the results of the sprint. During this time, the team determines 
what went well in the sprint, what could be improved, and what they will 
improve in the next sprint. 
Figure 2 illustrates the general flow of the Scrum framework (Sutherland and 
Schwaber, 2012). 
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Figure 2 Scrum framework workflow 
1.3 Secure Software Engineering 
Secure software engineering is the broad domain that covers various 
practices that serve to enhance the security of the developed software 
(Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000). We first examine the modern view of 
secure software engineering, called the security development lifecycle, in 
Section 1.3.1. Next, in Section 1.3.2, we place our focus on threat modeling, 
a high-value practice that is difficult to integrate into agile development. We 
then explore a particular type of threat modeling, called security design 
analysis, in Section 1.3.3. 
1.3.1 Security Development Lifecycle 
The security development lifecycle (SDL) is a business process that defines a 
set of practices that augment the software development lifecycle (SDLC) to 
produce demonstrably more secure software. It permeates the whole SDLC, 
expanding each phase of software development with one or more practices. 
Microsoft defined an often-cited catalog of practices that make up their SDL 
(Howard and Lipner, 2006). We summarize the current Microsoft’s SDL 
practices in Table 1. Notably, Microsoft’s SDL practices span a wide range 
of SDLC phases, from requirements engineering, through design and 
implementation, down to the testing and deployment activities. 
Table 1 Summary of Microsoft's SDL practices 
Name Description 
Provide Training 
Ensure that everyone has basic security awareness and is trained 
to perform the security activities related to their job role. 
Define Security 
Requirements 
Update security requirements to align with the changes in the 
developed software, regulatory compliance, and the threat 
landscape. 
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Define Metrics and 
Compliance 
Reporting 
Define the acceptable levels of security quality (e.g., through bug 
bars) and hold development teams accountable to meeting that 
criteria. 
Perform Threat 
Modeling 
Discuss the security of designs in the context of their planned 
operational environment to more effectively identify security 
vulnerabilities and prioritize appropriate mitigations. 
Establish Design 
Requirements 
Define standard security features that all development teams 
should use to avoid design flaws. 
Define and Use 
Cryptographic 
Standards 
Ensure vetted and properly configured cryptography is used to 
protect data. 
Manage the Security 
Risk of Using Third-
Party Components 
Manage the inventory of third-party components used by the 
software, monitor disclosures of their vulnerabilities, and create a 
plan to evaluate and mitigate the reported vulnerabilities. 
Use Approved Tools Maintain a list of approved tools that developers can use. 
Perform Static 
Security Testing 
Analyze source code before compiling to validate adherence to 
the secure coding standard. 
Perform Dynamic 
Security Testing 
Perform run-time security verification and validation of the 
compiled software to test the security of the fully integrated and 
running code. 
Perform Penetration 
Testing 
Uncover vulnerabilities resulting from coding errors, system 
configuration faults, or other deployment weaknesses. 
Establish a 
Standard Incident 
Response Process 
Prepare to address new threats and vulnerabilities in the deployed 
software that emerge over time. 
The traditional SDLs followed the waterfall development model. Since then, 
software vendors have, for the most part, reorganized their development 
business processes to follow various agile development methodologies 
(Kapitsaki and Christou, 2014). As the SDL is a set of security practices, 
applying the waterfall-based SDLs to the agile development environment 
calls for the redistribution of security practices, with or without modification, 
to the agile workflow. Microsoft has adapted its original SDL for the agile 
context (Microsoft, 2018). Their agile SDL contains the same security 
practices as in the waterfall SDL model, distributed in three categories: 
 One-Time practices – security practices conducted at the start of a 
new project; 
 Every-Sprint practices – security practices performed in every sprint; 
 Bucket practices – security practices that are completed periodically, 
spread across multiple sprints during the project lifetime. 
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While Microsoft’s SDL is comprehensive, it does not contain all the notable 
secure development practices found in the literature. Several papers explored 
and compared different processes for constructing secure software. De Win 
et al. (2009) compared the OWASP CLASP (which has since evolved into 
the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model Project (OWASP, 2019)), 
Cigital’s Touchpoints (which has since evolved into the Building Security-In 
Maturity Model (McGraw et al., 2018)), and Microsoft’s SDL. They break 
down the three major secure development processes of the time into 
practices, providing an extensive catalog of 45 security practices. A similar 
study was conducted by Baca and Carlsson (2011), who cataloged and 
compared practices found in Microsoft’s SDL, Cigital’s Touchpoints, and 
the Common Criteria (Keblawi and Sullivan, 2006) security engineering 
processes. After applying the practices to a real-world agile development 
process, they conducted interviews to determine which practices were cost-
efficient. Informed by the discussions, they constructed a hybrid SDL 
process that contained all the practices from the different source that were 
deemed to be cost-efficient. 
The SDL has become the topic of industry standards, where organizations 
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have issued standards that 
define requirements for a secure product development lifecycle (Ross et al., 
2016; IEC, 2018a). Table 2 outlines the different security practices defined in 
the IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard (IEC, 2018a). Compared to Microsoft’s 
SDL, the standard puts great emphasis on security management activities and 
includes the construction of security guidelines for the end-users of the 
developed product. 
Table 2 Summary of the IEC 62443-4-1:2018 secure product development practices 
Name Description 
Security management 
Build a secure development environment where roles and 
responsibilities are clearly defined, and security work is 
appropriately managed. 
Specification of 
security requirements 
Prioritized needs that bring value and are focused through the 
lens of risks, considering regulatory compliance, the threat 
model, and best practices. 
Secure by design 
Design layers of reliable defenses, protecting a minimized 
attack surface of a high-quality product. 
Secure implementation 
Write a resilient code design with secure constructs that 
adhere to the secure coding standard. 
Security verification 
and validation testing 
Verify adherence to security requirements and validate the 
quality of the layered protective controls. 
Management of 
security-related issues 
Detect, assess, prioritize, and address security-related issues in 
running products. 
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Security update 
management 
Construct tested and proven mitigations for new 
vulnerabilities and deliver them promptly. 
Security guidelines Aid all parties that interact with the product in staying secure. 
Regardless of the source, all security development lifecycles span a 
significant portion of the SDLC, if not the complete process. They entail 
many significantly different activities. For example, while security 
management is concerned with monitoring other activities and providing 
proper education to employees, security testing activities entail the use of 
specialized tools. Notably, the modern SDL approaches require that all 
personnel involved in software development perform some security 
activities, based on their role in the process. 
1.3.2 Threat Modeling 
A significant pillar of the SDL is threat modeling, which represents the 
systematic assessment of a software or system design regarding its ability to 
withstand attacks from adversaries (Shostack, 2014b; Synopsys, 2017). At a 
high level, threat modeling takes as input the design of a module1, considers 
its functional and security requirements, and outputs the necessary changes 
to the design and additional requirements (e.g., new development effort, 
requirements for third-party tool integration). Therefore, it is considered both 
a technique for security requirements engineering and secure design 
construction (Türpe, 2017). On the one hand, the result of threat modeling is 
a more secure design, while on the other, this analysis translates one set of 
requirements (i.e., high-level business requirements and security 
requirements) into low-level security requirements that developers can 
understand and fulfill. 
We use the term explicit security requirement to denote concrete security-
related requests for the software, that come from industry standards, 
regulations, and best practices. Examples of explicit requirements include 
securing the confidentiality of payment card information, as defined by PCI 
DSS (PCI, 2018), and the privacy of personal data defined under GDPR 
(GDPR, 2016). The other type of security requirements we call quality 
requirements. These requirements come from stakeholders and are often 
more ambiguous. For example, a stakeholder might define that he wants to 
maintain the integrity of their public website. Threat modeling can then be 
                                                 
1 We use the term module for the target of threat modeling or security design analysis. A 
module represents a software segment of any size. It can be an enterprise system, a single 
application, a single component in an application, or a set of functions provided by the 
software. 
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employed to decompose this request into actionable work items, such as 
building controls for anti-Injection and ensuring proper access control for the 
website files and the application-level functions (Stock et al., 2017). Finally, 
development teams can identify quality security requirements for technical 
assets, even when there are no explicit security requirements. Examples of 
this include the confidentiality of user credentials and cryptographic keys 
and the availability of infrastructure components and functions. Explicit 
security requirements are often easily mapped and threat modeling aids in 
identifying the areas of the software that a requirement addresses. On the 
other hand, quality security requirements must be threat modeled to 
determine actionable work items (Türpe and Poller, 2017). 
This practice finds design flaws and security issues before they enter the 
code, making them uncostly to fix (Security Innovation Europe, 2016). An 
interview of fourteen secure software engineering experts aimed to identify 
security practices that bring the most value to the organization, where threat 
modeling was among the top five practices (Weir et al., 2017). 
There is some confusion regarding what constitutes threat modeling in 
software development, that stems from the two often-used interpretations of 
the term threat (Synopsys, 2017). 
The first interpretation is that the threat is an individual or organization from 
which an attack originates. Threat modeling of these threats entails the 
analysis of these threat agents to determine their motivation and general 
ways in which they can accomplish their goals. This analysis includes 
assessing the attacker’s risk tolerance, their capabilities and opportunities, 
and the resources they might invest in targeting the module under analysis. 
The analyst can then identify high-risk areas of the developed module with a 
general idea of where to invest in security and to what extent. 
The second interpretation sees threats as potential events with unwelcome 
consequences. While such events can be broad in scope (e.g., destruction of 
the system, disclosure of information stored in the datacenter), they support 
lower levels of detail, where examples of specific threats include: 
 Pretending to be a different human when communicating with an 
application (and obtaining that human’s data and privileges); 
 Changing the data as it flows from one software service to another; 
 Performing a sensitive action and refuting doing so. 
By looking at threats as events in the module, it is possible to perform a fine-
grain analysis that finds security design flaws and sensitive areas of the 
module that require more attention. In turn, this form of threat modeling 
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enables the construction of a layered defense in depth for the developed 
software. 
Türpe (2017) examines three dimensions of security requirements and the 
security requirements engineering methods that combine them. The three 
dimensions are: 
 The security goal, an asset-centric view of security requirements 
concerned with protecting security properties (i.e., confidentiality, 
integrity, availability) of assets in the module. This view is common 
for regulatory compliance, as standards and regulations usually define 
security requirements through assets, as well as stakeholders, who 
might not understand security but do know which assets are 
important to them. 
 The threat, an attacker-centric view that defines security requirements 
as a means of preventing an individual or organization from attacking 
the module and accomplishing their malicious goals. Stakeholders 
usually do not understand threats, and the effectiveness of the design 
against threats is difficult to assess. However, threats can guide and 
prioritize secure design construction and can be a useful tool for 
verification tasks. 
 The security design, a software-centric view of security requirements, 
which defines technical security controls that can be traced to 
business-level requirements. This view of requirements is suitable for 
developers that are familiar with technical concepts, although 
eliciting such requirements from stakeholders can be challenging. 
Türpe (2017) notes that examining a single dimension is insufficient to 
define adequate security requirements. However, examining all dimensions 
is a three-variable problem, where any change in one dimension may entail 
changes or new questions in the remaining two. The author suggests 
temporarily fixating a single dimension and focusing on the other two, noting 
that this is the approach used by security requirements engineering 
techniques to reduce the complexity. The techniques that arise by combining 
two dimensions are: 
 Risk analysis (security goal and threat), where goal-threat 
combinations can be ranked by goal importance, expected damage, 
and the likelihood of an incident to determine the risk and prioritize 
further investments. 
 Design process (security goal and security design), where the security 
goals are translated into design decisions, by selecting, placing, and 
configuring security controls around assets. 
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 Security design analysis (threat and security design), where the 
threat’s behavior in the presence of the module is examined, to 
identify events which attackers might provoke to bypass existing 
controls and achieve their goals. 
1.3.3 Security Design Analysis 
Security design analysis, as defined by Türpe (2017), aligns with the second 
interpretation of the threat, as a potential event with unwelcome 
consequences. We base our work around security design analysis (SDA), the 
second interpretation for threat modeling. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, SDA and threat modeling are used 
interchangeably to mean the analysis of a module’s design to identify events 
with unwelcome consequences (i.e., threats), their decomposition into attack 
scenarios that realize them, and the definition of mitigations that resolve 
them. 
Several prominent SDA methodologies are often cited in both scientific and 
grey literature. These include the STRIDE methodology (Hernan et al., 
2006), LINDDUN (Wuyts and Joosen, 2015), PASTA (UcedaVelez and 
Morana, 2015), and Trike (Saitta et al., 2005). Additionally, both the 
scientific and grey literature boasts a plethora of other threat modeling 
techniques, and several surveys were conducted on the topic (Hussain et al., 
2014; Ramesh and Reddy, 2016; Tuma et al., 2018). Furthermore, several 
books were written about threat modeling, offering a practitioner’s insight 
into the intricacies of applying different threat modeling techniques to the 
real world (Ransome and Misra, 2013; Shostack, 2014b; Schoenfield, 2015). 
Regardless of the exact methodology, all SDA methods share a common set 
of high-level steps, as Figure 3 illustrates. 
 
Figure 3 Security design analysis steps 
The primary inputs for SDA include a module’s design artifacts, which are 
analyzed against the set of relevant functional and security requirements to 
assess the security posture of the current design. 
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The goal of module decomposition is to define the scope and understand the 
target of analysis (Synopsys, 2017). This part of SDA examines the module’s 
entry points, from which an attacker might deploy an attack, as well as the 
internal data and control flows to understand how attackers might progress 
through the module to achieve their goal. With an understanding of the 
module’s flows, assets can be mapped to determine the location of the 
attacker’s target in the module. 
The next step is threat analysis, whose purpose is to identify threats or 
events that an attacker might cause to work towards their goal. Identified 
threats are decomposed into specific attacks that can realize the threat. 
Furthermore, threat analysis entails defining mitigations (either existing or 
ones that should be introduced) that prevent the attacks and, consequently, 
the related threats from occurring. 
Finally, risk analysis examines the identified threats and existing mitigation 
to determine the risk. Based on the risk and the proposed mitigations, a 
suitable risk mitigation strategy is selected, which can require design 
changes, additional development work, or other forms of effort. 
The outputs of SDA include a prioritized list of work items that aid product 
management and development teams to secure the examined module. 
Additionally, security assurance is produced by performing and documenting 
SDA, providing evidence that security was addressed during the design of 
the module. 
Different SDA methods vary in how they address each of the three steps 
described above. For module decomposition, a common approach is to use 
data flow diagrams to represent the system (Shostack, 2014b; Wuyts and 
Joosen, 2015). Other methods use UML diagrams to examine potential 
security issues (Jürjens, 2002; Lodderstedt et al., 2002). The highest 
variability between methods is found in the threat analysis method. Each 
approach offers a unique take on how to identify and decompose threats, 
relying on taxonomies like STRIDE (Hernan et al., 2006) and LINDDUN 
(Wuyts and Joosen, 2015), utilizing misuse cases (Alexander, 2003; Sindre 
and Opdahl, 2005), attack trees (Schneier, 1999) or attack pattern libraries 
(Martin, 2007; Barnum, 2008). Risk analysis can be supported by external 
risk management methodologies (Ross, 2011) or more straightforward 
calculations that do not require significant overhead (Shostack, 2014b). 
Importantly, the core distinction of an SDA method is in the way threat 
analysis is conducted, while both module decomposition and risk analysis 
can be swapped between alternatives. 
While the work presented in this thesis can support and utilize most SDA 
methods, we focus our examples and evaluations around the STRIDE SDA 
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method, for several reasons. First, STRIDE is extensively described through 
a series of articles published by Microsoft (Hernan et al., 2006; Shostack, 
2008), as well as a complete book on threat modeling (Shostack, 2014b). 
Next, the scientific literature is full of papers related to the application of 
STRIDE to different technologies (e.g., IPv6 (Georgescu et al., 2016), web 
browser APIs (Dev and Jevitha, 2017), cyber-physical systems (Khan et al., 
2017)) and domains (e.g., online banking (Xin and Xiaofang, 2014), 
telehealth (Abomhara et al., 2015), smart grid (Jelacic et al., 2017)). Finally, 
the method has been studied and tested for usability and effectiveness 
(Scandariato et al., 2015), where the authors experimented with 57 students 
and concluded that STRIDE was not challenging to learn or execute, but it 
did produce many false negatives and was time-consuming. We describe 
STRIDE-based threat analysis in more detail to provide the reader with the 
necessary background for understanding our work. 
STRIDE is a tool for threat identification, a mnemonic where each letter 
represents a threat, specifically: 
 Spoofing – The impersonification of identity and subversion of 
authentication. In the context of software systems, anything from a 
user to a service, message, file, or machine can be spoofed; 
 Tampering – Unauthorized modification of data and loss of integrity. 
In our context, data can be tampered with at rest (e.g., in a file or 
database), in transit (e.g., while traveling over a network channel), or 
during use (e.g., while in active memory or during processing); 
 Repudiation – Lack of action accountability and subversion of non-
repudiation controls, allowing for denial and hiding of performed 
actions; 
 Information Disclosure – Unauthorized access to data and loss of 
confidentiality. As with tampering, data can be accessed at rest, in 
transit, or during use; 
 Denial of Service – Partial or complete denial of authorized access to 
data or systems and loss of availability; 
 Elevation of Privilege – The gain of privileged access and subversion 
of authorization, to gain unauthorized access to information or 
compromise the system. 
The astute reader might notice that spoofing and elevation of privilege lead 
to threats to confidentiality (information disclosure), integrity (tampering), 
and possibly availability (denial of service). The reason for this separation 
lies in non-linear attacks (Gantenbein, 2016), where the attacker performs 
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spoofing and elevation of privilege attacks to “open the door” and gain 
access to the system components for further attacks. 
By expanding the threat view, STRIDE allows for a software-centric 
approach to threat modeling, where the focus is placed on the software 
components and their interaction. This approach is more in line with the 
practice of software development, avoids some of the problems of asset-
centric threat modeling, like the ambiguity of assets, and allows for the 
identification of actionable steps to mitigate threats (Shostack, 2017). 
The idea is to map STRIDE threats to elements of a data flow diagram (that 
were produced as part of module decomposition) following the applicability 
matrix presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Applicability of STRIDE threats to different data flow diagram elements 
Threat 
DFD el. 
Spoofing Tampering Repudiation 
Information 
Disclosure 
Denial of 
Service 
Elevation 
of Privilege 
Process X X X X X X 
Data store  X  X X  
Data flow  X  X X  
External 
Entity 
X  X    
For each identified threat, the appropriate decomposition is required, which 
includes the identification of attacks that can realize the threat, vulnerabilities 
that enable them, and security controls that mitigate them. While threat 
identification can be completed without any expert knowledge, threat 
decomposition requires an interdisciplinary skillset. For this, the threat 
modeling team needs to be aware of both general and technology-specific 
security concepts (i.e., attacks, vulnerabilities, controls) to complete this 
exercise effectively. Finally, the identified threats and mitigations serve as 
input for risk analysis, which can prioritize further work items, as described 
above. 
1.4 Problem Statement and Hypothesis 
Baca et al. (2011) applied practices from Microsoft’s SDL to an agile 
development process practiced in Ericsson AB. They conducted interviews 
with personnel involved in software development to assess the applicability 
and effectiveness of the different security practices. The discussions 
concluded that Microsoft’s SDL had a significant adverse effect on the agile 
development process, criticizing practices such as threat modeling for being 
too costly to conduct. Similar conclusions were presented by Oyetoyan et al. 
(2016), where Microsoft’s Agile SDL was criticized for being too unwieldy 
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for the agile context. Traditional SDA is conducted during the early design 
phase. Incremental development approaches, such as Scrum, can drastically 
change the software’s design throughout its development, making the results 
of the initial security design analysis obsolete. Therefore, some form of 
incremental threat modeling is required to compensate for this, but this is not 
possible if threat modeling is too costly to conduct. 
Security design analysis is challenging to integrate into contemporary 
software development methodologies. One issue arises from the inherent 
complexity of SDA. As it is both difficult to learn and teach (Shostack, 
2014b; Schoenfield, 2015), Scrum teams often do not possess enough 
security knowledge to perform it effectively (Morrison et al., 2017). 
Schoenfield (2015) points out that apprenticeship programs, where an 
experienced security analyst teaches interns the art of SDA, are a viable way 
to train someone in performing quality SDA. However, this is a slow process 
that is hard to scale, which is why a more efficient solution is required for 
training Scrum teams on how to perform SDA. 
Poller et al. (2017) identified a different set of problems with security 
engineering processes such as Microsoft’s SDL and Cigital’s Touchpoints, 
concerning agile development. The authors conducted a long-term empirical 
study in which they examined the organizational impact that a security 
consultation had on a large, multinational software vendors’ development 
process. While the security assessment and workshops conducted by the 
consultants resulted in an initial rise of awareness and enthusiasm for 
developing secure software, after two months most of the initiative has 
faded, and no lasting consequences of the security consultation were 
observed. The authors identified several key factors that influenced the 
outcome. A major issue is unaccountability of work, where security work is 
intangible and not part of the binding agreement between the managers and 
development teams. Finally, security engineering processes, such as 
Microsoft’s SDL and Citigtal’s Touchpoints, do not offer appropriate 
guidance for organizations and developers on how to adapt the different 
practices to their workflow. 
As presented in (Luburić et al., 2018a), there exist several applicability 
issues that hamper the efficient practice of security requirements 
engineering, including SDA, in Scrum development: 
 Complexity – If the security analysis technique introduces new types 
of documentation, additional job roles, or requires much training to 
practice effectively, it works against agility and therefore cannot 
complement agile development; 
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 Unaccountability – If security is intangible and not part of the 
binding agreement between the managers and development teams, it 
will not be done as it cannot be accounted for; 
 Lack of Guidance – If the security analysis technique does not offer 
appropriate guidance, which includes examples of usage and tailoring 
considerations, it will require significant effort to introduce to an 
organization. 
Based on this, we define the problem through the following research 
questions: 
RQ 1. How to efficiently train Scrum teams to perform security design 
analysis? 
RQ 2. How to efficiently integrate security design analysis into Scrum 
development, providing the appropriate security assurance and 
visibility of security work? 
Based on these questions, we define the hypothesis around which the thesis 
is based. It can be summarized as follows: 
 It is possible for a Scrum team to practice security design analysis 
throughout a software’s development lifecycle, assuring that 
sufficient security is built into the software solution, provided that: 
o Adequate training is provided to the Scrum team to perform 
security design analysis efficiently. 
o The security design analysis is compatible with the Scrum 
development process, does not require the introduction of new 
roles to the team, and does not mandate the construction of 
heavyweight documentation. 
o Security work is tangible and can be planned and prioritized 
like any other work item. 
o Enough guidance and knowledge exist to adopt, use, and 
adapt the method to a specific organization’s context. 
From this hypothesis, we derive the primary goals of the proposed research, 
where the expected results include: 
1) The construction of a framework for developing training laboratories 
for software engineers to effectively learn SDA. The SDA Training 
Framework addresses the first research question and is the topic of 
Chapter 3. 
2) The definition of a process around SDA that sufficiently addresses 
the applicability issues defined in (Luburić et al., 2018a) and provides 
assurance that enough security is built into the developed software. 
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This method addresses the second research question and is the topic 
of Chapter 4. 
3) The utilization of the SDA Training Framework to integrate, support, 
and continuously improve the SDA process, defined under the second 
goal. When combined, these two methods support agile software 
development and comply with the requirements for SDA established 
by standard-defined security development lifecycles. 
To fulfill the Guidance requirement, the results of the proposed research will 
include: 
 Demonstrations of the SDA Training Framework execution, to 
develop labs for training different aspects of SDA and instructions on 
how best to utilize the framework. 
 Guidelines for tailoring the SDA method to organizations with 
varying security requirements for their software. 
 Instructions on how to utilize the SDA Training Framework to first 
introduce the SDA method to an organization and then to 
continuously improve its execution. 
 Explanations about how both the SDA method and training 
framework integrate with other SDL practices, and how they answer 
the requirements imposed by SDL industry standards, such as IEC 
62443-4-1: Secure product development lifecycle (IEC, 2018a). 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Throughout this introductory Chapter, we defined the problems that this 
thesis addresses and presented the necessary background to anchor our work. 
Here we outline the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review, where we examine methods for 
integrating SDA into agile development. We analyze teaching methods 
suitable for training software engineers SDA to address our first research 
question. We further examine existing SDA techniques and requirements for 
such techniques coming from both industry standards and the agile workflow 
to address the second research question. 
Chapter 3 details our SDA Training Framework, used for teaching software 
engineers on how to conduct SDA. The framework constructs educational 
materials and assignments for training workshops. Here we also demonstrate 
the use of the framework and its evaluation in an undergraduate university 
course setting. 
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Chapter 4 describes our Security Analysis and Threat Modeling of User 
Stories (SATMUS) process. SATMUS is a method for SDA that is 
compatible with agile software development practices and provides 
accountability of work. Here we provide guidance for method execution and 
tailoring and present two case study implementations of SATMUS. 
Chapter 5 combines the work presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and 
demonstrates how to integrate SDA into agile development by using the 
SDA Training Framework and the SATMUS process. Here we also examine 
how our work interacts with practices from well-established security 
development lifecycle approaches. 
Chapter 6 concludes our work and presents opportunities for further research 
and development. 
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2 Research Review 
In this Chapter, we present the results of our research reviews aimed at 
understanding how to effectively train software engineers the practice of 
SDA, as well as how to adapt the SDA to make it suitable for the agile 
development process, addressing the applicability issues discussed earlier. 
To answer the first part of the hypothesis defined in Section 1.4 and the 
research question related to defining adequate training for SDA, we surveyed 
the literature for methods used to teach secure software engineering in 
general, and SDA in particular. Section 2.1 presents the results of our 
literature review. To address the remainder of the hypothesis and the second 
research question, we examined the literature for security design analysis 
methods that were specifically designed for agile development 
methodologies, as well as a few industry standards which address this topic. 
The results of this research review are presented in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Training Approaches for Secure Software 
Engineering 
As the traditional classroom is considered to train engineers the practice of 
security design analysis inefficiently, we examine the literature to find 
alternative teaching methods that could be used to achieve this learning 
objective. This research was initially published in (Luburić et al., 2019a) and 
is expanded here. 
Section 2.1.1 describes case study analysis, a teaching method that fosters 
critical thinking and is suitable for inductive reasoning. Next, we examine 
the use of games in education in Section 2.1.2, where several publications 
address security design analysis through gamification. In Section 2.1.3, we 
explore the hybrid flipped classroom, a combination of the traditional and 
flipped classroom that promises to develop the security skills and expertise 
required for SDA. Section 2.1.4 presents teaching approaches that benefit 
from e-learning. Here we select parts of the literature reviews published in 
our previous work (Luburić et al., 2016, 2019b) and discuss the use of 
specialized tools for teaching different secure software engineering concepts. 
Finally, in Section 2.1.5, we summarize the results of our literature review 
and highlight the primary influences for the work presented in Chapter 3. 
2.1.1 Case Study Analysis 
Research was conducted under the National Science Foundation project 
“Developing case studies for information assurance education” (NSF, 2008). 
As a result of the project, 12 case studies were created to be used in 
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information assurance and risk management courses. Several publications 
were released that present the use of these case studies in different courses, 
where the impact on student learning was assessed. In general, the results 
showed that the use of the case study method was effective and that it 
enhanced learning. 
Varma and Garg (2005) discuss how different conventional and non-
conventional teaching methods do not achieve quality learning outcomes in 
the field of software engineering. They declare case study analysis as an 
effective teaching technique for software engineering, where complexity and 
intricacies related to the field of software engineering can only fully be 
experienced by examining a realistic case study. 
Meneely and Lucidi (2013) examine real-world vulnerabilities as case 
studies. They introduce the Vulnerability of the Day, where during the first 
10 minutes of each class, the teaching staff demonstrates a vulnerability 
through live code examples. The class discusses implications of the 
vulnerability, how to exploit it, the negative impact it can have on the 
system, and what are the appropriate mitigations. While no formal evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the teaching method was performed, the authors note 
the overwhelming interest of the students for this activity, measured through 
questionnaires. 
Case study analysis immerses students in realistic situations, where they 
must deal with incomplete information, conflicting goals, and time 
(Andersen and Schiano, 2014). The class discussion that emerges during case 
study analysis stimulates the development of students’ critical thinking skill. 
As many students are more inductive than deductive reasoners, they learn 
better from examples than from logical assertions that build upon basic 
principles (Dunne and Brooks, 2004). The use of case studies can, therefore, 
be a very effective classroom technique. According to (Dunne and Brooks, 
2004), the case study should fulfill the following requirements: 
 It represents a general issue beyond the case itself, tells an engaging 
story, and focuses on an interest-arousing, controversial issue, where 
it poses a problem that has no obvious right answer; 
 It requires the reader to use both the presented information in the case 
study, as well as critical and analytical thinking, to address the 
problem, and 
 It has just enough information for proper analysis and is relevant to 
the students. 
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2.1.2 Gamification 
Gamification has gained some traction when it comes to teaching 
cybersecurity. Over the years, several card games were produced to facilitate 
cybersecurity education, with many focusing on SDA. A group of 
researchers constructed a card game called Control-Alt-Hack, which acts as a 
light-weight learning tool that raises awareness about cybersecurity and 
offers teaching staff a light-hearted way to talk about threats, attacks, and 
countermeasures (Denning et al., 2013). They evaluate their approach by 
distributing copies of the game to a dozen information security courses, 
along with a survey to be filled by the teaching staff. The results of the 
questionnaire show that the game is well received and accomplishes the goal 
of facilitating interactive cybersecurity education. 
Williams et al. (2010) invented a security risk assessment game for agile 
development called Protection Poker. The agile team plays Protection Poker 
for every product development iteration, as part of a dedicated planning 
meeting. They identify and rank the security risks of each feature that is 
planned for development in the upcoming iteration. Through this activity, it 
is possible to identify additional security mechanisms that must be 
implemented to maintain an acceptable risk level across the product. The 
authors conducted a feasibility study with undergraduate students to 
determine the method’s practicality. Tøndel et al. (2018) observe the use of 
Protection Poker in Norwegian companies and determine the benefits and 
challenges of adopting it. They praise Protection Poker for raising security 
awareness and facilitating a discussion around the subject. However, the 
authors note that the discussion must be guided and that the time it takes to 
play can be significant. Furthermore, the game does not provide a 
mechanism for validating the quality of the output. 
Taking a similar approach, Shostack produced the Elevation of Privilege card 
game intended to teach developers at Microsoft the craft of SDA (Shostack, 
2014a). Through his research, Shostack identified that the primary challenge 
to efficient SDA is the lack of intuition when it comes to determining threats, 
attack vectors, and security controls on a real system. Shostack notes that 
implementing security features is usually only slightly more challenging than 
implementing any software feature. However, understanding where an 
attacker might strike or how an asset might be compromised is something 
that alludes many software developers. Elevation of Privilege was explicitly 
designed to teach cybersecurity in an enticing, supportive, and non-
threatening way. No experimental evaluation is performed to test the 
efficiency of Elevation of Privilege. 
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One novel approach to developing the intuition that Shostack mentions was 
proposed by Kohno and Johnson (2011). In their work, the authors concur 
that the students need to attain a mindset focused on the broader societal and 
contextual issues surrounding information security. They use science fiction 
prototyping to stimulate such thinking, where students are asked to research 
about cutting-edge technologies, extrapolate their development to the near 
future, and imagine threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and controls related to 
these future systems. While the authors note the usefulness of science fiction 
prototyping, no experiment nor evaluation is presented. 
Krutz et al. (2015) utilize a role-playing game in the classroom. Students 
have to design a secure system, where one student acts as a malicious insider 
whose goal is to produce a flawed design, which can allow an attacker to 
infiltrate the system once it is created. This activity pins the students against 
each other without knowing who the insider is, stimulating a fun 
environment in which the students learn about threat analysis by identifying 
attacks and countermeasures. No experiment was conducted to test the 
effectiveness of this method, but student satisfaction was rated using a 
questionnaire based on a Likert scale. 
2.1.3 Hybrid Flipped Classroom 
Recently, Carranza and DeCusatis (2015) critiqued the conventional 
approaches employed in cybersecurity education, both at universities and in 
industry-certified programs. The authors recognized a tendency to emphasize 
memorization of facts over a more in-depth cognitive understanding of the 
subject. They propose the use of the flipped classroom model to teach 
cybersecurity, where students are expected to complete weekly reading 
assignments, after which they discuss the subject matter with the teaching 
staff through consultations. Furthermore, the authors examine a variant of the 
flipped classroom, called the hybrid flipped classroom. Here, students 
additionally attend group lectures to gain a different view from the textbook 
on complex topics like encryption and public key infrastructure. Once again, 
no formal evaluation was conducted to test the efficiency of the hybrid 
flipped classroom. 
Researchers from the Anderson School of Management examined 
cybersecurity training initiatives and awareness campaigns held in 
corporations (Kassicieh et al., 2015). The article examines different types of 
cybersecurity training and awareness methodologies and tools. The authors 
conclude that the current cybersecurity training and awareness programs are 
limited in their efficacy and list several ways in which this can be improved, 
including the use of the flipped classroom. 
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2.1.4 E-Learning 
E-learning is concerned with effective multimedia learning using information 
and communication technology (Mayer and Moreno, 1998). At its purest 
form, e-learning can be supported with the use of a PowerPoint presentation 
or a video describing a specific subject matter. 
More elaborate uses of e-learning entail the use of software created for the 
sole purpose of teaching a specific subject matter. The papers (Dios et al., 
2008; Lovejoy and Wickert, 2015) point out the importance of using 
software tailored for a course in laboratory exercises. By using the Moodle 
learning management system and Maple software, which is a heavyweight 
toolset for supporting mathematical and technical courses, a cryptography 
course held in the Salamanca University, Spain, was presented by Dios et al. 
(2008). Lovejoy and Wickert (2015) show how a signals and systems course 
greatly benefited from using Python and, specifically, the IPython notebook, 
which is a computational notebook that combines images, formulas, text and 
interactive code snippets. Both papers noted improvements in the educational 
experience of their students, owing to the use of specialized software. 
A specialized set of e-learning tools, called vulnerable software packages 
(VSP), are used for learning about attacks, vulnerabilities, and defenses 
related to software systems. Pohl et al., (2015) present BREW, a VSP 
designed to teach students how to find and exploit vulnerabilities as an 
attacker and to subsequently identify the issues in the code and resolve them 
as a defender. The authors define different educational usage scenarios, 
offering guidance on how to integrate BREW into different classrooms. 
Furthermore, they list settings where BREW has been successfully integrated 
into lectures and lab exercise. 
Walden (2008) utilizes the OWASP WebGoat VSP to teach web security 
attacks and vulnerabilities, focusing on SQL injection attacks. He created 
several labs, where they attacked WebGoat manually and with the aid of 
security testing tools. The OWASP WebGoat is a maintained VSP, currently 
standing as a medium-level project in the OWASP organization. It provides 
an impressive array of challenges, presented as a collection of exercises. 
2.1.5 Literature Review Results 
During our experience with teaching students the security design analysis, 
we found that even students who did not attend laboratory exercises had little 
trouble learning how to use and implement security controls once they knew 
which specific controls to implement. However, the question of when a 
security control is needed, when to use a specific security control, and how it 
could be bypassed had alluded many students, even the ones that attended 
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every class, signifying the lack of critical thinking and the in-depth 
understanding of the subject. These findings fall in line with the conclusions 
made by Carranza and DeCusatis (2015), as well as Shostack (2014a). Based 
on this, we decided that the hybrid flipped classroom, as described in Section 
2.1.3, would be suitable for our context. We gave reading materials for 
students to learn on their own what specific security controls exist and how 
to use them while using the laboratory exercise to put more emphasis on 
recognizing when to use them. To facilitate the development of critical 
thinking, we utilized the case study analysis technique, as described in 
Section 2.1.1. 
The most notable research that inspired our new course design and initial 
version of the training framework includes (Carranza and DeCusatis, 2015) 
and (Kassicieh et al., 2015) for the hybrid flipped classroom, as well as the 
articles related to the use of case studies in the classroom, especially those 
developed under the NSF project (NSF, 2008; Andersen i Schiano, 2014). 
Other examined literature did affect our overall design, and we have 
expanded our framework to utilize both gamification, as described in Section 
2.1.2, and an e-learning platform in the form of a vulnerable software 
package, as presented in Section 2.1.4. By utilizing these methods, we 
created an SDA Training Framework, which is described in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Agile-based Security Design Analysis 
Methods 
In this Section, we examine the scientific literature of the past decade for 
security analysis techniques designed to identify security requirements and 
increase the security posture of software products developed following the 
agile development methodologies. 
First, we present a review of security requirements engineering (SRE) 
methods based on security design analysis. We examine how the proposed 
methods address the applicability issues of Complexity, Accountability, and 
Lack of Guidance, as defined in the problem statement in Section 1.4. The 
results, initially published in (Luburić et al., 2018a), are presented in Section 
2.2.1. Next, we examine several papers that, through literature review or case 
study analysis, identify additional issues when introducing SDA to agile 
development. We present these conclusions in Section 2.2.2. In Section 
2.2.3, we analyze several industry standards that define requirements for the 
secure software development lifecycle, paying particular attention to the 
requirements that directly address security design analysis. Finally, in 
Section 2.2.4, we compile the results of our literature review and draw 
conclusions which guide the construction of our SDA method. 
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2.2.1 Applicability Issues in Agile Security Requirements 
Engineering 
We analyze a recent systematic mapping study on the topic of security in 
agile requirements engineering (Villamizar et al., 2018), from which we 
extract methods applicable to the Scrum framework, excluding other agile 
development techniques. We further examine the literature for any additional 
relevant methodologies. 
We analyze each method to determine the extent to which it has issues of 
Complexity, Unaccountability, and Lack of Guidance. We do this by rating 
each technique on how well it fulfills the following requirements: 
1. Simplicity – The security analysis technique should not mandate the 
introduction of additional types of documentation or job roles. 
Additionally, the method should require as little training as possible 
to practice effectively. This requirement answers the Complexity 
issue. 
2. Accountability – The security analysis technique should be integrated 
into the standard agile development workflow and produce visible 
and quantifiable action items. This requirement answers the 
Unaccountability issue. 
3. Guidance – The security analysis technique should be fully 
documented, offering illustrative examples of its use, as well as 
advice for integration into different real-world contexts. This 
requirement addresses the Lack of Guidance issue and partially 
Unaccountability, as the execution of ambiguous methods cannot be 
sufficiently accounted for. 
Peeters (2005) introduces the concept of abuser stories – a user story that 
describes how a threat agent can achieve a goal that compromises the system 
or its assets. Abuser stories represent a skeleton for the threat model, but lack 
adequate requirement traceability to provide security assurance. Regarding 
Simplicity, abuser stories introduce a simple and intuitive artifact, while not 
requiring any new roles. Training needs are not discussed. Accountability is 
not addressed, as it is both unclear when sufficient abuser stories have been 
defined and what development work needs to be done to resolve the abuser 
story. While the original paper is concise and does not offer much regarding 
Guidance, abuser stories have been around for over a decade, and several 
papers have utilized this concept and offered some illustrative examples 
(Tondel et al., 2008; Mellado et al., 2010). 
Baca et al. (2015) present an extended Security-Enhanced Agile Software 
Development Process (SEAP), which was practiced in Ericsson AB. The 
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method introduces four roles in the agile development process, including the 
security manager, security architect, security master, and penetration tester. 
Activities conducted by the penetration tester are out of the scope of our 
context. Regarding Simplicity, SEAP mandates the introduction of several 
new roles to the organization, most prominently the security master who 
expands the Scrum team. As a result, the development team does not require 
any training, as the security master performs the security assessment. The 
paper does not discuss the documentation resulting from the analysis. 
Regarding Accountability, the process outlines the activities that need to be 
conducted by the development team. Finally, regarding Guidance, the only 
resources provided by the authors is the paper that documents the SEAP 
flow, practiced in Ericsson AB, which lists roles and their responsibilities in 
the process. No examples of use or tailoring guidelines are presented. 
Pohl and Hof (2015) describe Secure Scrum, where they expand user stories 
with S-Tags – descriptions of security concerns related to one or more 
backlog items. S-Tags represent security-related effort (e.g., in the form of 
new user stories, specialized testing, research). During the implementation of 
a user story, all related S-Tags need to be present in the sprint backlog, 
where the definition of done states that verification needs to make sure that 
all present S-Tags are resolved. Regarding Simplicity, Secure Scrum defines 
an additional, although simple, documentation type and no new roles. 
Training requirements are not discussed. Defining security-related effort in 
the backlog in the form of an S-Tag helps achieve Accountability. Regarding 
Guidance, it is unclear how to implement Secure Scrum in an organization 
efficiently. For example, the generalized nature of S-Tags as “anything 
security-related” is susceptible to threat explosion (Tuma et al., 2017), where 
developers can virtually indefinitely populate the backlog with new S-Tags. 
This raises an issue with Accountability, as it is unclear how to identify S-
Tags, and therefore determine when this activity is complete. Finally, there is 
no guidance on how to tailor the process for different contexts, as well as no 
illustrative examples to show the process in action. 
Azham et al. (2011) introduce a security analysis process for agile 
development based around a new document, the security backlog. The 
security backlog is managed by a new role, the security master, who 
processes the product backlog to identify security concerns with user stories, 
which are then entered into the security backlog. Regarding Simplicity, the 
security backlog approach introduces a new document structure, a new role, 
as well as a process which is disjoint from the development process. As the 
security master manages the security backlog, the development team does 
not require additional training. Accountability is achieved as the security 
master processes security-related concerns into user stories, where the 
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developers are required to perform only development tasks. Regarding 
Guidance, while the general flow of the security backlog management 
process is present, the details are not documented. In a later paper (Ghani et 
al., 2014), the authors showcase an illustrative example of the method used 
in an industry-based case study. There is no process tailoring guidance. 
Mougouei et al. (2013) present S-Scrum, an expansion to the Scrum 
framework that introduces three types of security-related research spikes. 
The first type of the research spike is conducted after release planning, where 
a security analysis is performed on the backlog, potentially introducing new 
items into the backlog. Then, the next spike is issued for security modeling, 
to incorporate the results of the security analysis into the software design. 
The final type of research spike entails a detailed security analysis for each 
sprint. Regarding Simplicity, the method does not introduce new documents 
or roles, while training needs are not discussed. However, S-Scrum offers 
little regarding Accountability, as it is unclear when the proposed research 
spikes are considered done. Furthermore, there is very little Guidance 
provided by the paper, as the research spikes are vague in their purpose and 
offer no detailed description of how to efficiently conduct them. 
Additionally, the article provides no illustrative examples and no tailoring 
guidance. 
Singhal (2011) describes the Agile Security Framework. This framework is 
presented as an end-to-end security development lifecycle for agile 
development, covering SRE and other activities (e.g., penetration testing). 
We focus on the SRE activities of the framework, where abuser stories, 
attack trees, and threat modeling is utilized to discover threats and attacks, 
and form requirements which mitigate them. Regarding Simplicity, the 
method introduces several artifacts (e.g., abuser stories, attack trees) and 
mentions a new role (i.e., security expert). The author recommends dedicated 
security training. Accountability is achieved through a method that 
decomposes abuser stories to make sure that relevant threats are identified, 
and appropriate mitigations are planned, which results in the construction of 
acceptance tests. Guidance is partially achieved, as the paper presents an 
extensive description of the method, coupled with illustrative examples of 
use, but no guidance is provided for tailoring the technique to different 
contexts. 
In (Othmane et al., 2014a, 2014b), the authors examine how to construct 
secure software incrementally. They introduce security assurance cases and 
present an expansion to the agile development process that entails the 
construction of these documents. Security assurance cases are structures that 
provide evidence that the developed software is acceptably secure and 
constructing such a body of evidence requires appropriate threat modeling 
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and security requirement analysis. It should be noted that the papers place 
greater emphasis on the end product of SRE (i.e., the security assurance case) 
and not the SRE method itself. Regarding Simplicity, the paper introduces a 
new document type that needs to be constructed, reviewed, and maintained. 
Furthermore, the article mentions the security expert role during the process 
of creating the security assurance case and notes that security training is 
required for developers. Concerning Accountability, the security assurance 
case is a well-structured body of evidence that can be directly mapped to 
work that needs to be realized. Finally, enough Guidance is given for 
executing all the tasks related to security assurance case construction, and 
two illustrative examples are presented in the papers. No tailoring guidance 
is offered. 
Rindell et al. (2015) present an expanded Scrum framework (called VAHTI-
Scrum) that is meant to be compliant with the Finnish security standard 
collection (VAHTI). As such, it is concerned with security throughout the 
whole software development lifecycle, where we once again focus on the 
SRE activities. Regarding Simplicity, VAHTI-Scrum introduces a new role 
to each Scrum team, the security developer, responsible for security reviews, 
security test cases, and other security-relevant work. The Scrum master is 
required to have substantial security knowledge. The method introduces 
threat modeling and application risk analysis, although it is unclear when 
these activities should be conducted. The process is further expanded by 
adding “sprint zero” for security analysis and periodic hardening sprints to 
enhance the security of the software. The method addresses Accountability 
by relying on the expertise of the security developer when completing well-
known tasks such as threat modeling. While the paper explains the roles and 
responsibilities, it offers only minor tailoring Guidance and does not present 
any illustrative examples. 
Table 4 summarizes the extent to which each SRE method has achieved the 
goals of Simplicity, Accountability, and Guidance. 
Table 4 Agile SRE methods in relation to Simplicity, Accountability, and Guidance 
Method Simplicity Accountability Guidance 
Abuser Stories 
(Peeters, 2005) 
Full Partial Partial 
SEAP 
(Baca et al., 2015) 
Partial Full Insufficient 
Secure Scrum 
(Pohl and Hof, 2015) 
Full Partial Insufficient 
Security Backlog 
(Azham et al., 2011) 
Partial Full Partial 
S-Scrum 
(Mougouei et al., 2013) 
Full Insufficient Insufficient 
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Agile Sec. Framework 
(Singhal, 2011) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
Sec. assurance case 
(Othmane et al., 2014a) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
VAHTI-Scrum 
(Rindell et al., 2015) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
From these results, we draw several conclusions: 
1. Guidance is insufficiently addressed. Three out of eight methods are 
presented in a single paper and offer little more than basic illustrative 
examples. No paper provides sufficient guidelines for tailoring the 
technique to different organizational contexts. 
2. Full Accountability is only achieved when a dedicated security expert 
exists in the process. However, most such methods are too 
complicated and fail to address the Simplicity requirement. 
3. Methods that fulfill the Simplicity requirement do not explain when 
the security analysis is done, which is why they can only partially 
satisfy the Accountability requirement. Furthermore, simple methods 
often lack proper Guidance, hinting at their lack of maturity. 
2.2.2 Additional Issues with Agile Security Design 
Analysis 
In (Tuma et al., 2018), the authors conducted a systematic literature review 
for security design analysis techniques, where they examined 26 
methodologies to determine their inputs, outputs, and internal workings. 
Furthermore, they analyze the current state of their adoption in contemporary 
software engineering trends, such as agile and DevOps, and discuss obstacles 
for their adoption. The authors present several applicability issues that 
impede the adoption of SDA in agile development and list recommendations 
to solve them, which include: 
1. Insufficient use of automatization 
a. There is little support for traceability between the discovered 
threats and the implemented code that can ensure that any 
change to the code that introduces a vulnerability does not go 
unnoticed. 
b. There is little support for composition of SDA results, where 
in practice the software systems are too large to be analyzed 
all at once, which is why SDA is performed on subsystems or 
components of the complete software. 
c. Time-consuming steps of the SDA activity, such as impact 
analysis, are not offloaded to tools. 
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2. Lack of Definition of Done 
a. It is up to the analyst to determine which part of the analyzed 
software should be decomposed to discover critical threats. 
b. It is up to the analyst to determine which threats are relevant 
and when all the critical threats have been discovered. 
c. It is up to the analyst to determine the abstraction level and 
what constitutes a unit of analysis. 
3. Lack of guidance 
a. Most of the methods do not precisely define all the steps of 
execution. 
b. Most of the tools that support an SDA method do not have a 
proper manual. 
Galvez and Gurses (2018) explore the challenges and opportunities of 
introducing privacy threat modeling to agile development of service-oriented 
architectures. Privacy threat modeling entails discovering, addressing, and 
validating threats that affect the realization of privacy goals. The authors 
conclude that agile development enables effective, iterative analysis and 
resolution of complicated problems, at the expense of comprehensive end-to-
end design analysis. They identify 21 challenges, some of which arise from 
agile development and others from service-oriented architectures. The 
challenges related to agile development can roughly be grouped into the 
following categories: 
1. Changing environment 
a. Maintaining an up-to-date threat model is difficult in an 
environment that emphasizes working software over 
documentation. 
b. High-level threat models lack important details and can lead 
to vague privacy threats and requirements, while low-level 
threat models focus on a single component and can miss 
critical privacy threats and requirements that affect multiple 
components. 
c. Frequent changes in the software can introduce, change, or 
remove threats and keeping the relevant threat list up-to-date 
is difficult in an environment where both threats and software 
evolve. 
2. Lack of expertise and guidance 
a. Deriving threats and requirements from threat modeling and 
prioritizing them can be time-consuming. 
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b. Customers may not possess enough domain knowledge to 
elaborate on the impact of low-level privacy requirements. 
c. Threat catalogs are limited, and developers may focus on 
unrealistic threats and attack scenarios, where analyzing 
realistic attack scenarios requires much creativity. 
Finally, Cruzes et al. (2018) elaborate on the challenges and experiences of 
performing security design analysis in the agile development process of a 
specific software vendor. They perform action research (Davison et al., 
2004) by facilitating the adoption of STRIDE-based security design analysis 
(Shostack, 2014b) to the software vendor’s development process. The 
authors observe SDA sessions conducted by the development teams and 
conducting interviews with members of the teams to discover the main 
challenges and ways in which the SDA method can be adapted to suit the 
agile workflow better. The result is a list of 21 challenges, from which we 
derive the following conclusions and list the challenges that support them: 
1. Development teams shy away from producing SDA documentation, 
especially when they do not perceive it as valuable. 
a. Teams did not document the list of assets relevant to the 
components they were developing as they did not see the 
value in this activity. 
b. It was challenging to motivate the teams to document the data 
flow diagrams required for threat analysis, as this was 
perceived as a time-consuming activity. 
c. Teams did not want to update the data flow diagrams 
frequently, as they could not determine a suitable moment for 
this activity. 
d. Teams did not want to follow up on threats and document 
them in more detail after the initial threat modeling meeting. 
2. Development teams lack the expertise and guidance necessary for 
efficient SDA. 
a. Many discussions around threats and mitigation strategies got 
lost, signaling a lack of structure and guidance. 
b. It was hard to decide the right level of abstraction for the 
DFDs, as high-level diagrams lacked essential details, while 
low-level diagrams lead to less effective meetings. 
c. It was hard to determine when enough analysis was done, and 
when all the critical threats were identified and decomposed. 
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d. The threat modeling meetings were not productive, causing 
frustration among team members. 
e. There was a need for a security expert to run the meeting, 
which was a resource that most teams did not have. 
f. The outputs of the threat modeling sessions were a list of 
concerns and threats which were not actual work items. 
2.2.3 Relevant Industry Standards 
We explore the “IEC 62443, Security for industrial automation and control 
systems - Part 4-1: Secure product development lifecycle requirements” 
standard (IEC, 2018a). As SDA is concerned with security requirements 
engineering and constructing a secure design, we examine the parts of the 
standard that address security requirements and secure design. 
The purpose of the security requirements specification practice, as defined by 
IEC (2018a), is to document the security capabilities that are required for a 
product along with the security capabilities expected of its production 
environment. The first part of this practice entails the definition of the 
product security context, a set of security-related assumptions about the 
environment in which the product will operate, which guide the definition 
and prioritization of threats and security requirements for the product. The 
second part of this practice requires the construction and maintenance of a 
threat model of the product, detailing its data flows, stores, and processes, as 
well as threats and mitigations. The rest of the practice is concerned with 
specifying and documenting explicit security requirements, which can affect 
SDA but are not an integral part of it. 
The secure by design practice (IEC, 2018a) entails the construction of a 
secure software design with multiple layers of defenses following the 
defense in depth principle. This applies to both conceptual and detailed 
design for the developed product. This practice is directly concerned with 
security design analysis, where the goal is to develop and document a secure 
design that identifies and protects all external and internal interfaces that 
cross a trust boundary. The SDA is further guided by the defense in depth 
principle, as well as secure design best practices like attack surface 
reduction, least privilege, and economy of mechanisms. 
Next, we examine the “NIST SP 800-160 vol. 1, Systems Security 
Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the 
Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems” (Ross et al., 2016). This 
publication provides a basis for secure system engineering, describing the 
various security activities, principles, and concepts that integrate into the 
system development lifecycle. Here we are concerned with the technical 
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processes that address the construction of a secure architecture and its 
translation into a secure design. 
The architecture definition process described by Ross et al. (2016) defines a 
set of security viewpoints of the system’s architecture based on the 
stakeholders’ security concerns. Through threat modeling, candidate 
architectures are constructed, each addressing the security concerns in 
different ways to inform risk assessment and management, where the goal is 
to select a candidate architecture that optimizes security against other 
requirements. The architecture is then mapped to the design definition 
process, where security design analysis is employed at the subsystem and 
component level to ensure the construction and maintenance of a secure 
design. 
2.2.4 Literature Review Results 
From the conclusions listed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we derive several 
guiding principles for developing an SDA method that is compatible with 
agile development: 
 High complexity contradicts agile development principles. 
Organizations that favor agility will not adopt complicated SDA 
methods. 
 Some security expertise is required to achieve Accountability of 
security analysis work. Dedicated personnel or training for the Scrum 
team is mandated. Furthermore, security analysis must be time-
slotted to provide a stopping condition when the analysis is 
considered done. 
 Organizations need Guidance to adopt an SDA method, which 
includes a detailed explanation of the technique, illustrative examples 
of its use, and tailoring guidance for adapting the SDA to their 
context. 
We follow these principles to define a security design analysis method. 
Furthermore, we consider requirements for security requirements 
engineering and secure design construction practices, as presented in Section 
2.2.3, to construct a method that can be used to address this regulatory 
compliance. The resulting SDA method is presented in Chapter 4. 
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3 SDA Training Framework 
This Chapter details our solution for the first research question and the first 
segment of the hypothesis listed in Section 1.4, related to providing adequate 
training to software engineers on the topic of security design analysis. The 
proposed solution is the SDA Training Framework, which guides the 
construction of educational materials and their composition into laboratory 
exercises. The framework’s core revolves around two teaching methods: 
(1) the hybrid flipped classroom (Carranza and DeCusatis, 2015), and 
(2) case study analysis (NSF, 2008). 
The resulting lab exercises address some of the issues described in Section 
2.1. The framework and its evaluation are published in (Luburić et al., 
2019a) and expanded through two additional papers (Luburić et al., 2019b, 
2019c). 
Section 3.1 outlines the main components of the framework, highlighting its 
inputs, outputs, and internal workings. Here we describe the process of using 
the framework to compose the laboratory exercises. Section 3.2 demonstrates 
the application of the framework, where we formulate the laboratory 
exercises using the framework, to provide guidance on how to use it. Here 
we also illustrate how different tools, such as industry standards and 
vulnerable software packages, can be utilized with the framework. Section 
3.3 explains the comparative analysis which we have conducted, to evaluate 
if the exercises conceptualized using the framework achieve better learning 
outcomes than lab exercises which utilize the traditional teaching method. 
Finally, Section 3.4 discusses the results of our analysis, as well as the 
limitations and implications of the work presented in this Chapter. 
3.1 Framework Structure 
This Section starts with an overview of the training framework, presenting its 
main components in Section 3.1.1. Next, in Section 3.1.2, we discuss the 
framework usage process to describe its internal workings that, when 
executed, formulate laboratory exercises for teaching SDA. 
3.1.1 Framework Overview 
As described in (Luburić et al., 2019a), the proposed framework consists of 
four parts: 
(1) the applied security design analysis method, 
 
38 
(2) the preparatory materials containing enough information, as 
determined by the lab constructor, for the lab participants to actively 
participate in the analysis, 
(3) one or more case studies which are targets of SDA, and 
(4) the laboratory exercises constructed by using the framework. 
The input for the framework is the SDA method, which is the primary 
learning goal. The selected SDA method guides the design of the laboratory 
exercises. A single workshop might cover a specific SDA method, while 
methods targeting a broad domain may span several courses. Sophisticated 
methods need to be decomposed into subactivities to fit the format of a 
workshop or lab exercise. 
The preparatory materials are the materials that lab participants need to 
examine before the lab exercise, the core pillar of the hybrid flipped 
classroom technique (Carranza and DeCusatis, 2015). This can be anything 
from reading materials (e.g., book chapters, scientific articles, blog posts) to 
videos (e.g., conference presentations, online course segments). In the 
context of security design analysis, these materials should detail 
vulnerabilities, attacks, and security controls relevant for the examined SDA 
or its subactivity. 
Following the case study analysis technique (NSF, 2008), the case study is 
the target of the SDA and represents a module2. The size and complexity of 
the case study dictate the effort required for a complete analysis. A single 
case study might be enough to cover all subactivities of an SDA, while 
multiple case studies may be examined to cover the SDA in-depth or 
reinforce the learning goals. The selection and presentation of the case study 
must be carefully considered to maximize trainee engagement. 
Finally, laboratory exercises are the main output of the framework. Each lab 
exercise contains: 
(1) a set of preparatory materials, to facilitate the hybrid flipped 
classroom, 
(2) a description of one or more case studies (which might be reused in 
multiple lab exercises), to support case study analysis, 
(3) an outline of the expected flow for that training session, and 
                                                 
2 As mentioned earlier, the term module is a generic term which can represent software of 
any size. A module can be an enterprise system, a single application, a single component in 
an application, or a set of functions provided by the software. 
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(4) guidelines for the trainers on how to apply the SDA on the case 
study, using the information described in the preparatory materials, to 
support them in their job. 
Following the method of the hybrid flipped classroom, trainees go over the 
preparatory materials before the lab exercise. At the start of the exercise, the 
trainer facilitates a discussion around the preparatory materials, to ensure the 
group has understood its content. Next, the trainer presents the case study, 
providing sufficient information for the group to perform SDA. During the 
exercise, the trainer guides the trainees in performing SDA on the relevant 
segments of the case study by utilizing what they have learned from the 
preparatory materials and expanding upon that base. The session concludes 
when the trainer summarizes the performed work and highlights the most 
significant learning outcomes of the exercise. 
3.1.2 Framework Usage 
The usage of the framework is a process that takes as input the components 
listed in the previous Section, as well as the constraints regarding the number 
of slots for laboratory exercises and the length of each slot and outputs a set 
of laboratory exercises. Figure 4 illustrates the process. 
 
Figure 4 Usage of the training framework to construct laboratory exercises 
The first step of this process is to choose the SDA method and set it as the 
learning goal of the lab exercises. Examples of SDA methods are discussed 
in Section 1.3.3 and include STRIDE (Shostack, 2014b), LINDDUN (Wuyts 
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and Joosen, 2015), PASTA (UcedaVelez and Morana, 2015), Trike (Saitta et 
al., 2005). The next step entails decomposing the SDA activity into 
subactivities. The decomposition of the SDA method should consider the 
complexity of the method, and the time limitations (i.e., the number of 
available lab exercises, the duration of each exercise). As described in 
Section 1.3.3, most SDA methods have three general steps – module 
decomposition, threat analysis, and risk analysis, where the primary focus of 
the method is on the threat analysis step. Therefore, most subactivities 
should be related to threat analysis (where each subactivity is concerned with 
a subset of relevant threats, attacks, and mitigations), while module 
decomposition and risk analysis might entail a single subactivity each. While 
the resulting set of the SDA subactivities does not require a one-to-one 
mapping on the final set of constructed lab exercises, the trainer should strive 
towards this goal at the start, to simplify the following framework activities. 
Each subactivity is analyzed (Examine next subactivity) to determine the 
related security concepts (i.e., attacks, vulnerabilities, security controls). The 
trainer creates the set of preparatory materials which cover the identified 
security concepts. These should contain information that is easy to consume 
while being relevant for the assignments and discussions of the lab exercise. 
The construction of preparatory materials can be a vast undertaking if the 
subject matter is complicated and if there are no readily available materials 
(e.g., publicly available lectures, articles, tools). 
Next, the trainer elicits requirements which the case study must fulfill to be 
relevant for the SDA subactivity and identified security concepts (Define 
case study requirements). For example, if a subactivity of an SDA examines 
threats of loss of confidential data, then the case study needs to work with 
sensitive data. Requirements for such a case study might be that: 
(1) it processes sensitive data, 
(2) it transports sensitive data over internal networks, 
(3) it provides (a subset of) sensitive data through Internet-facing 
services, and 
(4) it stores sensitive data in several different types of data stores. 
The breadth of the case study requirements is limited only by the time limit 
of the lab exercise. At this point, the case study is not conceptualized, as 
requirements from multiple SDA subactivities (and lab exercises which 
address them) might be grouped to form a single case study when all case 
study requirements are known. 
At this stage, the trainer formulates the general flow of the lab exercise 
(Determine lab flow). By focusing on the SDA subactivity, while keeping the 
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known aspects of the case study and preparatory materials in mind, the 
trainer decomposes the learning goal into assignments and tasks which need 
to be completed during the lab exercise. Tasks might include presenting the 
case study (conducted by the trainer), performing security design analysis on 
the case study (conducted by the trainees) or discussing the content of the 
preparatory materials (conducted by both the trainer and the trainees). By 
mapping these tasks to a timeline, the trainer constructs the general flow of 
the lab exercise. At this point, the lab exercise might be too complicated for 
the given time frame, in which case it could be split into multiple labs (if 
there is room to accommodate this). 
This loop repeats until the trainer creates preparatory materials, case study 
requirements, and general lab exercise flows for each subactivity of the SDA 
method. At this stage, the trainer compiles the list of requirements for the 
case studies to define the actual case studies for the lab exercises (Construct 
case studies that fulfill all requirements). The number of case studies can 
range from one to many, where one case study can be examined during one 
or multiple lab exercises, while one or multiple case studies can be examined 
during a single lab exercise. Apart from the elicited requirements, each case 
study should fulfill several global requirements, including: 
(1) being a believable representation of a real system, as this increases 
trainee engagement (Luburić et al., 2019b), and 
(2) being understandable to the trainees, so that they can quickly grasp 
the scope of the case study and focus their mental effort on the 
learning objective. 
Furthermore, each case study needs to be documented so that lab participants 
can familiarize themselves with it, either through preparatory materials or 
during the lab exercise. This documentation can take many forms (e.g., 
video, white paper, presentation) and the trainer should select the medium 
which maximizes usability and trainee engagement. 
Finally, once the case study set is defined, the trainer formulates the final 
flow for all lab exercises. During this step, lab exercises can be merged, 
further divided, or omitted based on the constraints of the working 
environment (e.g., equipment, time). 
3.2 Framework Application 
We utilized the framework to formulate laboratory exercises for a university 
course concerned with secure software engineering. We construct six 
laboratory exercises (Luburić et al., 2019a) and integrated them into our 
course, some of which were reworked and expanded during the next two 
school years (Luburić et al., 2019b, 2019c). 
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This Section illustrates the application of the training framework, where we 
create a set of laboratory exercises to provide guidance for the framework’s 
use. First, in Section 3.2.1, we present the application published in (Luburić 
et al., 2019a), where we select an SDA method, decompose it into 
subactivities, present the case study and an outline of the content of the 
preparatory materials. Next, in Section 3.2.2, we illustrate a single lab 
exercise in detail and demonstrate how an industry standard can be used as 
preparatory material, as published in (Luburić et al., 2019c), to offer further 
guidance for the framework’s use. Finally, in Section 3.2.3, we describe how 
the framework can utilize vulnerable software packages to quickly construct 
lab exercises, as published in (Luburić et al., 2019b), both reducing the 
complexity of the lab construction, and increasing the engagement of the 
trainees. 
3.2.1 Generation of Multiple Lab Exercises 
Following the process depicted in Figure 4, we first chose the SDA method3. 
From the methods examined in Section 1.3.3, we selected the traditional 
STRIDE-based SDA method (Shostack, 2014b), as it is popularly used and is 
suitable for web-based enterprise information systems with which our 
trainees (i.e., students) are already familiar. 
The next step entails the decomposition of the SDA into subactivities. We 
initially divided the selected SDA into six subactivities, which are listed in 
Table 5. Here we also identified some of the relevant security concepts which 
served as input for the construction of preparatory materials. Initially, we 
decomposed this SDA method into eight subactivities (module 
decomposition, one subactivity for each letter of STRIDE, and risk analysis). 
As module decomposition is a software engineering activity (and does not 
require security knowledge) we concluded that a single lab was enough to 
introduce concepts such as data flow diagrams, so we did not further 
decompose this subactivity. When examining the threat analysis 
subactivities, we decided to focus on cryptography as a means of mitigating 
Information disclosure and Tampering, so we merged these subactivities. 
Likewise, we assessed that Spoofing and Repudiation could be grouped due 
to their relation to authentication. Finally, while risk analysis can be 
sophisticated, making it suitable for further decomposition, we focused on 
the basic variant of this activity recommended by the STRIDE SDA method 
(Shostack, 2014b). 
                                                 
3 The use of italic in this Section signals that this is an activity illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Table 5 Defined Subactivities of the Chosen SDA Method 
Subactivity Description 
Decomposing the module The case study is introduced. Subsystems, actors, assets, 
entry points, and data flows are identified. The goal is to 
define relevant threat agents and construct data flow 
diagrams of the module under analysis. 
Threat analysis: 
Information disclosure, 
Tampering 
Threats related to information disclosure and tampering are 
identified and decomposed for the target module. Focus is 
placed on attacks and vulnerabilities mitigated by 
cryptographic controls. 
Threat analysis: 
Denial of service 
Threats related to denial of service are identified and 
decomposed for the target module. Focus is placed on 
attacks and vulnerabilities mitigated by network 
segmentation, high availability design, and DDoS 
protection controls. 
Threat analysis:  
Spoofing, 
Repudiation 
Threats related to spoofing and repudiation are identified 
and decomposed for the target module. Focus is placed on 
attacks and vulnerabilities mitigated by authentication and 
logging controls. 
Threat analysis:  
Elevation of privilege 
Threats related to the elevation of privilege are identified 
and decomposed for the target module. Focus is placed on 
attacks and vulnerabilities mitigated by access control and 
input validation controls. 
Risk analysis Security requirements for the selected case study are 
examined to determine the impact of each threat. Basic risk 
calculation is performed to determine a prioritized list of 
security controls. 
We created preparatory materials which cover cybersecurity concepts (i.e., 
attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures) concerning web-based information 
systems. The concepts covered in the materials are grouped based on the 
related subactivity, as demonstrated in Table 6. 
Table 6 Preparatory Materials Related to SDA Subactivities Listed in Table 5 
Subactivity Description 
Decomposing the module Presentation describing the case study and white paper 
detailing data flow diagrams and their graphical elements. 
Threat analysis: 
Information disclosure, 
Tampering 
White paper and lecture covering applied cryptography - 
symmetric ciphers, asymmetric ciphers, hash functions 
PKI, digital signatures, TLS, and select attacks against 
these mechanisms. 
Threat analysis: 
Denial of service 
White paper covering high availability design, performance 
counters, denial of service attacks and mitigations. 
Threat analysis:  
Spoofing, Repudiation 
White paper covering authentication controls, session 
management, logging, and spoofing attacks. 
Threat analysis:  
Elevation of privilege 
White paper covering role-based access control, access 
control lists, input validation, and injection attacks. 
Risk analysis Summary of risk management from (Ross, 2011). 
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Based on the subactivities listed in Table 5, and the security concepts 
identified in Table 6, we constructed a set of requirements for the case study, 
which are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 Case Study Requirements Related to SDA Subactivities Listed in Table 5 
Subactivity Description 
Decomposing the module The system needs to be web-based, consist of multiple 
applications which (to some extent) interact, contain 
several data stores (e.g., file system, databases) and service 
several different user categories (e.g., insiders, outsiders). 
Threat analysis: 
Information disclosure, 
Tampering 
The system needs to process, transmit, and store sensitive 
data, such as PII and user passwords. 
Threat analysis: 
Denial of service 
Some part of the system should require high availability. 
The system should communicate over the Internet. 
Threat analysis:  
Spoofing, Repudiation 
The system should require multi-factor authentication for 
some group of users. The system should require service-to-
service authentication. The system should offer sensitive 
functions that demand accountability. 
Threat analysis:  
Elevation of privilege 
The system needs to have some form of shared user 
interface to demonstrate access control. The system needs 
to have OS-level assets (i.e. files) that require access 
control. The system needs to have some forms of data 
parsers or interpreters (e.g., SQL database, XML parser). 
Risk analysis The system needs to have some form of security 
requirements derived from standards and regulations. 
At this stage, we conceptualized a set of laboratory exercises and determined 
their flow. During this, we divide the second subactivity (Threat analysis: 
Information disclosure, Tampering) into two lab exercises, as we assessed 
that the topics covered by this subactivity (cryptographic primitives and 
applied cryptography) required more time to go through based on our prior 
experience with the traditional classroom. Furthermore, we did not construct 
a separate lab exercise for the third subactivity (Threat analysis: Denial of 
service), as we considered it, for the most part, out of the scope of our lecture 
plan. 
With most of the work done, we started constructing the case study. We 
formed a description of a hospital information system (HIS) by examining 
scientific articles and grey literature related to applications of technology to 
the healthcare domain. The HIS was chosen as a suitable and highly relevant 
case study for the security assessment. First, it can be quite sophisticated, 
servicing a wide array of different actors, which makes choosing a 
representative subset of functionality that much easier. There have been 
several papers and articles that call for, examine, and present technological 
innovation in the field of healthcare (Hamine et al., 2015; Spanakis et al., 
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2016). As people live longer, more attention is directed at Smart Health 
systems that optimize the healthcare industry and reduce costs. The second 
reason the security analysis of such a system is suitable for our needs is the 
fact that hospitals deal with sensitive data. Health records have been a major 
target of cybercriminals, but there is also a wide array of sensitive data 
common to most business systems, like personally identifiable information, 
financial records, and system user credentials. There are a few articles in the 
literature calling for and proposing different security measures to protect 
these systems (Appari and Johnson, 2010). 
Our HIS case study is imagined to be deployed on a set of machines inside 
the hospital’s data center. The system interacts with several different actors, 
each chosen to present a set of attacks. This includes: 
 Hospital management, which consists of many staff members who 
handle human resources, finances, hospital equipment, and operating 
room schedules. This part of the system falls in the domain of 
business informatics. Managers interact with the system through a 
web application, from their workstations, which are located inside the 
hospital. 
 Medical staff, including physicians, technicians, and other relevant 
subjects concerned with patient management. Physicians use the 
system to examine their schedule, follow their patient’s treatments 
and health records, communicate with their patients as well as with 
the management, and so on. Like hospital management, the medical 
staff interacts with the system inside the corporate network, using a 
web application; 
 Patients, who use the system to follow their hospital appointments, 
recommended diet and therapy, and treatment history. They interact 
with the system over the internet, using a mobile or web application. 
Following the current trends in technological development, a patient 
can have several wearables or implanted devices, which monitor the 
patient’s physiological parameters and send them to the HIS; 
 The government, which periodically contacts the hospital to get 
statistical data. The government service sends a request over the 
internet and uses the retrieved data to monitor the health of its 
citizens, detect early signs of epidemics or high volumes of a 
particular type of illness. 
Finally, we constructed the final lab flow, the outline of which is as follows: 
(1) Decomposing the module: The HIS is introduced and examined as a 
real-world system that supports healthcare institutions. The system’s 
purpose is discussed, as well as its actors, functions, data flows, 
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subsystems, and entry points. Initial security requirements are 
discussed, and attackers are determined. 
(2) Threat analysis (Information disclosure, Tampering) 1: Threats 
related to the loss of confidentiality and integrity of the data 
processed by the HIS are examined. Sensitive data assets, such as 
financial information, patient information, and user credentials, are 
discovered, and protective mechanisms are proposed using 
cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic keys are identified as 
sensitive assets that require further protection. 
(3) Threat analysis (Information disclosure, Tampering) 2: Controls 
proposed in the previous lab exercise are enhanced using mechanisms 
such as PKI and TLS. Certificate verification is examined, and 
attacks related to these technologies, such as certificate pinning and 
attacks against TLS, are discussed. 
(4) Threat analysis (Spoofing, Repudiation): Authentication and logging 
controls and attacks are examined in the context of the HIS. User 
interfaces and services that require authentication are determined, and 
appropriate controls are selected. Sensitive actions of the HIS are 
determined, and logging controls that achieve non-repudiation are 
designed. 
(5) Threat analysis (Elevation of privilege): Access control and injection 
attacks are examined in the context of the HIS. Entry points that 
accept external input are identified, and the optimal input validation 
controls are selected. An access control matrix that defines all user 
groups, roles, and permissions for the HIS is constructed. 
(6) Risk analysis: The final lab is spent discussing security requirements 
and risk analysis. Regulations such as HIPAA (United States, 2004) 
are examined in the context of the HIS, and a basic risk analysis 
method is presented and performed to determine the critical 
vulnerabilities that need to be patched and the security controls that 
need to be applied to the HIS. 
We utilized these laboratory exercises during the 2016/2017 iteration of the 
secure software engineering course. 
3.2.2 Detailed Lab Construction 
To provide further guidance and resolve remaining ambiguity, this Section 
analyzes one of the labs in detail and present all the artifacts selected and 
created through the training framework. The lab in question is an evolution 
of the fifth lab (Threat analysis: Spoofing, Repudiation), which we split into 
two labs for the subsequent year. This Section focuses on the SDA 
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subactivity that addresses repudiation threats, as described in (Luburić et al., 
2019c). 
The main vulnerability that enables repudiation threats in software systems is 
missing or poorly designed logging mechanisms (Shostack, 2014b). Log files 
contain entries that track the events of a system. On the one hand, they offer 
insight into a system’s (mis)behavior, aiding software engineers in 
debugging issues. On the other hand, they offer non-repudiation by recording 
user actions. While the concept of an event logger is simple, correctly 
implementing logging controls throughout the system to achieve non-
repudiation can be challenging (IEC, 2018b). 
Preparatory materials 
Recently, the IEC has released a standard describing technical security 
requirements for industrial automation and control systems (IEC, 2018b), 
detailing many security controls and component requirements (CR), 
including a logging mechanism for non-repudiation. We use this document 
as a basis for our preparatory materials and from it derive the following 
requirements for the logging mechanism (the related requirements from the 
standard are noted in the braces):  
(1) Completeness – Each log entry needs to contain enough data to prove 
non-repudiation of an action (CR 2.8) and each event for which non-
repudiation is required needs to be logged (CR 2.12). 
(2) Reliability – Logging needs to be reliable, which is achieved by 
ensuring the availability of the mechanism (CR 2.9, CR 2.10) and the 
integrity of the log files (CR 3.9, CR 6.1). 
(3) Accuracy – Log entries across the system need to state their creation 
time precisely (CR 2.11). 
Apart from the requirements derived directly from the standard, we add two 
requirements that improve the efficiency of the logging mechanism:  
(4) Usability – The logging mechanism needs to be designed so that 
security-relevant events (e.g., those that provide non-repudiation) can 
be easily extracted from the log files.  
(5) Minimalism – The logging mechanism should create a minimal 
amount of log entries needed to serve its purpose, to avoid cluttering 
the log files.  
As log files contain system events that are used primarily for debugging, we 
need to make sure that security events are not buried and lost due to a large 
amount of non-security events. Based on these requirements, we construct a 
three-page white paper to serve as preparatory materials for the lab exercise. 
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The document explains the danger of repudiation, illustrates it through real-
world examples, and describes the motivation behind it. The paper concludes 
by explaining event logging and details the requirements for an efficient and 
secure logging mechanism. 
Case Study 
Audit records need to be generated for access control, request errors, critical 
system events, backup and restore events, configuration changes, and audit 
log events, as noted in IEC (2018b), CR 2.8. Furthermore, CR 2.10 defines 
additional activities that require logging, including performing system 
actions, creating or changing information, and sending messages.  
Based on this list, we conclude that any software system that interacts with 
human users and has some sensitive assets can be used as a case study. As 
the SDA subactivity and relevant security concepts do not impose significant 
limitations for our case study selection, we can utilize the hospital 
information system (HIS) described earlier. The HIS contains a wide array of 
sensitive assets, including health data and PII. 
Lab Flow 
Figure 5 illustrates the flow of the lab exercise, where the arrows originating 
from the trainees and trainer signify who drives the activity. 
 
Figure 5 Flow of laboratory exercise dedicated to SDA for repudiation threats 
The trainees are required to go over the white paper describing repudiation 
and logging before attending the lab exercise. At the start of the lab exercise, 
the trainer conducts a brief discussion with the trainees to summarize the 
main points of the preparatory materials. 
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After the initial recap, the trainer presents use case diagrams for the HIS case 
study, focusing on the user’s interaction with the system. The trainer takes 
care to introduce the main points of the system that need to be protected, 
without making them obvious. This information is masked with irrelevant 
information and low priority assets. However, care is taken not to bloat the 
presentation too much, to avoid loss of interest from the trainees. The 
presentation concludes with data flow and deployment diagrams of the HIS, 
which were developed during earlier labs. 
Next, the trainees perform SDA to discover repudiation threats and try to 
find actions that a user might have reason to rebut. They identify interfaces 
between the human users and the software and discuss where and how the 
actions need to be logged. The goal of this discussion is to fulfill the 
Completeness requirement of the logging mechanisms, as well as obtain an 
understanding that logs can be generated at different levels of the software 
system (e.g., operating system, web server, application software). 
Once most of the system events requiring non-repudiation have been 
mapped, the trainees expand the data flow diagrams with log data stores. At 
this point, the trainer directs the discussion towards the Reliability 
requirement, examining how the logging mechanism can be protected from 
tampering and denial of service. Scenarios that detail attacks are discussed, 
and the trainees determine appropriate security controls and design changes 
to protect the logging mechanisms.  
The trainer addresses the final security requirement, Accuracy, by explaining 
how the network time protocol and GPS time synchronization protocols 
(Mills, 2016) can be used to create system-wide time synchronization. The 
design of ACME’s system is expanded with these controls, and their security 
is discussed.  
Finally, the software engineering requirements of Usability and Minimalism 
are addressed. The trainer divides the trainees into teams and asks them to 
design an application logging mechanism that can answer the following user 
stories:  
“As a data protection officer, I want to quickly examine all access 
requests to GDPR (GDPR, 2016) related data, so that I can examine 
if there is an anomaly in the system’s behavior.” 
“As a reliability engineer, I want to quickly examine all mission-
critical function calls, so that I can monitor performance to prevent a 
denial of service.” 
“As a software engineer, I want to examine log entries when an error 
occurs in a system, so that I can triage the bug and resolve the issue.” 
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At the end of this exercise, each team presents their design and argues how it 
can fulfill the listed user stories. All trainees take this opportunity to discuss 
the pros and cons of each approach. At the end of the lab, the trainer 
summarizes the main learning points of the lab and offers additional 
exercises and reading materials. 
3.2.3 Introducing Vulnerable Software to the SDA 
Training Framework 
A significant limitation of the training framework is its complexity. The 
trainer prepares the labs by constructing preparatory materials, the case 
study, assignments for the trainees, and then putting it all together. To 
address this issue, we created an enhancement to the training framework, 
published in (Luburić et al., 2019b). 
We utilize publicly available vulnerable software packages (VSPs) to offload 
some of the work required from the lab constructor. Vulnerable software 
packages offer software engineers, security auditors, and penetration testers a 
playground to practice software security skills, both from the attacker’s and 
defender’s perspective and for this reason, are often used in training 
programs (Yuan et al., 2016; Siles and Bennets, 2019). Additionally, these 
packages are used to test the efficiency of hacking tools, such as 
vulnerability scanners (Esposito et al., 2018) as well as security controls 
which mitigate the vulnerabilities of the software package (Pupo et al., 
2018). 
We propose that the vulnerable software package can be used as a case study 
and the target of security design analysis. Once requirements for the case 
study are gathered, the lab constructor searches for a suitable VSP instead of 
manually constructing a case study. Furthermore, when determining the lab 
flow, assignments for the lab trainees can be derived directly from the 
features of the VSP. 
To illustrate the enhancement to the framework and provide low-level 
guidance, we demonstrate its usage by constructing a lab with the learning 
objective of examining, understanding the impact of, and mitigating 
elevation of privilege threats through injection attacks and vulnerabilities 
(Stock et al., 2017). 
Preparatory materials 
The preparatory materials for this lab are created by utilizing the latest 
OWASP Top Ten list (Stock et al., 2017). This list is an authoritative 
document that presents a broad consensus regarding the most common and 
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most critical security risks for web applications. It is updated and published 
every several years to keep up with the shifting threat landscape. 
The OWASP Top Ten list provides a thorough overview of each class of 
security risks, offering insight into the risks impact, examples of attacks, 
pointers for vulnerability discovery, and mitigation planning. For the lab in 
question, trainees examine the entries which cover elevation of privilege 
threats realized through some form of injection attacks. They examine the 
following categories before attending the lab: 
 A1 – Injection, as the primary subject matter of the lab. 
 A4 – XML External Entity, due to its similarities with XML injection 
attacks from A1. 
 A7 – Cross-Site Scripting, which can be seen as an injection attack 
aimed at the browser’s command interpreter. 
Furthermore, trainees are required to find and examine at least one example 
of each of the listed attacks (e.g., SQL injection, LDAP injection, Stored 
XSS) to get a sense of what the attack vectors look like and how they might 
be deployed. 
Case Study 
Guided by the learning objective and preparatory materials, we go over the 
list of different attacks and vulnerabilities and define the following 
requirements for a suitable case study: 
 It should provide a web user interface to demonstrate cross-site 
scripting issues. 
 It should have an SQL database where at least one command sent 
from the application is dependent on user-supplied input, to explain 
SQL injection issues. 
 It should process XML documents supplied by external entities, to 
demonstrate XML injection issues. 
 (Optional) It should provide functionality suitable for showing 
additional injection issues (e.g., OS command injection, LDAP query 
injection). 
 (Optional) It should be built using modern technologies and ideally 
those directly utilized by the trainees, to increase the perceived 
relevance and their engagement. 
We selected the OWASP Juice Shop (Kimminich, 2019) VSP as a suitable 
case study that fulfills both the mandatory and optional requirements listed 
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above. The OWASP Juice Shop has several benefits when compared to other 
VSPs: 
 It is mature, categorized as a Flagship project by the OWASP 
organization, signifying its value to the field of application security. 
Furthermore, it has previously been utilized in the classroom (Yuan et 
al., 2016; Kimminich, 2019), as a tool for testing the efficiency of a 
hacking tool (Esposito et al., 2018) and a security defense (Pupo et 
al., 2018). 
 It is rich with content, covering a wide array of attacks and defenses 
and containing 74 challenges as of version 8.3, released in January 
2019. 
 It is easy to use, offering detailed documentation, presentation, and 
video material to aid with its use and a companion guide which 
details each challenge and its solution (Kimminich, 2019). 
 It is built on a technological stack (Angular, Node.js, SQLite) 
familiar to our trainees. 
 It is a fully functioning, realistic web shop, offering browsing and 
shopping functionalities similar to applications which the trainees 
built on earlier courses. 
Lab Flow 
The lab constructor utilizes the OWASP Juice Shop companion guide to 
select challenges related to the learning objective and marks them as 
assignments for the lab. With these assignments, the final lab flow can be 
created, as Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
Figure 6 Flow of laboratory exercise examining injection attacks with the aid of a VSP 
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At the start of the lab, the trainer goes over the different injection attacks and 
answers any questions which the trainees might have. 
Next, the trainer introduces the OWASP Juice Shop and demonstrates the 
basic functionality of the application, after which the architecture and data 
flow diagrams of the module are presented (available at (Kimminich, 2019)). 
The first assignment for the trainees is to identify the attack surface where 
injection attacks might be deployed, as part of a group discussion. 
Once most of the attack surface is discovered, the trainees are given a list of 
challenges from the companion guide to complete on the laboratory 
computers. 
At the end of the lab, the trainer highlights the learning objective, 
summarizes the activities conducted during the lab, and notes the important 
takeaways. During this discussion, the participants: 
 Define the impact of the attacks they performed; 
 Determine which vulnerabilities exist in the software to allow those 
attacks to succeed; 
 Specify mitigations which resolve the vulnerabilities and discuss 
ways in which the mitigations can be circumvented. 
3.3 Framework Evaluation 
In this Section, we describe the evaluation of the proposed framework. 
Section 3.3.1 describes our course, the context in which it resides, and the 
knowledge trainees gain before attending our course. Next, in Section 3.3.2, 
we described the structure of the two instances of the course, which we 
compare as part of the evaluation. We then detail the design of the controlled 
experiment and comparative analysis used to evaluate the framework in 
Section 3.3.3. The evaluation described here concerns only the basic 
structure of the framework (described in Section 3.1 and illustrated in 
Section 3.2.1) and is not concerned with the enhancements described in 
Section 3.2.3. Finally, in Section 3.3.4, we detail the empirical evaluation, 
conducted through interviews and questionnaires, which assess the quality of 
the enhancements described in Section 3.2.3. 
3.3.1 Course Context 
Our course on secure software engineering is an elective course for fourth-
year undergraduate students of computer science studies. Around 50 students 
enroll in this course each year. Before attending the course, the students 
complete several mandatory courses covering the topics of data modeling, 
software engineering, network-based systems, distributed software systems, 
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and information systems. They have no prior knowledge related to the 
domain of information security or any of its subdomains. 
Based on the student’s prior knowledge, we focus the course on topics 
related to the application and system security. As most of the students find 
employment as software engineers, we focus on topics that offer the most 
value to future software designers and developers. Topics include applied 
cryptography, data security (protecting data in transit, storage, and in use), 
authentication and access control mechanisms, and secure software 
development, with a focus on security design analysis. 
3.3.2 Course Structure 
Two instances of the course are relevant for this research. The 2015/2016 
instance (referred to as the traditional course) uses the traditional classroom 
approach, where the professor holds lectures every week for all trainees (i.e., 
students), while the trainer (i.e., the teaching assistant) runs laboratory 
exercises for groups of 10 to 16 trainees. The laboratory exercises focus on 
the topic from the previous week’s lecture, where trainees complete 
assignments that require them to implement or use a specific security control 
or stop a common attack. 
The 2016/2017 instance (referred to as the framework course) contains one 
significant difference, where the laboratory exercises are constructed using 
the training framework. The lecture materials used in both instances of the 
course are mostly identical. However, to accommodate the hybrid flipped 
classroom, the materials for the laboratory exercises are restructured for the 
new course. In both instances of the course, there are six laboratory 
exercises, each lasting 2 hours, as described in Section 4.2.1. 
The main difference between the old and new course design, relevant to our 
experiment, is the structure of the teaching materials. In the new course, the 
lab time is dedicated to the discussion and learning the intricate craft of 
security design analysis. In our experience, security concepts, such as 
common controls, attacks, and vulnerabilities, when presented in a vacuum, 
is something that the trainees can learn on their own, which is why we leave 
this to the trainees, as part of their preparation for the lab. 
3.3.3 Experiment Design 
To complete the traditional instance of the course, trainees had to secure a 
part of a banking information system implemented as part of another course. 
They did this by producing a security design analysis of the system before 
implementing it, after which they implemented the identified security 
controls in their code and configurations. 
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To complete the framework instance of the course, trainees had to complete 
the same project as their predecessors, the traditional group. They performed 
a security design analysis of the banking information system and then 
implemented the identified security controls during the system development. 
It should be noted that a full banking information system can have hundreds 
of critical assets, each of which can have several accompanying threats. The 
trainees examine a subset of the system to reduce the workload. 
Another thing to note is that during project development of both instances of 
the course, teams of trainees had a series of checkpoints for which they had 
to produce specific deliverables. We did this to track the progress of trainees 
more efficiently. 
By providing both groups of trainees with an identical project and roughly 
the same amount of time to complete it, we were able to do a comparative 
study of the effectiveness of the training framework, as opposed to the 
conventional teaching approach. 
The trainees were divided into teams of three or four members. By 
comparing the quality of threat models produced by teams from both groups 
of trainees, we evaluated the new design. We have adopted the approach 
from (Scandariato et al., 2015) to define the quality of a threat model as a set 
of metrics, which include the following: 
 The quality of the produced data flow diagrams (DFDs); 
 The quality of the threat identification step. 
The quality of the DFDs is measured by examining: 
 The number of produced DFDs; 
 The average number of elements in each diagram. 
We compare DFD sets produced by teams from both groups to a baseline 
DFD set produced by the professor and the trainer. The quality of the threat 
identification step is evaluated by looking at the following metrics: 
 The number of correctly identified threats (TP, true positives); 
 The number of incorrectly identified threats (FP, false positives); 
 The number of unidentified relevant threats (FN, false negatives). 
The maximum number of relevant threats a team of trainees can identify (Trel 
= TP + FN) is closely tied to assets, as relevant threats are defined as losses 
of security objectives. We define relevant assets as assets for which true 
positive threats have been identified. This excludes abstract assets such as 
company reputation and user satisfaction. We also aggregate similar assets 
into a single asset. For example, all log files located on the corporate bank 
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network are considered a single asset. The list of relevant assets includes but 
is not limited to: 
 Data assets, including user credentials, credit card information, 
invoices, reports; 
 System assets, including important subsystems and services, log and 
configuration files, the website; 
 Infrastructure assets, such as workstations, the network, ATMs. 
The maximum number of relevant threats that each team can identify is 
directly linked to the relevant assets identified by each team Nassets. For each 
team, the professor and trainer have analyzed the assets obtained by that 
team to determine their Trel. 
We summarize the obtained results by calculating the average correctness 
(precision) and average completeness (recall) of the individual teams of both 
class instances. The correctness of an individual team is calculated by 
dividing the number of correctly identified threats to the total number of 
threats identified by a particular team: 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 (1) 
The completeness of an individual team is calculated by dividing the number 
of correctly identified threats with the estimated maximum number of threats 
(for that individual team): 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇
 (2) 
We aimed to determine whether the teams of the framework instance had on 
average achieved significantly higher correctness and completeness 
compared to the traditional instance teams. Thus, we analyze the obtained 
results by applying an unpaired test as we had different subjects in the two 
test groups. We used the Mann–Whitney test, a non-parametric analog of the 
unpaired t-test that does not require the assumption of normal distributions. 
We validated the null hypothesis H0: “There is no difference between teams 
of the traditional instance and teams of the framework instance in terms of 
achieved correctness/completeness.” For statistical tests, we set the 
significance level of α = 0.05. 
We did not measure the quality of the threat decomposition step, nor the risk 
analysis step. Regarding threat decomposition, we could not find a suitable 
way to measure the quality of this step, as no evaluation metrics are proposed 
in the literature. We decided to avoid comparing the quality of the risk 
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analysis, as the framework trainee group had one whole laboratory dedicated 
to this activity, while the traditional group only briefly examined this step. 
To measure the effectiveness of our new approach, we only considered threat 
model documents produced by teams where the document owner was present 
during the six laboratory exercises. Twenty-eight trainees were present 
during the six lab sessions of the traditional instance, while thirty-six trainees 
attended the six lab sessions during the framework instance. Not all of these 
trainees were threat model document owners as some of them belonged to 
the same team. Overall, fourteen threat models were examined from the 
traditional instance of the course, while seventeen threat models were looked 
at from the framework instance. 
The results of this evaluation are described in Section 3.4.1. 
3.3.4 Empirical Evaluation of Enhancement 
We conducted an informal evaluation of the enhancement described in 
Section 3.2.3 by analyzing observations of the trainer and supplying a 
questionnaire to the trainees (i.e., the students). 
Through participant observation (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984), the trainers 
observed how the trainees interacted with the VSP during the exercise. The 
trainers noted and payed special attention to: 
 The levels of trainee engagement; 
 The nature of the interaction with the VSP; 
 The way the VSP influenced the lab; 
 Any difficulties that occurred. 
At the end of the semester, the trainers conducted a survey, following the 
approach described by Punter et al. (2003). Trainees were provided with a 
questionnaire for evaluating the quality of each of the labs. The questionnaire 
had the following structure: 
 A brief description of the lab and its goal; 
 A set of statements to be graded through a 5-point Likert scale 
(Albaum, 1997) (1 – strongly disagree, 3 – undecided, 5 – strongly 
agree), including: 
o The goal of the exercise is clear and meaningful; 
o During the lab we have achieved the specified goal; 
o The lab was interesting. 
 The question What was the best part of the lab, to be answered using 
a free text field; 
 
58 
 The question What would you improve, to be answered using a free 
text field. 
The results of this evaluation are described in Section 3.4.2. 
3.4 Results and Analysis 
In this Section, we present the results of our evaluations and discuss their 
meaning. In Section 3.4.1, we present the results of the experiment described 
in Section 3.3.3, where we show that our SDA Training Framework achieves 
better learning outcomes when compared to the traditional teaching 
approach. Next, in Section 3.4.2, we examine the findings of our 
observations and surveys described in Section 3.3.4, regarding the quality of 
the enchantment to our framework. In Section 3.4.3, we discuss the 
limitations of our experimental evaluation and the training framework, 
including its enhancement. Finally, in Section 3.4.4, we discuss the 
implications of all the work presented in Chapter 3 and how the training 
framework can be applied in different contexts. 
3.4.1 Results of Comparative Analysis Experiment 
We first analyze the quality of the DFDs produced by the two groups of 
trainees and compare them with the quality of the DFDs produced by the 
teaching staff. Each group produced 1 level 1 DFD and multiple lower-level 
DFDs. We measure the average number of elements on the level 1 DFD, the 
number of level 2 DFDs, the average number of elements on level 2 DFDs, 
and the number of level 3 DFDs. When counting the number of elements, we 
take into account data stores, process nodes, and external entities. The results 
are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 Quality of the DFDs 
Group 
Traditional 
trainees 
Framework 
trainees 
Teaching 
staff 
Avg. # of level 1 DFD elements 9.64 10.71 10 
# of level 2 DFDs 2.29 2.24 3 
Avg. # of level 2 DFD elements 
per diagram 
6.09 8.56 9.33 
# of level 3 DFDs 6.36 0.24 0 
While both groups showed similar results when analyzing the high-level 
view of the system through a level 1 DFD, the framework trainee group 
showed significant improvement when it came to more detailed analysis. In 
general, the framework trainees showed a better understanding of their 
system from the perspective of data flows. 
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The main improvement was related to the significantly lower amount of level 
3 DFDs. In general, level 3 DFDs signal a too-detailed model, which rarely 
adds value to the threat modeling activity. Indeed, of all level 3 diagrams 
produced by the traditional trainee group, not one was produced that 
introduced a new threat to the system, making the diagram useless. 
We believe that this improvement is a direct consequence of previous 
experience, where we warned the trainees about excessive level 3 diagrams. 
Therefore, the new teaching approach had little impact on the positive 
results. 
Next, we analyze the number of identified relevant assets Nassets, which 
determines the maximum number of threats that each team can identify. The 
average number of identified relevant assets for each course instance is 
presented in Table 9. These results show that the framework trainee group 
identified more assets. We attribute this to our own increased experience, as 
we recognized that the traditional trainees completely missed infrastructure 
assets, and we put more emphasis on this topic in the next instance of the 
course. 
Table 9 Number of identified relevant assets 
Group 
Traditional 
trainees 
Framework 
trainees 
Teaching 
staff 
# of identified assets 9.57 12.18 16 
Finally, the results of the threat identification step are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 Number of identified threats 
Group 
Traditional 
trainees 
Framework 
trainees 
Avg. # of correctly identified threats (TP) 11.36 22.82 
Avg. # of incorrectly identified threats (TN) 5.36 3.18 
Avg. # of missed threats (FN) 9.64 4.82 
Correctness (precision) 68% 87% 
Completeness (recall) 54% 81% 
These results show a significant increase in the quality of the threat 
identification step between the two class instances. The differences in 
correctness/completeness between the traditional and framework instances 
were found to be statistically significant (the null hypothesis H0 was rejected 
for completeness with the p-value of 1.78 × 10−5 < 0.05; for correctness, the 
null hypothesis was rejected with the p-value of 2.76 × 10−5 < 0.05). Thus, 
we may conclude that the teams of the framework instance have achieved 
significantly better correctness/completeness compared to the teams of the 
traditional instance. 
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Moreover, the Scandariato et al. (2015) measure the correctness and 
completeness of the threat identification performed by their students when 
compared to their own threat identification. They choose the 80% threshold 
for both precision and recall as a good reference point for student success. 
According to this, we conclude that the framework trainee group has 
achieved good precision and recall when it comes to threat identification. 
It is our opinion that these results are a direct consequence of our SDA 
Training Framework. By supplying trainees with attacks and security 
controls beforehand, trainees were able to discuss and reason about threats 
and focus on the cognitive aspect of security design analysis during the lab 
exercises. 
3.4.2 Results of Empirical Evaluation of Enhancement 
During the execution of the lab exercise created using our framework and a 
vulnerable software package, the trainers noted a higher than expected level 
of engagement from all trainees. Concretely, the VSP with its challenge 
system facilitated a competitive atmosphere, where trainees were rushing to 
complete the next challenge before their colleagues. For more difficult 
challenges, the trainees gathered in smaller groups to brainstorm solutions, 
maintaining the competitive spirit by contesting other groups. 
Problems would occur when trainees got stuck with a challenge, causing 
frustration. Additionally, more successful trainees or groups gave answers to 
other groups when left unchecked, subverting the learning goal for the other 
groups. Both cases were resolved by the trainer intervening, to give advice to 
stuck trainees and help them solve the challenge, as well as to foster a fair 
playground, where more successful groups would not ruin the game for the 
rest. 
Near the end of the lab, the participants summarized the learning outcomes, 
where the trainer noted that the trainees clearly understood the impact 
injection attacks could have on the software, why they occur and how to 
conduct them. Finally, the trainer facilitated a discussion around the quality 
of the lab and the use of the VSP. The consensus was that the lab was fun 
and engaging and that the case study was both realistic and relatable. The 
trainees made requests for similar labs in the future. 
Fifteen trainees filled the optional questionnaire at the end of the semester. 
Table 11 presents the average grade for each statement, given by the trainees 
using a 5-point Likert scale. 
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Table 11 Results of the survey grading the quality of the VSP Injection lab 
Statement Grade 
The goal of the exercise is clear and meaningful 4.67 
During the lab we have achieved the specified goal 4.73 
The lab was interesting 4.6 
Notably, not a single trainee disagreed (strongly or otherwise), with any of 
the statements. The first statement had two undecided votes, while the 
second and third had one undecided vote each. Most of the trainees strongly 
agreed with the statements. Importantly, this lab had the highest grade for all 
three statements, when compared to all our other labs. 
Six responders answered the free-form question “What was the best part of 
the lab”. All six answers praised the use of the vulnerable software package 
and the opportunity to conduct real attacks. 
Two responders answered the free-form question “What would you 
improve”. The first responder asked for more guidance when performing the 
attacks, while the second responder proposed that different groups of trainees 
tackle different sets of challenges provided by the VSP and present the 
results to each other near the end of the lab. The first answer is aligned with 
the observations made by the trainers, where some trainees got frustrated 
when not being able to solve a challenge. To address this, we developed Hint 
cards which we can distribute to trainees that need more assistance with the 
challenges. The second answer gave us an idea to bundle the challenges of 
different levels of difficulty (e.g., 3 level 1 challenges, 2 level 2 challenges, 
and a single level 3 challenge) and to distribute a bundle to each trainee 
group and have them compete for points against the time limit of the lab. 
This setup is typical in capture the flag events and different gamification 
approaches discussed in Section 2.1, so we feel confident that this approach 
can further enhance the quality of the learning outcomes. 
3.4.3 Limitations 
Several limitations influence the results of the study. First and foremost, both 
the professor and the trainer (i.e., the teaching assistant) have gained 
experience in both teaching and the domain of information security. We 
cannot accurately determine the quality of the gained knowledge and skill 
between the old and new course. However, we can safely say that our 
understanding of both information security and teaching information security 
has increased in general. As Schoenfield (2015) points out, threat modeling 
is an art form, where experience plays a vital role in the quality of the 
produced models. If we were to apply our old class design to the next 
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generation, then we are confident that we would get better overall results 
compared to the 2015/2016 instance of the course, if only marginally better. 
The next limitation to consider is the fact that we have not adequately 
measured the change in the quality of courses the students attended before 
our course. This is especially important for the software engineering and 
network-based systems courses, as we rely on the knowledge students 
receive here to reason about security. According to the official study 
program document, no significant changes have occurred in the curriculum 
of these courses. To the best of our knowledge, no minor changes in the 
teaching technique or the subject matter of the relevant courses have taken 
place. However, it is difficult to assess if this is the case. 
The final limitation related to the study is the lack of a larger dataset to 
analyze. Fourteen threat models were examined from the 2015/2016 instance 
of the course, and seventeen from the 2016/2017 instance, which is a 
relatively small scale. 
A limitation of our framework is its inherent complexity, which requires 
additional effort to prepare the course. For the traditional classroom, the 
teacher prepares course materials that can then be used in the classroom. Our 
approach involves the construction of preparatory materials, in addition to 
the case studies that are examined in the classroom. Furthermore, an effort is 
required to align the preparatory materials, the case studies, and the security 
analysis method. As with regular course materials, the preparatory materials 
need to be periodically updated to stay relevant. 
To address the complexity limitation, we have utilized vulnerable software 
packages (VSPs), as described in Section 3.2.3. By enhancing our framework 
and integrating a VSP into the formulated labs, we drastically reduced the 
amount of time it takes to prepare a lab using our framework. Initially, before 
enhancing our framework, the lab constructor needed to invest significant 
time (approximately a week) to build the case study, the assignments and 
related code samples for the lab covering the topics of injection attacks. With 
the Juice Shop application, the build time was reduced to a single day, which 
included the time it took to find and explore the VSP. Additionally, the 
preparatory materials were constructed by combining resources from the 
Juice Shop website and the OWASP Top 10 list (Stock et al., 2017). 
A significant limitation of this enhancement is the relative shortage of VSPs. 
While web technologies and common web security issues (Stock et al., 2017) 
are covered by several high-quality VSPs (Siles and Bennetts, 2019), 
domains such as mobile or embedded application are scarcely covered. 
While elementary code samples and toy projects can be found, sophisticated 
 
63 
solutions reaching the quality of the OWASP Juice Shop project are few and 
far between. 
3.4.4 Implications 
The goal of our SDA framework is to contribute to the development of a 
security-aware workforce of software engineers. As part of our secure 
software engineering course, we designed a novel framework based on the 
hybrid flipped classroom and case study analysis to teach students the 
practice of security design analysis. We evaluated our new approach by 
comparing the quality of the threat model documents produced by the 
2015/2016 student group (who attended traditional labs) with the threat 
model documents produced by the 2016/2017 student group (who attended 
labs created using our proposed framework). Our results show that the 
student teams of the framework instance of the course have achieved better 
overall correctness and completeness on the threat identification task 
compared to the student teams of the traditional instance of the course. The 
applied statistical test shows that the obtained differences are statistically 
significant. Therefore, labs created through the SDA Training Framework are 
the preferred alternative, as opposed to the traditional classroom, when it 
comes to teaching SDA. 
A significant limitation of the framework is its complexity, which we tried to 
address by enhancing the framework using vulnerable software packages. 
Vulnerable software packages enable trainers to demonstrate security issues 
in a real-world context and allow trainees to apply their security knowledge 
to both perform attacks on and build defenses in a real-world software 
system. Thus, vulnerable software packages serve the first principles of 
instruction (Merrill, 2002) to increase trainee learning. By utilizing these 
tools, we have reduced the effort it takes to develop a laboratory exercise 
through our framework. Additionally, we have increased the overall quality 
of the lab by replacing a case study description and vulnerable code samples 
with a fully functioning application that contains vulnerable code. 
The framework proved useful for the fourth-year undergraduate students of a 
software engineering university program. However, we argue that the 
framework is also useful for employed software engineers, as most of the 
fourth-year students find employment right after finishing our course on 
software security. Therefore, the framework presented in this Section can be 
used to formulate a one-day workshop for a conference, a set of training 
exercises for software developers, as part of a corporate training program, or, 
as we have demonstrated, a set of labs for a university course. While the 
framework is designed for teaching security design analysis, the target of the 
SDA can be anything from a web-based system to a hardware chipset. 
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4 SATMUS Process 
This Chapter details our solution for the second research question and the 
second segment of the hypothesis listed in Section 1.4. Our goal is to define 
a security design analysis method which: 
 is compatible with agile software development practices, 
 provides accountability of work, 
 is accompanied with adequate guidance for method execution and 
adaptation to different contexts, and 
 offers security assurance for the developed software and an 
incrementally updated threat model. 
We conceptualize an SDA method called SATMUS, which stands for the 
Security Analysis and Threat Modeling of User Stories. SATMUS represents 
an adaptation of the traditional threat modeling method (Shostack, 2014b) to 
the context of software development following the Scrum framework 
(Rawsthorne and Shimp, 2011). SATMUS examines each user story to 
derive actionable low-level design decisions and implementation tasks from 
ambiguous and generalized high-level security requirements. Furthermore, 
SATMUS aims to address the applicability issues which hamper the adoption 
of SDA in agile development, identified in (Luburić et al., 2018a). 
Section 4.1 defines the SATMUS process, where we examine the methods 
inputs, outputs, and composing activities. Here we explain how the process 
integrates with Scrum development and what part the different organizational 
roles play in SATMUS. Section 4.2 discusses how to tailor SATMUS to 
contexts with different levels of security requirements for the developed 
software. Here we illustrate two case studies of SATMUS adaptation to the 
workflow of two different software vendors. In Section 4.3, we demonstrate 
the execution of the tailored SATMUS processes on real-world user stories 
supplied by the two case study vendors, as well as the comparative analysis 
which examines how SATMUS addresses the applicability issues in (Luburić 
et al., 2018a), compared to similar methods proposed in the literature. 
Finally, Section 4.4 discusses the outcome, as well as the limitations and 
implications of the presented work. 
4.1 Process Structure 
This Section starts with an overview of the SATMUS process, presenting its 
purpose, inputs, and outputs in Section 4.1.1. Next, in Section 4.1.2, we 
describe the process in detail, analyzing each of its activities. 
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4.1.1 Overview 
The goal of the SATMUS is to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the 
developed software system that an attacker might exploit. SATMUS 
analyzes user stories to identify security-related issues concerning either the 
feature represented by the examined user story or an asset with which the 
feature interacts. Consequently, SATMUS translates high-level security 
requirements (e.g., protecting the confidentiality of personal data and user 
credentials) into actionable, low-level design decisions and tasks. 
To integrate SATMUS into the Scrum development process, we utilize the 
Definition of Ready (Power, 2014). The Definition of Ready is a set of rules 
that help agile teams remember all the things that need to be done before the 
development team can start implementing a user story. We expand the 
Definition of Ready with a single task that states that SATMUS analysis 
must be conducted for each user story. Therefore, SATMUS executes for 
each user story that is in the product backlog, before adding the user story to 
a sprint backlog and before any code is written. To minimize wasted work, 
SATMUS should be among the final tasks conducted as part of user story 
preparation, to analyze a mature user story that is unlikely to change 
significantly. We also utilize the Definition of Done, which contains a list of 
tasks that must be completed for each user story before it is considered 
finished (Rawsthorne, 2010). As it is possible for a user story to be 
misinterpreted before developing the code, we add a task to the Definition of 
Done that requires each story to be reevaluated for security considerations, to 
ensure that the implemented code is aligned with the initial security 
assessment. 
Figure 7 presents the SATMUS process overview, noting the inputs and 
outputs of the process. 
 
Figure 7 SATMUS process overview 
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Inputs 
The primary input to the SATMUS process is the user story. User stories are 
a mechanism for describing features provided by the software system, which 
bring value to the user of the software and the business running it (Cohn, 
2004). The elements of a user story are: 
 The software user role, for which the feature is being developed; 
 The goal, which describes what the user wants to achieve; 
 The value, which explains why the user wants to achieve the goal; 
 The acceptance criteria, a list of conditions and requirements under 
which the user story is considered complete. 
Based on these elements, the user story is often described through the 
template which has the following structure: As a <role> I want <goal> so 
that <benefit>, where the acceptance criteria follow as a list of items that 
need to be met. An example user story might be: 
“As a system administrator, I can block user accounts from accessing the 
system, so that I can stop suspicious activity. 
Acceptance criteria: 
1) I can block any user with lower privilege than me; 
2) I can ban multiple users at once; 
3) Blocking users should be quickly achieved (e.g., with one click).” 
In the previous example, the acceptance criteria contain a mixture of 
functional requirements (the first and the second acceptance criteria) and 
non-functional requirements, such as usability (the third acceptance criteria). 
In general, acceptance criteria can consist of anything the product owner and 
development team deem necessary to specify explicitly. Apart from the 
distinct functional requirements, this can include the need for specialized 
analysis, testing, or documentation. Standard unit and integration testing 
might be part of the Definition of Done (Rawsthorne, 2010). However, 
performance testing or security testing might be reserved for high priority 
features and listed in the acceptance criteria for the appropriate user stories 
(Leffingwell, 2010). 
It should be noted that assets that the new code will manipulate, and its 
environment are important for SATMUS, as from these we derive security 
requirements for the examined user story. They are not presented as an input 
here, as they are an integral part of the SATMUS process, determined during 
process tailoring, as discussed in Section 4.2. 
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Outputs 
One possible outcome of applying SATMUS to a user story is the 
introduction of additional, security-relevant, acceptance criteria. These might 
include requirements for the software (e.g., Arriving XML documents must 
be validated against an XML Schema; The maximum image upload size can 
be 20 megabytes) or for the organization developing the software (e.g., The 
feature code needs to undergo a team-wide security code review; The feature 
endpoints need to be tested against fuzz testing tools). 
Another output of SATMUS can be a spike (Knaster and Leffingwell, 2018). 
A spike represents activities such as research, design, and prototyping. The 
goal is to gain the necessary knowledge to sufficiently understand a 
requirement, increase the reliability of a story estimate, or understand the risk 
of a technical approach. As a result of SATMUS, the Scrum team might 
realize that a vulnerability exists, but may not know how to mitigate it. 
Likewise, the team might understand that a specific security control needs to 
be integrated into their solution but might not possess the knowledge about 
which provider of the security control is tried and tested, and which 
configuration offers the most security. For these situations, a research spike 
is issued. For example, when a need for an anonymization function for 
personal data is discovered, the team conducts a research spike to find out 
how to develop and use such a feature. 
Finally, during the security analysis, the team might discover that additional 
work needs to be done to introduce or modify a security control, change the 
infrastructure, or perform any significant development to increase the 
security posture of their solution. Therefore, SATMUS can output new user 
stories directly focused on improving the security of the system. An example 
of this might be the development of an infrastructure component for input 
validation of data specific to the application domain. 
4.1.2 Internals 
The SATMUS process flow, including its composing activities, is illustrated 
in Figure 8. The first set of activities, Estimate Impact4, is concerned with 
calculating the security impact of the user story (which can be high, medium, 
or low), to justify the investment of effort for further security analysis. Low 
impact user stories are not analyzed further, as they do not introduce a 
significant security risk. User stories of medium and high impact undergo the 
Threat Model set of activities. Furthermore, external experts assist the Scrum 
team for high impact stories, as these usually map to critical security 
                                                 
4 The use of italic in this Section signals that this is an activity illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
69 
requirements. The goal of this set of activities is to identify any potential 
security issues concerning the user story, incrementally update the threat 
model for the component which the user story expands, and define 
requirements for mitigations. Finally, the evidence is documented to: 
 Ensure that the SATMUS process was conducted; 
 Fulfill any potential regulatory compliance; 
 Issue new tasks (e.g., user stories, research spikes) to resolve any 
identified security issues. 
 
Figure 8 SATMUS process internals 
Determine Affected Assets 
The process starts by determining assets that will be affected by the code that 
will implement the user story. The term asset is often ambiguous and 
generic, most often defined following the ISO definition as “anything that 
has value to an organization” (Disterer, 2013). In the context of our method, 
we describe an asset as follows: 
 An asset is a software object (e.g., data, function, UI component, 
service, an application server) manipulated by the software system 
under development, which has a security requirement. 
This definition, which is a subset of the ISO definition, is suitable for our 
context because: 
 It is only concerned with concepts related to software engineering 
and the system under development, which makes it more 
understandable to the people practicing the process; 
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 It focuses only on objects that have security requirements, enabling 
reasoning about security throughout the rest of the process. 
Organizations that develop software that has regulatory compliance 
requirements should consider constructing an asset inventory that notes the 
security requirements for each asset. In (Luburić et al., 2018b), we have 
proposed a conceptual model for an asset inventory, that maps assets to 
security goals (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, availability). When an asset has 
a security goal, the owner of the asset needs to determine the security goal 
value (on a scale of 1 to 3) and provide the reasoning behind this value (e.g., 
references to standards or best practice documentation). 
With the aid of such resources, software engineers can perform checklist 
verification to make sure that vital assets were not forgotten during this step. 
Organizations that have little or no explicit security requirements can rely on 
the expertise and agility of their Scrum team and their stakeholders to 
understand and identify which assets have quality security requirements. 
Examine Environment 
Another significant aspect to consider is the environment in which the 
developed feature will reside. 
For example, a piece of code that realizes a user story might manipulate user 
passwords, cryptographic keys, or personal data, making it highly sensitive 
code. However, if this code is accessible only to internal services, sheltered 
by layers of security controls where no user input arrives unvalidated, then 
the user story might have fewer security implications than first assumed. 
Likewise, while code accessing a database might not work with sensitive 
data, it can raise a significant security issue if, for example, there exists an 
SQL injection vulnerability. Therefore, it is essential to examine the context 
in which the code that realizes a user story will operate. 
The primary goal of this activity is to determine if the data supplied to or 
resulting from the new code crosses a trust boundary and what the nature of 
that boundary is (Myagmar et al., 2005). For example, publicly available 
APIs that accept user input have more significant security implications than 
code that interacts with a service running under the same privilege on the 
same machine. Likewise, code that accesses a database or offers a critical 
system function has higher security requirements than code that does not 
handle sensitive data and provides a low priority service. 
Finally, it is vital to examine how the new user story changes the 
environment, as the introduction of new data flows or entry points can 
increase the attack surface and produce new threats to the environment. 
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Calculate User Story Impact 
The purpose of the following step is to funnel the security-related 
development effort to the most sensitive parts of the system. Threat modeling 
requires effort and thoroughly performing it might entail more effort and 
expertise than the Scrum team possesses. Therefore, we propose an activity 
that determines whether a user story requires such an investment. 
Each organization must define the calculation algorithm for its context, based 
on their internal resources and the security requirements for their product. 
This calculation should consider: 
 The assets affected by the user story; 
 The environment in which the new code will run. 
An example of such a calculation formula utilizes the asset inventory 
presented in (Luburić et al., 2018b). The Scrum team determines the highest 
security goal value from the list of affected assets (on a scale of 1 to 3). Next, 
the team examines the environment and grades it on a scale of 1 to 3, based 
on the following criteria: 
1) When the new code does not interact with a human user and it does 
not introduce new data flows. 
2) When the new code interacts with an internal human user. 
3) When the new code represents a security feature (e.g., cryptographic 
module, access control module), or interacts with an entity external to 
the software solution (e.g., Internet users, integrated external 
systems). 
For this example, the user story impact is calculated based on the formula 
presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 Sample user story impact calculation formula 
Asset security 
goal 
Environment 
1 2 3 
 
1 
 
Low Low Medium 
 
2 
 
Low Medium High 
 
3 
 
Medium High High 
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Regardless of the exact calculation algorithm, the output of this step 
determines the amount of effort invested for further security analysis, where 
the three general outcomes are: 
 A user story has a low security impact, where no additional security 
analysis is required; 
 A user story has a medium security impact, requiring further security 
analysis; 
 A user story has a high security impact, requiring a detailed security 
analysis, with a possible investment of resources from other parts of 
the organization or experts from a different organization. 
It should be noted that the Estimate Impact set of activities (Determine 
Affected Assets, Examine Environment, and Calculate User Story Impact) 
should introduce only a minor overhead to the development process. A 
glance at the asset inventory and a brief discussion of the environment can 
quickly determine what the impact of the user story is. As this is the part of 
SATMUS that must be conducted for each user story, it must be quickly 
finished. 
Obtain Expertise 
When a user story has high impact, additional resources need to be invested 
to ensure that no significant security issues get introduced with the upcoming 
code implementation. Ideally, this activity should be triggered rarely, as 
security expertise in software development is hard to come by and is 
expensive (Whyte and Harrison, 2010; Assante and Tobey, 2011). 
Organizations building software with plenty of explicit security requirements 
should consider obtaining a dedicated security team to support software 
developers for high impact user story assessment (McGraw et al., 2018). A 
less expensive alternative might be to hire security consultants (Poller et al., 
2017) to perform the threat modeling and train the Scrum team on how to 
mitigate any issues that might arise from it. One caveat regarding this 
approach is that external consultants might understand the security of a 
technological stack or problem domain, but they cannot fully grasp the inner 
workings and intricacies of the specific software developed by the 
organization. Alternatively, the Scrum team should contact senior developers 
and architects within the organization to aid with the threat modeling. 
As part of this activity and before expending significant resources, a research 
spike might be called for to gain a better understanding of the problem and 
the best solutions for it. 
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Analyze Module 
When a user story becomes the Scrum team’s focus, software code and 
design level details are discussed so that the whole team can get an 
understanding on what tasks need to be executed to fulfill the user story. 
During this discussion, software components, functions, and control flows 
are examined in an informal and unstructured manner. When a user story has 
a high or medium impact, our approach expands this discussion by analyzing 
the module from a security perspective. The purpose of this step is to define 
the entire attack surface and ensure that no threats go unnoticed and that a 
suitable defense in depth can be planned. 
Analyzing the module usually entails examining design artefacts such as 
UML activity and sequence diagrams or data flow diagrams. Depending on 
which SDA method is used, a suitable representation can be selected to 
support the next step, which is threat analysis. For STRIDE-based SDA, a 
common approach is to utilize data flow diagrams (Shostack, 2014b). Here, 
the team needs to identify all data stores, flows, and processing nodes 
affected by the proposed design and code changes. Flows which interact with 
entities external to the jurisdiction of the Scrum team (e.g., outside users, 
third-party services, components developed by other Scrum teams) are 
especially important, as they cross significant trust boundaries. 
An issue arises during this step if a data flow (especially one which contains 
assets of high security goal values) leaves the components of the system with 
which the Scrum team is familiar (Cruzes et al., 2018; Tuma et al., 2018). If 
this is the case, a Scrum team member (e.g., Scrum master) or a security 
team member, if available, need to consult with other teams and expand the 
data flow diagram to include their components. This is especially important 
when new assets are introduced to the system, as this can affect the threat 
models of the other teams. As Scrum favors face-to-face communication, the 
organization should encourage and facilitate such knowledge transfer. 
The team builds the initial threat model at the start of development and 
incrementally updates it with each impactful user story. Therefore, data flow 
analysis for a specific story might entail a small tweak to the existing data 
flow diagrams (DFDs), or it might not even require modification to these 
artifacts (when the new story does not change the current flows). 
Importantly, data flow diagrams need to be concise and accurate, focusing on 
trust boundaries (e.g., between the application and the OS, between internal 
and external services, between human users and the software). Data flow 
minimization, as described by Tuma et al. (2017), aids developers in 
constructing more concise diagrams that are less prone to the threat 
explosion problem. For example, two communicating processes where there 
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is no trust boundary between them can be merged into a single process. 
Likewise, when two nodes have multiple data flows between them, they can 
be merged into a single flow, which gains the criticality of the most critical 
initial flow. 
Analyze Threats 
Threat analysis, as the core activity of SDA, largely depends on the selected 
SDA method. For the example above, we utilize STRIDE threat discovery on 
the constructed DFDs. We choose STRIDE as the basis for this step due to 
the method’s relative maturity and prevalence, as described in Section 1.3.3. 
Once applicable threats are determined, threat decomposition takes place. 
The goal of threat decomposition is to identify attacks that realize a threat 
and the vulnerabilities that enable attacks so that mitigations can be planned 
during the next step. 
Threat analysis, and especially threat decomposition, is the most challenging 
activity for Scrum teams, as it requires security expertise, which developers 
usually lack (Dhillon, 2011; Morrison et al., 2017). Looking at SATMUS, 
most of the activities discussed so far can be performed with no or simple 
training, as Estimate Impact activities and Analyze Module requires expertise 
in software engineering, while threat discovery can be achieved following a 
simple algorithm. While threat decomposition can be performed by 
identifying misuse cases (Alexander, 2003; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005) and 
creating control flows to stop them, this can be practiced successfully only 
when aided by a security mindset and software security knowledge 
(Shostack, 2014a; Schoenfield, 2015). For example, a software developer 
lacking security expertise might realize that an authentication mechanism can 
be bypassed because of poorly-designed control flow in the existing code but 
might not understand what cross-site scripting is. 
To combat this issue, organizations need to invest in dedicated training. 
While this is in contrast with our Simplicity requirement, some security 
training is unavoidable. As pointed out by Poller et al. (2017), organizations 
rely on developers to produce quality software, fulfilling quality security 
requirements alongside other “ilities” (e.g., maintainability, usability) 
without dedicated training, leading ultimately to the production of insecure 
software. Therefore, organizations should invest research spikes conducted 
by their senior developers (with the aid of a security team if one is available) 
or hire external security experts to produce and administer dedicated 
software security training. The training needs to be related to the product’s 
context, considering the technologies used to create the product and any 
explicit security requirements (e.g., derived from standards and regulations). 
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Here the SDA Training Framework described in Chapter 3 can be utilized to 
optimize the training program and achieve better learning outcomes. 
An alternative or supplemental approach is to employ attack pattern catalogs, 
which aids threat decomposition by providing example attacks and 
vulnerabilities that can be mapped to the context of the developed product. 
Several public catalogs exist, such as the Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification – CAPEC (Barnum, 2008), the Common 
Weakness Enumeration – CWE (Martin, 2007), and resources provided by 
OWASP (Stock et al., 2017). However, such catalogs can be unwieldy as 
they contain many entries that might not be relevant to the Scrum team’s 
context. 
For the construction and maintenance of the threat models, the Scrum team 
might benefit from a tool like the freely available Microsoft Threat Modeling 
Tool (Microsoft, 2019). Apart from the diagramming functionality, the tool 
offers a knowledge base that generates threats for the given diagrams. 
However, the tool is susceptible to the threat explosion problem, where 
dozens of (possibly vague) threats can be generated for even a basic diagram, 
especially when relying on the knowledge base offered by the default 
templates (Sion et al., 2018). Organizations should consider constructing 
their own knowledge base for the given technological stack, even if it is less 
comprehensive, as it is better to generate a few relevant threats than many 
vague threats (Cruzes et al., 2018). 
When not aided by an attack pattern catalog or tool, the threat decomposition 
step is usually conducted during one or more brainstorming sessions 
(Ransome and Misra, 2013; Shostack, 2014b; Schoenfield, 2015). Given the 
exploratory nature of the problem, threat decomposition can be time-
consuming, where unlikely attacks can be discovered indefinitely, and there 
is no clear way to determine when all the critical threats have been 
discovered. Therefore, organizations need to determine the amount of effort 
and time dedicated to threat decomposition, based on the user story impact, 
to introduce a stopping condition (Schoenfield, 2015; Luburić et al., 2018a). 
Specify Mitigations 
Once threats are decomposed, and attacks are identified, mitigations can be 
analyzed to resolve potential security issues. At this point, new user stories 
can be created, a research spike can be planned, or additional acceptance 
criteria can be issued for the examined user story. For each identified attack 
there should be explicit mitigation (either already in place, for example, an 
infrastructure component, or planned). If it is not possible to identify 
mitigation for an attack, a research spike is expected. 
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If misuse cases were utilized, additional acceptance criteria could be defined 
to test if a misuse scenario was prevented. Likewise, acceptance criteria can 
be expanded to include specialized testing and code review (manual or aided 
by security tooling). 
New user stories arise when a need for a new component (usually in the 
infrastructure of the system) is discovered. The implementation of a new 
access control model, the use of a cryptographic module, or a need for an 
enhanced event logger are all examples of features that can be described by a 
new user story. 
The goal of research spikes can be to obtain a better understanding of threats 
and attacks or a prerequisite for the successful implementation and testing of 
a new user story or acceptance criteria. 
It should be noted that mitigation analysis does not entail risk analysis, so the 
mitigations are not prioritized. While the Scrum team takes part in the whole 
SATMUS process, prioritization of user stories and tasks, in general, is left 
to the product owner and the management of the organization, rather than the 
developers. 
Document Evidence 
The final step of the SATMUS process is the documentation of evidence. 
The purpose of this step is to provide evidence that SATMUS took place, as 
well as list any results of the analysis relevant for the organization. 
Depending on the agility, relevant security requirements, the impact of the 
user story, and general context of the organization, this step can have 
significantly different outcomes. For example, an organization aiming to 
comply with the IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard (IEC, 2018a) can construct 
templates for documenting the execution of the SATMUS process. Another 
organization with less stringent security requirements can tag medium or 
high impact user stories with the “security” tag to note which stories required 
threat modeling. 
4.2 Process Tailoring 
The SATMUS process can have significantly different implementations for 
different software vendors, for different software products constructed by the 
same software vendor, or even for different sets of teams working on the 
same software product. Software products require different levels of security, 
determined by the purpose of the software, the functions and assets it works 
with, and the context in which it operates (Schoenfield, 2015). While one 
vendor might produce software with strict security requirements and a strong 
requirement for security assurance, another vendor might have basic security 
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requirements for the developed software and no need for documented 
evidence of security assurance. 
In Section 4.2.1, we analyze the activities of the SATMUS process that are 
most prone to change based on the security context of the developed 
software. We then present two software vendors with significantly different 
case study implementations of SATMUS and describe how the process is 
adapted to their context. The differences between the software vendors 
include organizational structure, the level of security requirements for their 
software, and the domain in which their software operates. In Section 4.2.2, 
we describe SATMUS tailored for a software vendor (“Vendor A”) that 
produces software for industrial control systems for utility companies around 
the world and has strict security requirements (both explicit and quality). In 
Section 4.2.3, we present a SATMUS implementation used by a software 
vendor (“Vendor B”) that produces management information systems for 
businesses and has few security requirements that need to be fulfilled. For 
each case study, we describe the context of the organization using SATMUS, 
providing a brief description of the organization’s capabilities, their business 
model, the goals of the software they produce and the security requirements 
for that software. Next, we examine the specific SATMUS implementation, 
where we describe how SATMUS is tailored for the given organization. 
4.2.1 Tailoring Areas 
When tailoring SATMUS to a specific organization’s context, there are 
several areas of the process that can vary based on the required level of 
security for the developed software, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Tailoring areas in the SATMUS process 
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Asset Inventory 
Explicit security requirements are arguably more important than quality 
security requirements, as they are required for regulatory compliance. 
Furthermore, explicit security requirements are often concerned with easily 
identifiable assets (e.g., user passwords, cryptographic keys, personal data). 
Therefore, an organization with regulatory requirements for their software 
can benefit from an asset inventory that Scrum teams can reference during 
the Determine Affected Assets5 step of SATMUS. However, this inventory 
can contain lightweight entries (e.g., the name of asset and asset owner) for 
organizations that do not wish to complicate their implementation of 
SATMUS and can even be a lightweight list of items (e.g., on a sticky note) 
that each team defines for themselves in organizations that value flexibility 
and speed of development over security. 
While assets with explicit security requirements are easy to map to an asset 
inventory, the asset inventory can and should contain assets with quality 
security requirements, deemed of high value to the organization. Essential 
services and business functions, trade secrets, and confidential documents 
can all be listed in the inventory. 
Finally, it should be noted that a sophisticated asset inventory needs an 
inventory management process to maintain its contents and would benefit 
from a tool dedicated for asset management. 
Calculation Formula 
The calculation formula is arguably the most important decision an 
organization needs to make when implementing SATMUS, as the calculation 
algorithm directly determines the amount of security-related effort that will 
be invested during software development. Organizations that want to spend 
less on security will aim to classify most user stories as low impact, while 
organizations that wish to invest in security will classify most stories as 
medium or high impact. Conducting threat modeling for each user story is 
inefficient and does not bring value to the organization (Türpe and Poller, 
2017). 
The calculation formula can consider the importance of adequately 
implementing the user story itself (e.g., important business function, 
essential infrastructure component). This can be achieved by estimating the 
loss value of a user story, as suggested by Pohl and Hof (2015). Loss value 
                                                 
5 The use of italic in this Section signals that this is an activity illustrated in Figure 8 and 
described in Section 4.1.2. 
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represents the cost to the organization, should the user story functions or the 
data involved in the user story get attacked. 
An essential requirement for the calculation formula is simplicity, as Scrum 
teams need to quickly and effectively measure the impact of each user story. 
Ideally, the whole Estimate Impact set of activities should introduce a 
negligible overhead to the development process, once teams are familiar with 
the algorithm. 
One example of the formula is presented in Section 4.1.2. An example of a 
lightweight formula, suitable for a development team only concerned with 
GDPR (GDPR, 2016) would be to rate user stories as having a medium 
impact only if the new code manipulates PII or expands the attack surface 
towards the Internet. 
Internal Security Team 
Organizations, especially those with regulatory requirements for their 
software, need to consider investing in an internal security team. The internal 
security team, in this context, is a team dedicated to the practice of secure 
software engineering, examining arising threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and 
mitigations applicable to the software being developed. Importantly, this is 
different from the security team that organizations usually have, which is 
focused on corporate security measures (e.g., IT security of the internal 
network, physical security) and general security management. As pointed out 
by Poller et al. (2017), a security management team that is not familiar with 
agile development practices can hurt security practices in development by 
imposing inappropriate activities and documentation. 
A team dedicated to secure software engineering practices can assist Scrum 
teams for high impact user stories and can also take part in training 
construction and administration, conduct or aid research spikes, and improve 
the overall maturity of SATMUS, making it more valuable, usable, and 
efficient. 
Importantly, security experts are inherently less connected to the low-level 
software components and their everyday evolution, when compared to 
development teams that are designing and implementing them. Therefore, an 
internal security team cannot continually manage and conduct SATMUS, 
especially for large software products, which is why this duty must fall onto 
the development teams that can do this efficiently and comprehensively. 
Finally, organizations should consider constructing an informal security 
advisory team. This team consists of developers, architects, and any 
employees interested in software security. Members dedicate a portion of 
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their time (e.g., 6 hours a week) to learn about the latest security trends and 
assist in the threat modeling of high impact user stories. 
Underlying SDA Method 
The security design analysis method defines the views of the system that 
should be constructed and maintained as part of the Analyze Module step, as 
well as the practices conducted on those artifacts during the Analyze Threats 
step. Section 1.3.3 lists some of the various SDA methods that can be 
integrated as the underlying SDA method for SATMUS. 
Tools and Training 
Efficient conducting of any process, SATMUS included, requires some 
training to understand the steps and expected outputs of each activity. 
However, dedicated training is necessary for the threat analysis activity, 
especially the threat decomposition step. This type of training requires 
security expertise to construct and conduct and needs to be updated regularly 
with new attacks and mitigations as threats arise. Furthermore, it is not 
enough to obtain general training on secure software engineering, as it brings 
less value for developers than training relevant to their context (Bartsch et 
al., 2011; Oyetoyan et al., 2016; Poller et al., 2017). Therefore, the training 
should focus on the technology used by the Scrum teams, as well as the 
context into which the developed software is delivered. 
Dedicated training is crucial for the success of SATMUS, both for the whole 
process and especially for security analysis. Oyetoyan et al. (2016) analyzed 
two software vendors on the use of security-related activities in their agile 
workflow. By interviewing different roles in the organization, they 
concluded that proper training is essential for any security-related activity, as 
skill determines whether it will be conducted. While security bulletins, blogs 
and e-learning can be a cost-efficient way to distribute security knowledge, 
especially to introduce new threats, more involved training is required to 
achieve a mastery of the basics (Kassicieh et al., 2015). Dedicated training 
should take the form of interactive workshops, especially when starting with 
SATMUS. As examined in our previous work, published in (Luburić et al. 
2019a) and described in Chapter 3, the hybrid flipped classroom and case 
study analysis produces good results for this type of training. 
If the organization chooses to utilize attack pattern catalogs dedicated 
training can be replaced in part with a process for constructing and 
maintaining the knowledge base that will aid threat decomposition. Tools for 
threat modeling and security design analysis, such as (Goodwin, 2018; 
Microsoft, 2019), can support the use and maintenance of this knowledge 
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base. The use of threat libraries and attack pattern catalogues can increase the 
value of the generated threat models (Dhillon, 2011). 
Evidence Structure 
The final consideration regarding the adaptation of SATMUS is related to the 
structure of the evidence produced by the security analysis. 
Evidence for a user story of low impact might be in the form of an oral 
statement from the product owner or the most senior developer, stating that 
the Estimate Impact activities were conducted and that the impact was 
deemed as low. Organizations with explicit security requirements might 
supplement this statement with a list of identified assets and notes regarding 
the environment of the user story. 
Evidence for user stories of high impact in organizations with lax security 
requirements might contain a list of planned mitigations, while organizations 
with regulatory compliance needs might document every part of the threat 
model in detail, to be used as a form of security assurance, as examined in 
our previous work (Luburić et al., 2018b). 
The bottom line is that the evidence documented at the end of SATMUS 
should be synced with the needs of the organization, be it to fulfill regulatory 
compliance, or the needs of its customers. Furthermore, it should facilitate 
accountability of work so that security work is visible both for planning and 
auditing needs. 
4.2.2 Case Study – Industrial Control System Software 
Development 
With the rise of Industry 4.0, industrial control systems are increasingly 
benefiting from software solutions that automate their operations. As these 
solutions often play a critical role in the functioning of factories and parts of 
a society’s critical infrastructure, they have become a target of the most 
sophisticated cyberattacks that threaten businesses, governments, and human 
lives (Kobara, 2016). 
Here we describe SATMUS tailored for Vendor A, a company that produces 
software for industrial control system for utility companies around the world.  
Organization Context 
Vendor A has a workforce of about 500 software engineers (including 
architects, coders, and testers), organized into 50 Scrum teams. Additionally, 
Vendor A has a dedicated internal security team that covers a broad spectrum 
of security-related activities. The vendor’s customers are spread across the 
globe. 
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Vendor A produces a set of software products for the utility companies. 
Starting from the baseline product, the software is customized for each 
customer of Vendor A and is deployed on the premises of the utility 
company, where the customer’s personnel operates it. The software is not 
directly accessible from the Internet. It is configured and maintained by 
system administrators, used by utility controllers, and integrated with several 
other systems (e.g., remote terminal units in the field, customer’s internal 
information systems, geographic information systems). 
Utility companies are a priority target for sophisticated attackers like 
cyberterrorists. To combat this, organizations for standardizations and 
governments have issued various standards and regulations with which the 
utility company must be compliant with, some of which directly address the 
software used by the utility company, such as NIST SP 800-53 (Force and 
Initiative, 2013), NERC CIP (NERC, 2019), IEC 62443-4-2 (IEC, 2018b). 
Therefore, the software produced by Vendor A must adhere to a broad set of 
explicit and quality security requirements. Furthermore, the fulfillment of 
these requirements needs to be adequately documented, to enable the 
customer to prove their regulatory compliance concerning the purchased 
software. 
Tailoring Decisions 
Asset Inventory: Vendor A utilizes an asset inventory which details the name 
and type of the asset, as well as its security goals (i.e., confidentiality, 
integrity, availability) and the priority of each security goal (on a scale of 1 
to 3), as presented in (Luburić et al., 2018b). Vendor A expands the model 
by including references toward the sources of these security requirements 
(e.g., entries in an industry standard, regulation, or best practice document). 
Furthermore, the asset inventory contains entries related to critical functions 
and services, whose protection is paramount to ensure the reliability of the 
core system. 
The entries in the asset inventory are split into several groups, where each 
Scrum team is made aware of which parts of the inventory are relevant for 
them. The product owner manages the inventory for each team and 
immediately communicates any updates of the inventory to the development 
teams. 
Calculation Formula: Once affected assets are determined, and the 
environment is examined, the calculation formula takes as input two 
numbers, following the example given in Section 4.1.2, Calculate User Story 
Impact. The first number is the highest security goal value in the list of 
affected assets (on a scale of 1 to 3). The second number is related to the 
environment and can have the following values: 
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1) When the new code does not interact with a human user, does not 
introduce new data flows, and the user story does not represent an 
essential feature (as determined by the product owner). 
2) When the new code interacts with an internal human user or the user 
story represents an essential feature. 
3) When the new code represents a security feature (e.g., cryptographic 
module, access control module), or interacts with an entity external to 
the software solution (e.g., remote terminal units, remote users 
accessing the system, integrated external systems). 
Based on these two numbers, the impact of the user story is calculated by 
using Table 12. 
Internal Security Team: Vendor A maintains an internal security team, with 
members dedicated to assisting Scrum teams with high impact user stories. 
Additionally, the security team aids product owners in managing their asset 
inventories. 
Furthermore, the internal security team constructs and administers dedicated 
security training for threat analysis utilizing the SDA Training Framework 
presented in Chapter 3, as well as the whole SATMUS process, driving its 
continuous improvement. 
Finally, the security team organizes the security advisory forum, a quarterly 
event where representatives from every team join in on the discussion about 
software security. The security team presents new threats, attacks, and 
mitigations, and highlights security problems and solutions identified and 
implemented by the different teams in the organization, facilitating the 
knowledge transfer between participants. 
Underlying SDA Method: Vendor A relies on STRIDE-based SDA that 
examines data flow diagrams, as described in Section 4.1.2. 
Tools and Training: Dedicated training is constructed and updated by the 
internal security team using the SDA Training Framework from Chapter 3. 
The primary security design analysis methods include STRIDE-based threat 
analysis (Shostack, 2014b) and misuse case identification and analysis 
(Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). The developed software acts as the primary case 
study for analysis, to present relevant threats, attacks, and mitigations. The 
internal security team constructs and distributes preparatory materials 
through an e-learning platform and holds periodic workshops to apply the 
knowledge from the preparatory materials to the case study. Training is 
readministered if the Scrum team detects a need, vulnerabilities are 
discovered in production, or if there is a significant update in the training 
materials. The security team utilizes attack and vulnerability catalogs, such 
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as CAPEC (Barnum, 2008) and CWE (Martin, 2007), to hand pick relevant 
entries and construct easy-to-consume training materials from them. They 
integrate this knowledge into a template for the Microsoft Threat Modeling 
Tool (Microsoft, 2019), which the development teams utilize to construct 
their threat models and receive feedback about the most critical threats. 
Evidence Structure: Finally, templates are provided for documenting the 
execution of the SATMUS process, which is done by the product owner. The 
templates are constructed to fulfill the requirement of the IEC 62443-4-
1:2018 standard, namely SR-2: Threat modeling and SD-1: Secure design 
principles. For low impact user stories this entails a note that SATMUS was 
conducted, while medium and high impact stories include data flow diagrams 
and lists of decomposed threats and mapped mitigations, as well as 
references to SATMUS outputs. 
4.2.3 Case Study – Management Information System 
Software Development 
Management information systems aid organizations in coordinating, 
controlling, and analyzing information in an organization, to provide support 
for decision-making. Their use is wide-spread, and they present a core pillar 
for all modern organizations (O'Brien and Marakas, 2006). From the security 
perspective, they are less critical than industrial control systems, but due to 
the sensitivity of the data they handle (e.g., trade secrets, PII) they can be a 
viable target for cybercriminals. 
Here we present the SATMUS implementation used by Vendor B, a 
company that produces management information systems for businesses. 
Organization Context 
Vendor B has a workforce of about 50 software engineers (including 
architects, coders, and testers), organized into 8 Scrum teams. The vendor’s 
customers are always from the European Union. 
Vendor B produces software solutions to support management information 
systems. Each solution is built from the ground up and is deployed on the 
premises of the customer. The solutions are usually developed by three to 
five Scrum teams at a time, where teams need to be agile and move from 
project to project quickly. Most solutions have at least one set of endpoints 
that are accessible from the Internet, while most of the code is dedicated to 
internal data and process support. 
Customers of Vendor B are small and medium business with medium-scale 
databases. They are low to medium priority targets for cyberattackers, as 
often the only target worth their engagement is PII. The primary regulation 
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that affects these businesses is GDPR. Therefore, the software produced by 
Vendor B must explicitly protect personal information. Furthermore, as the 
Internet presents an attack surface with practically infinite attackers, some 
quality security requirements are needed to protect the customer from chaotic 
attackers, as well as corporate sabotage. 
Tailoring Decisions 
Asset Inventory: For each product, Vendor B maintains a simple list of 
GDPR-relevant data assets, including a name and a brief description of each 
asset. The list is printed next to each whiteboard where sprint planning 
occurs. 
Calculation Formula: The impact of the user story is calculated based on the 
following three questions: 
1) Will the new code manipulate assets from the inventory? 
2) Will the new code directly interact with users? 
3) Is the new code a security control? 
If the answer to 1 and 2 is yes, the user story impact is Medium. If the 
answer to 3 is yes, the user story impact is also Medium. In all other cases, 
the user story impact is Low. High impact user stories do not exist in the 
current context of Vendor B. The product owner maintains the asset 
inventory. 
Internal Security Team: Vendor B does not maintain an internal security 
team. The most senior developers are tasked with identifying and prescribing 
security practices for design and development. 
Underlying SDA Method: Like Vendor A, Vendor B utilizes STRIDE-based 
SDA that examines data flow diagrams, as described in Section 4.1.2. 
Tools and Training: Vendor B does not maintain an internal security team 
and instead annually sends members of the development teams to application 
security-related workshops and conferences. Employees who attended are 
then tasked to construct training materials that present the most relevant 
knowledge from the conference for the context of the organization. Time is 
set aside every sprint for team members to spend on improving their software 
engineering skill, which must be focused on security at least once per 
quarter. 
Evidence Structure: User stories with medium impact are tagged as 
“security”. After SATMUS completes for these stories the outputs of 
SATMUS are referenced in a note tied to the examined story (if the output is 
a research spike or a new user story). 
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4.3 Process Evaluation 
In this section, we present our evaluation of the SATMUS process. 
Following the results of the systematic literature review on security threat 
analysis methods (Tuma et al., 2018), we utilize the two most common 
evaluation methods for security analysis techniques - comparative analysis 
and case study analysis. 
In Section 4.3.1, we refer to our previous work (Luburić et al., 2018a), and 
we examine how SATMUS compares to the Scrum security requirements 
engineering techniques found in literature, concerning the Simplicity, 
Accountability, and Guidance requirements (examined in Section 2.2). In 
Section 4.3.2, we present a set of user stories from Vendor A (described in 
Section 4.2.2) and detail how their version of SATMUS executes and what 
are the outcomes of this analysis. We perform a similar exercise in Section 
4.3.3, where we detail the process of applying SATMUS to a set of user 
stories from Vendor B. These case study analyses both evaluate our process 
as well as offer guidance for the utilization of SATMUS. 
4.3.1 Comparative Analysis 
In (Luburić, 2018a), we analyzed the literature to extract requirements for 
our process to maximize its real-world applicability. To reiterate, the 
requirements are: 
1) Simplicity – The security analysis technique should not mandate the 
introduction of additional types of documentation or job roles. 
Additionally, the method should require as little training as possible 
to practice effectively; 
2) Accountability – The security analysis technique should be integrated 
into the standard agile development workflow and should produce 
visible and quantifiable action items; 
3) Guidance – The security analysis technique should be fully 
documented, offering illustrative examples of its use, as well as 
advice for integration into different real-world contexts. 
Furthermore, we examined how different Scrum SDA methods fulfilled these 
requirements, as described in Section 2.2. Table 13 presents our previous 
results and adds SATMUS to provide a comparative analysis. Here we 
summarize the extent to which each method has achieved the goals of 
Simplicity, Accountability, and Guidance. 
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Table 13 SATMUS compared to different Scrum SDA techniques in relation to 
Simplicity, Accountability, and Guidance 
Method Simplicity Accountability Guidance 
SATMUS Partial Full Full 
Abuser Stories 
(Peeters, 2005) 
Full Partial Partial 
SEAP 
(Baca et al., 2015) 
Partial Full Insufficient 
Secure Scrum 
(Pohl and Hof, 2015) 
Full Partial Insufficient 
Security Backlog 
(Azham et al., 2011) 
Partial Full Partial 
S-Scrum 
(Mougouei et al., 2013) 
Full Insufficient Insufficient 
Agile Sec. Framework 
(Singhal, 2011) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
Sec. assurance case 
(Othmane et al., 2014a) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
VAHTI-Scrum 
(Rindell et al., 2015) 
Insufficient Full Partial 
Regarding Simplicity, we believe we have partially fulfilled this requirement. 
While our method is flexible regarding new roles (the internal security team 
is optional) and documentation structure (evidence can be lightweight, as 
well as the asset inventory), we cannot avoid the need for some dedicated 
security training or the integration of tools to supply the security knowledge. 
A checklist approach that replaces the need for the training is feasible if 
attack pattern catalogs are selected and prepared. However, this introduces a 
new document and a process for maintaining and updating it. Therefore, our 
recommendation is to invest in dedicated security training, especially that 
which is constructed through the SDA Framework described in Section 3. 
Regarding Accountability, we believe we have fulfilled this requirement 
entirely. Our process has actionable outputs and clear steps that are 
conducted by the Scrum team. The only caveat is the threat decomposition 
step of the threat analysis activity, which lacks a concrete stopping condition. 
Therefore, it is our recommendation to timeslot this activity, where time is 
invested into threat decomposition depending on the impact of the examined 
user story. 
Regarding Guidance, we believe we have fulfilled this requirement entirely. 
Section 4.1 documents our process, offering descriptions of the inputs and 
outputs to the process, as well as details regarding each activity. 
Furthermore, we describe how to tailor the process to different real-world 
contexts, and two case study implementations in Section 4.2, noting 
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significant decisions that need to be made when implementing SATMUS in 
the organization. Finally, in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, we present examples of 
SATMUS execution on several real-world user stories. 
Comparing SATMUS to other SDA techniques, our method stands out 
concerning the Guidance requirement. Furthermore, SATMUS is the only 
technique apart from SEAP that achieves full Accountability while being 
able to address the Simplicity requirement partially. 
4.3.2 Vendor A Case Study Analysis 
This Section illustrates the execution of SATMUS, as defined in Section 4.1 
and augmented in Section 4.2.2. Here we execute SATMUS for the user 
stories Introduction of Personally Identifiable Information and Service-to-
Service Password-Based Authentication. 
Introduction of Personally Identifiable Information 
The examined user story has the following text: 
“As a utility controller, I want to manage maintenance teams so that I can 
track and assign available teams to handle and fix utility outage incidents. 
Acceptance criteria: 
 CRUD operations for maintenance teams and team members, 
following the agreed upon data model; 
 Ability to examine and search for all available maintenance teams; 
 Ability to assign available teams to utility outage incidents.” 
Determine Affected Assets: The Scrum team goes over the part of the asset 
inventory relevant for them and notes that maintenance team member data, 
which is personal data and therefore protected under GDPR (GDPR, 2016), 
has the highest security goal value (a 3 for the security goal of 
confidentiality). The Scrum team notes other assets affected by the user 
story, as they will be mapped to the data flow diagrams. 
Examine Environment: The new code will communicate with a database 
over an object-relational mapper, where the code will be accessible to 
internal non-administrative users (the utility controller). Based on this 
information, and the calculation formula used by the organization, the Scrum 
team grades the sensitivity of the environment as 2. 
Calculate User Story Impact: The user story has a High impact, based on the 
formula described in Table 12. 
Obtain Expertise: The product owner contacts the internal security team to 
confirm the impact of the user story. The security team confirms the result of 
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the calculation and representatives from both teams schedule a meeting 
where most of the threat modeling shall be conducted. 
Analyze Module: During the meeting, the team draws data flows on a 
whiteboard, as presented in Figure 10. They discuss the use cases and map 
the affected assets to the elements of the diagram. 
 
Figure 10 Data flows of maintenance team member PII 
As the product the Scrum team is working on is complex and developed by 
dozens of other Scrum teams, system components and data flows exist with 
which the analysis team is unfamiliar. In this case, the Replication Service 
copies some of the content of the Operations Database to other parts of the 
system. The problem is that the analysis team is unsure if it will copy the 
new team member personal data. Therefore, the first output of this SATMUS 
execution is defined, even before threat modeling completes – a research 
spike which states that the data flow needs to be completed by consulting 
with colleagues from other teams, after which a threat and mitigation 
analysis needs to be conducted for any potential additions to the original 
DFD. 
Analyze Threats: The first step of threat analysis, threat identification, is 
conducted following STRIDE (Shostack, 2014b). The team places focus on 
the trust boundary between the system and the users (in this case, the utility 
controller and database administrator) and the boundary between 
components under the Scrum team’s jurisdiction and components which fall 
under the jurisdiction of other teams (in this case, the replication service). 
Each identified threat is decomposed through misuse cases and aided by the 
security knowledge of both the Scrum team (obtained through dedicated 
training) and the security expert. For each identified attack, the team notes 
mitigations which exist in the system. Each unmitigated attack vector is 
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listed for mitigation analysis. In the context of the analyzed user story, two 
threats are identified with unmitigated attacks. These include: 
 Elevation of privilege, where a non-controller user that uses the same 
UI as the utility controller can read team member data; 
 Repudiation, where a database administrator can read the content of 
the database without the system logging this action. 
Specify Mitigations: As a result of the two discovered vulnerabilities, the 
team plans mitigations. They issue two more outputs of the SATMUS 
analysis – an additional acceptance criterion “CRUD operations of team 
member data require access control checks for permissions tied to the utility 
controller role”, as well as a new user story, which requires that logging of 
database administrator actions, especially database reads of team member 
data, needs to be carefully tracked. 
Document Evidence: The team selects a member to fill the regulatory 
compliance templates. The member notes the impact of the user story, draws 
the examined data flow diagrams, lists identified threats and their 
mitigations, and provides references to each output of SATMUS (the 
research spike defined during data flow analysis and the new user story and 
acceptance criteria outlined during mitigation analysis). Finally, the member 
adds a note to the initially examined user story that references the new 
document. 
Service-to-Service Password-Based Authentication 
The examined user story has the following text: 
“As a utility company, I want to authenticate the utility management software 
to relevant internal systems, so that I can protect my systems from rogue 
services. 
Acceptance criteria: 
 The utility management system provides a username and password to 
authenticate to the customer’s internal systems before every request; 
 The password needs to be protected.” 
Determine Affected Assets: The Scrum team goes over the part of the asset 
inventory relevant for them and notes that passwords, a sensitive asset in any 
system, has the highest security goal value (a 3 for the security goal of 
confidentiality). 
Examine Environment: The new code is a security control (i.e., 
authentication) and communicates with entities external to the software. The 
Scrum team grades the sensitivity of the environment as 3. 
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Calculate User Story Impact: The user story has a High impact, based on the 
formula described in Table 12. 
Obtain Expertise: The product owner contacts the internal security team to 
confirm the impact of the user story. The security team confirms the result of 
the calculation and representatives from both teams schedule a meeting 
where most of the threat modeling shall be conducted. 
Analyze Module: During the meeting, the team draws data flows on a 
whiteboard, as presented in Figure 11. They discuss the control flow and 
map the affected assets to the elements of the diagram. 
 
Figure 11 Data flows of service passwords 
The main discussion is about protecting the passwords throughout their 
lifecycle. The data flows need to be precisely mapped and understood to 
identify all threats. 
Analyze Threats: The team conducts threat identification following the 
STRIDE method. They place focus on the trust boundary between the system 
and the users (in this case, the integration administrator) and the boundary 
between the developed software and other systems (to which the solution 
authenticates). The Scrum team and the security expert perform threat 
decomposition. For each identified attack, mitigations which exist in the 
system are noted. Each unmitigated attack vector is listed for mitigation 
analysis. In the context of the analyzed user story, two threats are identified 
with unmitigated attacks. These include: 
 Information disclosure, where any user with access to the machine 
can read the password storage (passwords cannot be hashed, as they 
need to be read by the integration service and supplied to the 
customer’s systems); 
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 Repudiation, where all actions related to password manipulation need 
to be logged for security monitoring purposes. 
Specify Mitigations: The team issues two sets of outputs of the SATMUS 
analysis. The first is two additional acceptance criteria (“Log all access and 
changes to the password storage, including the identity of the action 
executor” and “Establish access control on the password storage”). The 
second is a research spike to determine how to best utilize cryptography for 
protecting passwords at rest (without the option of using hash functions). 
Document Evidence: The team selects a member to fill the regulatory 
compliance templates. The member notes the impact of the user story, draws 
the examined data flow diagrams, lists identified threats and their 
mitigations, and provides references to each output of SATMUS (the 
additional acceptance criteria and the research spike). Finally, the member 
adds a note to the initially examined user story that references the new 
document. 
4.3.3 Vendor B Case Study Analysis 
This Section illustrates the execution of SATMUS, as defined in Section 4.1 
and augmented in Section 4.2.3. Here we execute SATMUS for the user 
stories Calendar National and Religious Holidays, Employee Vacation 
Monthly Report, and Support for Electronic Payment. 
Calendar National and Religious Holidays 
The examined user story has the following text: 
“As an HR worker, I want to examine and enter national and religious 
holidays in the corporate work calendar so that I can manage employee 
vacation days. 
Acceptance criteria: 
 Introduce two types of events to the corporate work calendar 
(national holiday and religious holidays); 
 Expand event creation forms to include these types and automatically 
set them to repeat each year.” 
Determine Affected Assets: The Scrum team determines that no assets are 
affected by the user story. 
Examine Environment: The new code interacts with HR workers and is 
contained in the calendar app. It does not generate flows which cross a 
significant trust boundary. 
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Calculate User Story Impact: The user story does not introduce a security 
control and, based on the previous two activities, it is deemed as having Low 
impact. No further security analysis is conducted. 
Document Evidence: The product owner confirms orally that the user story 
does not require additional security considerations. 
Employee Vacation Monthly Report 
The examined user story has the following text: 
“As an HR worker, I want to generate monthly reports that show which 
employees have taken vacation days so that I can examine trends and aid 
planning management. 
Acceptance criteria: 
 A new report type can be selected from the generate reports menu; 
 The system creates a report according to the agreed-upon template.” 
Determine Affected Assets: The Scrum team notes that the new code will 
manipulate personal information of employees. 
Examine Environment: The new code will be called by an HR worker where 
the result of the code execution is a file which will be placed in the file 
system. 
Calculate User Story Impact: The Scrum team grades the user story as 
having Medium impact, as it works with user-supplied input and handles 
personal data. 
Analyze Module: The team draws data flows on a whiteboard, as presented 
in Figure 12. They discuss the control flow and map the personal data to the 
elements of the diagram. 
 
Figure 12 Data flows regarding employee reporting 
 
94 
Analyze Threats: The team conducts threat identification following the 
STRIDE-per-interaction method. They place particular focus on the trust 
boundary between the system and the users (in this case, the HR worker) and 
the boundary between the software and the file system. In the context of the 
analyzed user story, two threats are identified with unmitigated attacks. 
These include: 
 Information disclosure, where any user with access to the file system 
can read the reports; 
 Repudiation, where the system does not log report generation events. 
Specify Mitigations: The team issues a single output of the SATMUS 
analysis. Two additional acceptance criteria (“Log report generation events, 
including the identity of the action executor” and “Establish access control 
lists on the report storage system”). 
Document Evidence: The user story is tagged as security. 
Support for Electronic Payment 
The following user story can be considered a feature, due to the scale of the 
work which goes beyond the traditional user story scope. It has the following 
text: 
“As a buyer, I want to pay for my shipped goods through the mobile shipping 
app, so that I can quickly pay for the goods upon successful shipping. 
Acceptance criteria: 
 The in-app wallet should support Master Card and Visa wallet top-
ups; 
 The app scans QR code from shipped container to verify it is the 
correct item. 
 Upon success, the app automatically subtracts the appropriate 
amount from the wallet.” 
Determine Affected Assets: The Scrum team notes that the new code will 
manipulate payment card information and cardholder data. Although this is 
not an asset in their list, the product owner is aware that this data is sensitive 
and quickly learns about the PCI DSS (PCI, 2018). 
Examine Environment: Due to the sensitive nature of the financial functions, 
the new code will require some form of security controls, notably 
cryptography, careful auditing, and excellent access control. 
Calculate User Story Impact: The Scrum team realizes that their standard 
calculation formula does not hold for this unique feature. Due to the security 
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implications of the feature, the team sees the new development as having a 
High security impact. 
Obtain Expertise: The product owner consults with product management to 
determine the best strategy for securing the new feature. Due to the risk 
introduced by the new feature and insufficient expertise in the organization, 
the product management decides to outsource development to a third-party 
organization specialized in PCI DSS-compliant development. 
Threat Model: The team requires an up-to-date threat model of the 
externally-developed component as one of the deliverables at the start and 
end of the project. Furthermore, they request guidance for securing parts of 
their component, which interface with the externally-developed component. 
With the aid of the third-party vendor, they define new user stories. 
Document Evidence: The team archives the threat model from the third-party 
vendor and tags the user stories derived from the threat model as security. 
4.4 Process Analysis 
In this Section, we discuss the results of our work, examining the limitations 
of the SATMUS process and the implications of all the work presented in 
Chapter 4. In Section 4.4.1, we discuss the limitations of our method by 
consulting with the list of limitations that affect agile security requirements 
engineering methods as defined by Villamizar et al. (2018). In Section 4.4.2, 
we discuss the implications of the SATMUS process and how it addresses 
agile secure software engineering. 
4.4.1 Limitations 
To assess the limitations of our process, we examine the list of constraints 
determined in the systematic mapping study of agile security requirement 
engineering methods (Villamizar et al., 2018). The authors identified several 
areas of limitations, including the environment, people, effort, and resource 
investment. To this list, we add completeness, as a metric that assesses the 
degree to which a method achieves the security of a product. 
Environment limitations arise from the Scrum framework, as release cycles 
are short, making addressing of all security requirements difficult. Indeed, 
SATMUS can produce new user stories and research spikes, tasks which 
might not be included in the current sprint or even the current release cycle. 
However, while having a completely secure product might be something to 
strive towards, security is one of many sources of requirements which bring 
value to an organization. The bottom line is that if security is given sufficient 
attention, it will get implemented, but this is entirely up to the product 
management and their risk assessment. Therefore, we believe that the Scrum 
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environment does not impose limitations on security, but instead prioritizes it 
accordingly, so long as the product management is aware of the need for 
security. For this assumption to hold, it is the responsibility of every Scrum 
team member to champion security awareness and fight for higher-quality 
development. 
People limitations are related to the lack of security-related skill in the Scrum 
team. As we pointed out earlier, dedicated training is required to practice 
SATMUS efficiently. This is a limitation of our approach (because of which 
SATMUS only partially fulfills the Simplicity requirement), which can 
somewhat be mitigated by a knowledge base and tool support. 
Effort and resource limitations are concerned with the introduction of new 
roles and the overhead introduced by security requirement engineering 
methods. Furthermore, lack of guidance is listed under this category. The 
nature of SATMUS allows it to be tailored to organizations of varying 
degrees of security and agility requirements. A SATMUS implementation 
can be a lightweight process that rarely triggers significant investment of 
effort, and it can be a rigorous process that ensures that a product is secure 
by design. For example, an organization with little security requirements can 
use the calculation formula presented in Section 4.1.2, while reconfiguring 
Table 12 to produce a Medium impact output only when both axes have a 
value of 3 and a Low impact output in all other cases. Therefore, we believe 
that SATMUS introduces just enough overhead, according to the 
organization’s needs. Furthermore, no new roles are mandated by SATMUS. 
Finally, we offer significant guidance to tailor and execute SATMUS 
through this document. 
Regarding completeness, the question is can SATMUS be used as standalone 
to ensure that a product is secure. The answer is no, and this can be 
considered a limitation of our approach. SATMUS is concerned with 
translating high-level security requirements to low-level design decisions and 
implementation tasks revolving around user stories. Importantly, the quality 
of the Analyze Threats activity can significantly vary based on the expertise 
of the analysts and, depending on the investment in education, and some time 
may pass before the team can adequately identify and decompose threats. 
Importantly, SATMUS achieves a reasonably secure design only if it is 
applied to every story, through both the Definition of Ready and the 
Definition of Done, as described in Section 4.1.1. As discussed by Othmane 
and Ali (2016), frequent changes to the code and the initial design found in 
Scrum can quickly make the initial threat model obsolete. Therefore, it is 
necessary to frequently reevaluate the threat model and ensure that new 
threats are discovered and addressed. 
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Additionally, SATMUS fails to address code-level vulnerabilities, and it is 
not concerned with verifying that enough security is present in the product 
(e.g., through security and penetration testing). SATMUS is applied between 
determining high-level security requirements and implementing the code. To 
combat this limitation, we recommend that organizations utilize tools that aid 
in code-level vulnerability discovery, such as static code analysis and fuzz 
testing. Following recent trends, DevSecOps (Myrbakken and Colomo-
Palacios, 2017) should be explored to complement SATMUS. Tools 
integrated into the DevSecOps cycle help prevent code-level vulnerabilities 
and can enhance the maturity of SATMUS by supplying it with information 
on what categories of threats and attacks are not sufficiently addressed by the 
Scrum teams. Finally, penetration testing can be conducted to ensure that a 
product is resistant to attacks, though this entails hiring third-party auditors. 
4.4.2 Implications 
Throughout Chapter 4, we presented the SATMUS process, starting from the 
high-level overview and discussion about its internal activities, and moving 
on to specific adaptations of SATMUS and examples of its execution. By 
focusing SATMUS around existing development artifacts and activities (e.g., 
user stories, research spikes), we were able to design a method that is 
harmonized with Scrum development practices. Firstly, the outputs of 
SATMUS are requirements defined just like any other requirement in Scrum 
development, which can, therefore, be prioritized, verified, and validated 
following regular development practices. Secondly, the requirement for new 
knowledge and expertise in the Scrum team is limited to the Analyze Threats 
activity. However, this is not an insignificant requirement, as the quality of 
Analyze Threats activity significantly affects the security of the product. The 
investment in security education and tools directly correlates to the 
efficiency and value of threat identification and decomposition, as well as 
appropriate mitigation planning. Based on the experience with Vendor A and 
B (described in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3), a good strategy is to start with the 
basic threat analysis (e.g., STRIDE threat discovery with no additional 
decomposition) and build on that over time. 
Another benefit of tying the SATMUS process to the user story’s definition 
of ready is that it guarantees that the threat model will be incrementally 
updated, reflecting the design changes that can be frequent in agile 
development. On the one hand, this avoids the common problem with design 
documentation in agile development, where the initial design is created and 
then quickly becomes deprecated and forgotten (Prause and Durdik, 2012). 
As teams define the structure of their threat model (e.g., a series of photos of 
the whiteboard, a sophisticated model using a tool), they can maintain agility 
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while incrementally updating the security view of their components. On the 
other hand, this allows the team to quickly produce a body of evidence for 
security assurance, requiring negligible effort to compile the report when the 
client or third-party requires it. 
The SATMUS process enables the security analysis and threat modeling of 
the developed software in the Scrum development workflow. It requires 
some investment to understand, integrate into the environment, adapt it to 
maximize efficiency, usability, and value, and finally roll out on the whole 
organization, providing training and aid where necessary. For this initial 
investment, SATMUS requires a champion which will drive its adoption and 
continuously improve its quality. Once installed, SATMUS produces just 
enough overhead to the development teams to make sure they adequately 
address the security of the product, while maintaining both their agility and 
efficiency. 
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5 Discussion 
In this Chapter, we combine the work presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and 
discuss how to integrate it into the agile development workflow to build 
teams that can efficiently perform security design analysis. Supported by the 
SDA Training Framework and the SATMUS process, development teams 
incrementally construct a secure software design, from the high-level system 
architecture to the low-level code design. While the SATMUS process 
provides the basic structure for the analysis, the SDA Training Framework 
enhances its quality and supports its continuous improvement. 
In Section 5.1, we examine the integration and use of both the SDA Training 
Framework and the SATMUS process into the agile development process. 
Here we explain how organizations can adopt these two methods to introduce 
efficient SDA into their workflow. We examine how our work expands the 
responsibilities of the traditional Scrum roles, how it interacts with the key 
Scrum events, and how the application of our methods in individual Scrum 
teams can achieve the security of the product developed across multiple 
teams. Section 5.2 demonstrates how our work compares to well-established 
security development lifecycle approaches. Here we map our methods to the 
different phases and practices of these SDLs and discuss how our methods, 
that focus on security requirements and design, interact with the rest of the 
SDL. 
5.1 SDA Training Framework and SATMUS in 
Agile 
The SATMUS process enables incremental security design analysis by 
examining new user stories and building upon the existing threat model of 
the developed product. When the Scrum team is adept in SATMUS and is 
starting a new project, the continuous application of SATMUS builds a 
product that is secure by design. The issue is introducing SATMUS to a 
Scrum team that lacks knowledge in SDA and is in the middle of developing 
a product. Introducing SATMUS to such a context requires both training the 
Scrum team members how to perform SDA and constructing a baseline 
threat model for the existing product, which SATMUS can then build upon. 
The SDA Training Framework is used to accomplish both goals and to 
continuously improve the SATMUS process by enhancing the SDA 
knowledge of the Scrum team. In Section 5.1.1, we describe the process of 
the initial adoption of the SDA Training Framework and SATMUS process, 
noting how the different Scrum roles participate in the adoption process. In 
Section 5.1.2, we describe areas for continuous improvement. Here we 
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examine how the SDA Training Framework aids in the continual 
development of knowledge and expertise, how the SATMUS process can be 
optimized in individual teams, and how the SATMUS process should be 
supplemented in larger organizations, to achieve adequate security across the 
developed product. 
5.1.1 Initial Adoption 
Organizations can integrate efficient SDA into their workflow by combining 
the SDA Training Framework with the SATMUS process. Figure 13 
illustrates the process of integrating SDA to an organization’s agile 
development workflow by using our methods. For each activity, we note the 
role that drives the activity (on the left-hand side of the activity), as well as 
any other roles that require significant involvement (on the right-hand side of 
the activity). 
 
Figure 13 Adoption of the SATMUS process and SDA Training Framework 
To start the process, the business owner must assign security champions to 
drive the adoption and development of the SDA Training Framework and 
SATMUS process. The security champion is an informal role that must 
possess a certain level of security knowledge that they can distribute onto the 
organization through the SDA Training Framework. They can be internally 
built, for example by using senior developers that have performed security 
work during their career and are knowledgeable about the subject, or they 
can be externally hired, as domain experts. 
The security champions utilize the SDA Training Framework described in 
Chapter 3 with one crucial difference – they do not build the case studies and 
instead select them from the products in development. With the aid of the 
business owner, they select a suitable product for the case study and note the 
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Scrum teams involved in its development. The security champions select the 
SDA method that they wish to use as part of the SATMUS process, based on 
both the selected case study and the needs of the organization. While the 
SDA method is the most complicated aspect of the SATMUS process, 
champions need to consider the whole process when constructing the 
workshops. Importantly, SATMUS tailoring must be completed to include 
the final process in the training workshops. Champions should consult with 
the product owners of the selected Scrum teams and the business owners to 
determine: 
 Inventories of affected assets for each Scrum team, based on the 
security requirements for the product; 
 The rigor of the calculation formula, based on the risk tolerance of 
the organization; 
 The suitable evidence structure, based on the security assurance 
requirements of the organization; 
 Investments for tools to support SDA and strategies related to 
obtaining expertise for high impact development. 
Next, the security champions determine the relevant security concepts and 
create preparatory materials in the form suitable for the organization. For 
example, if an organization uses an internal e-learning platform, the 
champions can record lectures detailing the security concepts for easy 
distribution and reuse. 
With a defined SATMUS process, the constructed preparatory materials, and 
a realistic and relevant case study, the security champions can construct the 
training workshops. At this stage, champions should consider the different 
roles in the Scrum team, as each role has a different part to play in 
SATMUS. The product owner must be aware of the purpose of the process, 
how to manage the related asset inventory, and how to handle and prioritize 
the outputs of SATMUS. The Scrum master must be aware of the general 
flow of the process. Their goal is to facilitate the efficient execution of 
SATMUS by recognizing when development team members require better 
SDA training and tools and communicating these issues with the business 
owner. Furthermore, Scrum masters can utilize the Scrum of Scrums to 
coordinate SDA across multiple teams when the need arises, as discussed in 
Section 4.1.2, Analyze Module. Finally, the development team requires a 
deep understanding of SATMUS and the underlying SDA method. On the 
one hand, it enables them to define a secure design, and on the other, it 
guides their security code review and testing activities, as described in 
Section 5.2.3. Therefore, most of the workshops should be directed towards 
the development team. 
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Additionally, the security champions should structure the workshops for 
specific Scrum teams, focusing on the part of the case study relevant for that 
team. Depending on the product, one team might be focused on web 
application development, while another might produce code that solely 
works with databases and data stores, which is why effort is required to 
increase relevance for the Scrum team members. 
Importantly, the workshops should be designed with two goals in mind. The 
first goal is to train the Scrum teams on how to conduct SATMUS, focusing 
on the SDA activities conducted by the development team. The second goal 
is to kickstart the creation of the baseline threat model that the team can use 
and expand as the product expands. Once the workshops are prepared, the 
champions can administer them to the Scrum teams. Through these 
workshops, the baseline threat model for the Scrum team can be started or 
even completed. While it might contain only the first elementary set of 
threats (e.g., high-level STRIDE threats), constructing the baseline is a 
necessary first step (Tarandach, 2019) which can then be expanded as the 
Scrum team becomes more knowledgeable about the subject. 
As with most security-related initiatives, several crucial prerequisites that 
must be addressed to ensure the successful integration of SDA into the 
development workflow. First, the top-level management needs to clearly 
state their support for SDA and the implementation project surrounding it. 
Secondly, everyone taking part in SDA, from the product owner to the 
Scrum master, must be aware of their responsibilities. Finally, care and 
patience must be practiced, and steps need to be carefully considered to gain 
buy-in from the development teams and minimize the risk of their aversion 
to SDA. 
5.1.2 Continuous Improvement 
Once the Scrum teams are familiar with the SATMUS process, they can look 
for areas where they can optimize the process and adapt it to better suit their 
workflow and bring higher value to the organization. The primary candidates 
for continuous improvement include: 
 The SDA knowledge and expertise of the development teams; 
 The details of the SATMUS process; 
 The security of the developed product. 
The quality of the SDA, and in turn, the security of the product, rely heavily 
on the expertise of the analysts performing the security design analysis. 
Therefore, an ongoing cost for the organization practicing SDA is the 
construction of new workshops through the SDA Training Framework. 
Introducing new workshops can be the responsibility of the internal security 
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team (if one is available) or the informal team of security champions. They 
need to research the changing threat landscape and distribute the new 
relevant knowledge to the development teams. 
Following the example of the case study organization presented in Section 
4.3.3, team members can attend external security workshops or conferences 
and use the knowledge they obtained to construct internal workshops through 
the SDA Training Framework. Likewise, Scrum teams might obtain security 
knowledge through their regular work, where the organization can benefit if 
this knowledge is distributed. The Scrum masters need to communicate and 
share this information with other Scrum masters and collaborate with the 
business owner to facilitate the investment in new workshops. 
Finally, the organization can hire external domain experts to perform security 
audits, where the vulnerabilities and design flaws discovered during the audit 
serve as valuable input for new educational workshops. Furthermore, the 
domain experts can help prepare the workshops by providing knowledge, 
preparatory materials, and advice. 
Regardless of the source of new knowledge and workshops, Scrum teams 
need to reevaluate their threat models every time they obtain new knowledge 
through the workshop. When aided by threat analysis tools, Scrum teams 
should examine their threat models with each major update of the attack 
pattern library, to ensure that the model is in line with the actual threat 
landscape. 
The next area for improvement is related to the details of the SATMUS 
process. The teams might wish to modify SATMUS and tailor it to the way 
they practice Scrum development. Importantly, any team-level changes to the 
SATMUS process should not harm the general strategy of the organization 
regarding SATMUS, and reasonable justification must be provided for each 
such change. The internal security team or the security champions that 
introduced SATMUS can assess the justification provided by the team for 
the change and consult the business owner. While teams might wish to 
modify the SATMUS process itself, they also might wish to modify how it 
interacts with their Scrum development. For example, the team might collect 
all user stories with medium or high impact and collectively analyze them 
when grooming the sprint backlog. 
Notably, when teams develop a more efficient version of SATMUS, they 
should push for changes across the organization through the business owner 
or Scrum of Scrums event. Additionally, the organization should consider 
developing internal tools to support their version of SATMUS, automating 
whatever is possible and integrating it into their build cycles where 
appropriate. 
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The final area for improvement is tied to the goal of SDA, which is the 
construction of a secure software product. While a single Scrum team that is 
trained using the SDA Training Framework and following the SATMUS 
process might hope to secure their part of the product, additional effort is 
required to coordinate the security of the complete product. This 
responsibility might be delegated to the internal security team, but for 
organizations that lack such resources, the Scrum teams need to coordinate to 
implement security efficiently and achieve product-wide security assurance. 
Baca et al. (2015) point out that the underlying issue with integrating agile 
methods and security is that individual teams are not familiar with the details 
of the complete product. As security is often a cross-cutting concern, the 
efficient way to introduce security controls into the software is to build them 
into its infrastructure components. The less efficient alternative is to 
introduce the same security controls to multiple higher-level components, 
increasing maintenance cost and the possibility of developer error. However, 
for individual Scrum teams, it might not be obvious when integrating a 
security control is their responsibility, and when it might be offloaded to 
other teams. To remedy this, the Scrum master should communicate these 
issues during the Scrum of Scrums event. Another issue is that a security 
control might not fit into the infrastructure initially, but over time as the 
system evolves, this might become the preferred option. Rindell and Holvitie 
(2019) mark this type of issue as technical debt, where the software needs to 
be redesigned, and the code refactored to increase its quality. 
5.2 SDA Training Framework and SATMUS in the 
SDL 
The security of a software product requires the application of various 
security activities throughout the product’s development lifecycle. Secure 
software engineering entails far more than SDA, from secure coding and 
testing to security management of both regular development and issues found 
in production. 
While the SDA Training Framework and SATMUS aid with security 
requirements engineering and secure design construction, they also interact 
with other practices of the security development lifecycle. Here we examine 
how our work integrates into the SDL defined by Microsoft (Howard and 
Lipner, 2006) and the IEC organization (IEC, 2018a). Notably, the SATMUS 
process directly maps to segments of both SDLs concerned with threat 
modeling and security design analysis, as discussed in Sections 1.3.1 and 
2.2.3. Likewise, the SDA Training Framework maps to the provide training 
practice, described by Microsoft, and the security expertise required by the 
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IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard. Both practices require that personnel receive 
adequate security-related training for their job role, which aligns with the 
goal of the SDA Training Framework. 
We further explore these SDLs to determine practices with which our work 
interacts and discuss the nature of that interaction. In Section 5.2.1, we 
examine how security requirements serve as valuable input for the SATMUS 
process and the SDA Training Framework. In Section 5.2.2, we discuss how 
secure design concepts, such as security design patterns and secure design 
principles, can be built into our work. Section 5.2.3 describes how our work 
guides secure implementation and testing activities. Finally, in Section 5.2.4, 
we detail how our work answers the requirements related to security 
management. 
5.2.1 Security Requirements 
Microsoft’s define security requirements practice entails the specification of 
both explicit and quality security requirements (as defined in Section 1.3.2) 
that arise from regulatory compliance, internal quality standards, reviews of 
previous incidents, and known threats. The IEC 62443-4-1:2018 (IEC, 
2018a) specifies a similar set of security requirements sources in its 
specification of security requirements practice. In addition to these sources, 
we add stakeholders (possibly aided by security consultants), internal Scrum 
teams, and threat intelligence services as a source for quality security 
requirements. 
Security requirements are a crucial input for the SATMUS process. One goal 
of SDA is to map explicit security requirements onto the developed software, 
and another is to decompose quality security requirements into actionable 
work items. For SATMUS, both types of security requirements are mapped 
to assets, either explicitly or implicitly. Depending on the tailoring decisions, 
the asset inventory can include traceability between the assets and the 
security requirements (Luburić et al., 2018b). 
Security requirements are likewise an essential input for the SDA Training 
Framework. When a software vendor acquires a project that entails 
compliance with a new security standard, the workshop constructors must 
examine the standard to determine the relevant security concepts and the 
appropriate SDA method. From this information, they can construct 
preparatory materials and the set of workshops to train the development 
teams. 
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5.2.2 Secure Design 
Regarding secure design, Microsoft proposes a practice to establish design 
requirements, where the goal is to determine organization-wide 
implementations of security design patterns (Yoshioka et al., 2008; Uzunov 
et al., 2012). Developers can then use these implementations instead of 
building their security controls. 
Security design patterns present mature solutions for a class of problems, 
much like software design patterns. Security design patterns, like 
authorization and secure communication, mitigate a class of vulnerabilities 
and attacks. A security design pattern can be more abstract (e.g., 
authorization) or more concrete (e.g., role-based access control), forming a 
hierarchy, where an abstract pattern can have multiple children in the form of 
concrete designs that can be translated into code (Uzunov et al., 2012). For 
example, input validation is a pattern that has specific implementations for 
preventing SQL Injection (i.e., prepared statements), XSS (i.e., input 
validation paired with output encoding), and buffer overflows. 
The IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard requires that all development teams 
conduct design activities following security design principles (Saltzer and 
Schroeder, 1975; Ross et al., 2016). While security design patterns present 
solutions for a class of problems, security design principles do not address a 
specific set of problems and are instead applicable for most problems and 
solutions. They serve as guidelines for all design activities. For example, the 
principle of least privilege states that each entity should have privileges to 
accomplish its specified functions and no more. While conceptually simple, 
adherence to this principle can require significant additional development. 
The apparent restriction is to reduce active permissions of user roles to the 
functions that are required by such roles, but additional consideration can 
reveal that the time-frame when a function should be available to the user 
can also be defined. When paired with the principle of complete mediation, 
this type of access restriction should be applied across the whole system, 
including application-level access, OS-level access, and potentially physical 
access. 
Both security design patterns and principles serve as valuable input for the 
SDA Training Framework and the SATMUS process. The patterns and 
principles are essential security concepts that must be addressed by the 
workshops created using the SDA Training Framework. They can be covered 
indirectly, as part of a workshop that examines some aspect of SDA, or even 
directly, where the workshop’s focus is on a set of patterns or principles. By 
examining least privilege, a workshop can be constructed to explore the 
different areas of the case study and define how privileges can be restricted 
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to enable the standard business functionality and nothing else. SATMUS 
directly employs both patterns and principles, as the goal of SDA is to 
produce a secure design that fulfills the security requirements, which can 
only be accomplished by utilizing security design patterns and adhering to 
security design principles (Ross et al., 2016). 
5.2.3 Secure Implementation and Security Verification 
Secure implementation practices, as defined by the examined SDLs, include 
the application of static code analysis tools and security-focused code 
reviews to ensure compliance with the secure coding standard and that no 
code-level vulnerabilities are introduced to the developed software. These 
practices look for flawed code design and use of insecure constructs that an 
attacker might exploit. 
While code-level security is a requirement for secure software in general, it 
is especially important in the sensitive areas of the code, which includes code 
exposed to a large attack surface and code that manipulates critical assets. As 
SATMUS examines both the assets and the environment for all new 
development, it identifies sensitive code as medium or high impact user 
stories. Therefore, SATMUS can guide security code reviews and define 
areas of the code that require more effort to examine. For example, 
SATMUS can generate an acceptance criterion, where a team-wide code 
review must be conducted for the code implementing a particular user story. 
Regarding the SDA Training Framework, vulnerable code constructs, not 
aligned with the secure coding standard, should be included in the 
preparatory materials and utilized during the workshop assignments, to 
enrich the learning experience and include both secure design and secure 
implementation learning objectives. 
Security testing is a broad area that includes practices related to the 
functional testing of security controls, the security testing of functional 
controls, and penetration testing. While the SDA Training Framework has no 
significant interaction with the security testing practices, the SATMUS 
process can guide security testing activities, in a similar way to the security 
code reviews. For example, SATMUS can define an acceptance criterion for 
a user story which states that fuzz testing should be conducted on a specific 
set of endpoints and that all significant vulnerabilities are resolved. 
5.2.4 Security Management 
Security management is concerned with, among other things, ensuring that 
security is sufficiently addressed across the product development lifecycle. 
As the goal of the SDL is to produce demonstrably more secure software, 
security management is concerned with achieving and maintaining this 
 
108 
security assurance. As pointed out by Vivas et al. (2011), the security 
assurance case is built by using mature SDL procedures and extracting from 
their execution the evidence and argumentation needed to support the 
assurance case and to reasonably prove the software is secure. Importantly, if 
any part of the product proves insecure even with a well-developed case, it is 
crucial to understand why this happened and how these issues can be avoided 
in the future (Goodenough et al., 2007). The IEC 62443-4-1:2018 standard 
(IEC, 2018a) requires continuous improvement as part of the security 
management practice to address these issues. 
The SATMUS process is flexible enough to support rigorous security 
analysis, depending on the context. By using the user story as the input for 
SATMUS, we ensure that all new development undergoes security 
examination. A vital prerequisite for satisfactory SDA is adequate training on 
the subject, and the SDA Training Framework is built to support that. The 
SDA Training Framework and the SATMUS process interact with each other 
to enhance the security work and provide continuous improvement. As the 
threat landscape changes, new workshops can be constructed and any 
significant changes to this landscape should trigger a reevaluation of the 
existing threat models. 
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6 Conclusion 
Vulnerabilities in wide-spread hardware, operating systems, and 
applications, are making headlines daily and news about massive data 
breaches and successful hacks are only slightly less frequent. Software 
security is becoming a leading concern in the developed world, and much 
effort is put into building security into software during its development. 
Throughout this work, we have focused on security design analysis, a cost-
efficient practice concerned with security requirements engineering and 
secure design construction for the developed software. SDA examines a 
software’s design and contrasts it with its functional and security 
requirements to determine enhancements required to make a more secure 
software product. This analysis is applied from the macro-level of the 
complete software architecture to the micro-level of software features and 
code design to achieve defense in depth of the developed product. 
Specifically, we examined how the leading SDA methods interacted with 
modern agile software development practices and discovered issues that 
hamper the adoption of SDA to the agile workflow. Notably, we discovered 
that SDA is both difficult to teach and learn, resulting in its inefficient 
practice and abandonment by development teams. Furthermore, we found 
incompatibility issues between traditional SDA methods and the 
contemporary software development processes, specifically those following 
the Scrum framework. Based on this research, we defined the following 
research questions: 
RQ 1. How to efficiently train Scrum teams to perform security design 
analysis? 
RQ 2. How to efficiently integrate security design analysis into Scrum 
development, providing the appropriate security assurance and 
visibility of security work? 
From these, we formulated a hypothesis that guided our work: 
 It is possible for a Scrum team to practice security design analysis 
throughout a software’s development lifecycle, assuring that 
sufficient security is built into the software solution, provided that: 
o Adequate training is provided to the Scrum team to perform 
security design analysis efficiently. 
o The security design analysis is compatible with the Scrum 
development process, does not require the introduction of new 
roles to the team, and does not mandate the construction of 
heavyweight documentation. 
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o Security work is tangible and can be planned and prioritized 
like any other work item. 
o Enough guidance and knowledge exist to adopt, use, and 
adapt the method to a specific organization’s context. 
Section 6.1 highlights the contributions of this thesis, which can be grouped 
around the SDA Training Framework and the SATMUS process, as well as 
their interconnection. In Section 6.2, we examine further research and 
development opportunities. 
6.1 Contributions of the Thesis 
To address the first question, we inspected various approaches that have 
found success in teaching secure software engineering. While our primary 
goal was not to make a comprehensive catalog, Section 2.1 does provide a 
useful map of different teaching approaches for this domain, grouped around 
gamification, case study analysis, e-learning, and the hybrid flipped 
classroom. 
From this analysis, we constructed the SDA Training Framework, as a 
structure for constructing educational workshops that have the learning goal 
of training developers on how to perform SDA. We combined the case study 
analysis and hybrid flipped classroom teaching methods and enhanced them 
with gamification and e-learning techniques, to construct labs that produce 
better learning outcomes when compared to the traditional classroom. 
Chapter 3 described the framework in detail, from its structure to the process 
of its use. To guide the use of the framework, we demonstrated the 
generation of six labs at a medium level of detail and examined the 
construction of a single lab in great detail. A minor contribution is the 
resulting set of labs, grouped around the STRIDE SDA method and hospital 
information system case study, described in the same Chapter. Near the end 
of the Chapter, we presented the controlled experiment and observational 
evaluations that proved that the labs formulated through the SDA Training 
Framework achieve better learning outcomes than traditional labs. 
Throughout Section 2.2, we examined SDA methods used in the industry, as 
well as those proposed by the scientific community and contrasted these with 
process requirements issued by contemporary standards for security 
development lifecycles. Albeit incomplete, this knowledge base can help 
practitioners examine other SDA approaches to find a suitable candidate for 
their organization as well as highlight issues that might arise with these 
methods and SDA in general. 
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We defined the SATMUS process to address the second question. By 
examining applicability issues with proposed SDA approaches and SDA 
process requirements imposed by agile development and well-established 
SDLs, we have conceptualized a process that offers the security assurance 
provided by SDA, while being compatible with agile development practices. 
Throughout Chapter 4, we demonstrated the internals of our process, 
provided guidance for its use and tailoring. We evaluated SATMUS on two 
case study implementations, describing the tailoring decisions for both 
contexts, and illustrating the execution of the two instances of SATMUS on 
several user stories, offering further guidance. 
With both research questions answered, we described how to combine our 
methods to integrate software security design analysis into the agile 
development process throughout Chapter 5. Here we also discussed how to 
integrate our methods into the well-established SDL processes and how our 
methods help answer some of the requirements imposed by SDL standards. 
To summarize, the primary contributions of this thesis include: 
 The definition of the SDA Training Framework and its enhancement, 
including guidance for its execution. The SDA Training Framework 
enables the generation of laboratory exercises for teaching SDA that 
achieve better learning outcomes than traditional labs. 
 The definition of the SATMUS process, including guidance for its 
execution and tailoring. SATMUS enables the incremental 
development of threat models as the software changes, where 
organizations can tailor the process according to their needs, to define 
and prioritize security work accordingly. 
 Instructions for integrating both the SDA Training Framework and 
SATMUS process to introduce SDA into the agile development 
workflow, construct the baseline threat models, and set up the 
foundation for the continuous improvement of SDA. 
Minor contributions, which arose as a byproduct of the research, include: 
 A catalog of approaches for teaching secure software engineering 
practices. 
 A knowledge base of SDA techniques, requirements for these 
techniques, and their related issues. 
 A set of laboratory exercises with the accompanying case study that 
can be used as part of a university course or a corporate training 
workshop. 
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Considering these contributions, we confirm the central hypothesis and meet 
all the introduced goals and expected results of this research. 
6.2 Future Work 
Importantly, SDA is not a standalone method that achieves complete 
software security. It plays a significant role in an array of security practices 
and interacts with other security requirements engineering techniques and 
secure coding practices. The threat models constructed and addressed by 
SDA need to undergo security verification and validation to ensure the 
implementation adheres to the model, and all these activities require 
management and continuous improvement. For genuinely comprehensive 
defense in depth, many more practices need to be implemented and 
integrated to produce an agile security development lifecycle. 
With this integration in mind, a natural expansion for the work presented 
here is the development of a supporting tool which can automate parts of the 
SDA Training Framework and SATMUS process. Such a tool must offer 
forms and graphical editors for assisting development teams in performing 
SDA. For full integration and traceability, the tool needs to integrate with 
commonly used software development management tools, such as 
requirements and user story repositories, code review assistants, and bug 
tracking tools. 
Traceability between different practices of secure software engineering 
remains an open issue, and this presents several avenues for further research. 
On the one hand, research and development can be aimed at defining 
methods and tools that examine the threat model and ensure that the code 
implements the mitigations defined by it. On the other hand, mapping the 
security requirements from standards and regulations to threat models can 
aid with formal security assurance. The issue here arises from the distributed 
nature of threat models produced through SATMUS. A structure that 
integrates threat models produced by the development teams into a product-
level threat model is required to demonstrate security assurance formally. 
Another related open issue is assessing the quality of threat models, where 
contemporary methods do not provide a comprehensive way to determine if 
all the critical threats were identified, let alone decomposed sufficiently. 
Methods for risk analysis that consider the completeness of the model, along 
with the likelihood and impact of threats can be examined to address these 
issues. 
Security design analysis is a cost-efficient method for discovering 
vulnerabilities and design flaws early in the software’s development and 
before they are introduced to the code. It is one of the core pillars of secure 
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software engineering, which is why organizations must integrate it correctly 
into their workflow. This integration is not easy and requires dedicated 
security champions to build the security awareness and starting expertise 
required to perform it effectively. Unlike secure coding, that can be 
significantly aided by mature static code analysis tools, SDA is a more 
sophisticated practice that lacks adequate tool support. This thesis aids 
practitioners and security champions in introducing SDA into their 
organization and offers researchers a baseline on which they can build tools 
and methods for enhancing secure software engineering practices. 
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